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Among the challenges confronting U.S. healthcare are improved quality and 
safety, greater efficiencies, and increased rivalry among competitors. Against the 
backdrop of technological advancements, shifts in market dynamics, and organizational 
restructuring, hospitals are likely to adopt clinical service line specialization as a 
competitive strategy. 
The purpose of the research was to determine if general, community hospitals 
show evidence of specializing within the nation‘s six highest volume, highest revenue-
generating service lines and to identify market and organizational factors correlating with 
such a strategy. 
The study used a retrospective, non-experimental, correlational design to analyze 
secondary 2003-2007 data of hospitals throughout Florida, Virginia, and Nevada. 
  
Simultaneous regression and subsequently backward deletion, stepwise regression 
modeling was applied to analyze cross-sectional relationships between descriptive 
variables of markets and hospital organizations, as well as state as a covariate, and five 
selected measures of specialization. Six leading service lines were selected for study: 
cardiac surgery, cardiology, invasive cardiology, orthopedics, labor and delivery, and 
pulmonary services. 
Results indeed show evidence of specialization among the top six service lines. 
There are, however, different characteristics supporting such evidence in each service 
line and thus variation from one line to the next. While this research is considered 
exploratory in nature, findings suggest that the general, community hospital, traditionally 
a full-service provider of a wide range of costly and complex services, may be 
undergoing transformations including specialization. 
This study demonstrates the usefulness of examining service lines separately 
when assessing specialization. Complex differences among states may exist. There was 
no evidence from the sub-analysis of hospitals of specialization due to cluster effect. 
At least six policy issues surface to warrant the need for further investigation: (a) 
source of hospital admission and drivers of physician referral patterns; (b) potential 
usefulness of case studies in studying service line strategies; (c) localized analysis of 
variations by state; (d) usefulness of studying specialization at the service line level; (e) 
loss of choice in access for labor and delivery as a service line; and (f) further analysis of 
hospital size as an important variable in its influence on strategic choices by hospitals. 
 
  1 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Overview 
Among the many challenges confronting the U.S. healthcare industry are three 
major trends impacting strategic choices of the general, community hospital: (a) demand 
for improved hospital quality and safety, (b) the need for greater efficiencies to curb 
spiraling costs, and (c) increased rivalry among locally competing hospitals. Hospitals 
face these challenges against the backdrop of recent technological advancements, shifts in 
market dynamics, and organizational restructuring including the formation of hospitals 
into clusters. The latter is especially important given that clusters provide the 
administrative structures within which local systems are able to respond to external 
pressures by negotiating and facilitating service restructuring among member hospitals. 
Collectively, these changes and challenges are likely to encourage general, community 
hospitals to adopt clinical service line specialization as a competitive strategy. 
Specialization is also of interest because of the longstanding influence specialty 
physicians have historically exerted on inpatient services, referrals to hospitals and 
consequently hospital investments. 
The purpose of the research is to determine if general, community hospitals show 
evidence of specializing specifically within the nation‘s six highest volume, highest 
revenue-generating service lines and to identify factors that correlate with such a strategy.
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Specialization by general, community hospitals is important because of the vital role 
these hospitals have played in the delivery of healthcare across America. Although the 
general, community hospital is widely considered the cornerstone of acute care delivery 
in the United States, sweeping changes are pushing the sector to rethink the traditional 
concept that every general hospital must provide the full range of diagnostics, medical 
care, and surgical services to meet the broad needs of the community it serves (Shi & 
Singh, 2004). The research seeks to observe whether general, community hospitals 
modify their delivery models in order to compete more effectively in their markets. While 
several theoretical arguments can be offered to explain why they might do this, little 
research has applied these perspectives to the study of specialization by general, 
community hospitals as they operate within the current, often turbulent environment.   
Although there is more than one way to define and measure hospital 
specialization, this study defines it as a hospital‘s disproportionate servicing of cases 
within selected service lines. The top six lines, as defined by volume of inpatient 
discharges and charges generated, are selected because they represent areas where 
general, community hospitals are likely to invest in service restructuring. These six also 
offer the opportunity to assess hospital strategy in delivering inpatient care for widely 
prevalent, chronic conditions, as well as high demand, acute care cases. Based on 
national statistics from aggregate hospital charges as a measure of revenue-generating 
potential and case volumes in 2007, the top six service lines selected for study are:  
(a) labor and delivery, (b) pulmonary services, (c) cardiology, (d) cardiac surgery, (e) 
orthopedics, and (f) invasive cardiology. The research will examine the relationship 
  
3 
between measures of hospital specialization in each of these selected service lines and 
various market and organizational characteristics.  
Purpose and Goals of the Research 
The purpose of the research is to determine if general, community hospitals show 
evidence of specializing in the nation‘s six highest volume, highest revenue-generating 
service lines and, if so, to examine which identifiable organizational and local market 
characteristics are associated with such specialization. The drivers discussed above and 
other factors provide the backdrop for this study. The first step is to measure hospital 
specialization. Alternative measurement strategies will be assessed for their usefulness in 
studying specialization within general, community hospitals. The second step is to 
identify possible correlates of specialization. It is expected that particular market factors 
and organizational characteristics will be associated with general, community hospital 
specialization in high volume, high revenue-generating service lines. A last step will be 
to assess specialization within hospital clusters (local hospitals under common 
ownership), under the assumption that gains in specialization by one cluster member 
could be offset by losses in others.   
This introductory chapter is organized into the following eight sections:  
(a) examination of the historical context for the development and expansion of the 
general community hospital, followed by a discussion of how growth in the number of 
specialty physicians has shaped the development of the general, community hospital; (b) 
assessment of some of the most important influences in recent decades that have brought 
change to the hospital sector (e.g., growth in medical technology, shifts in market 
  
4 
dynamics, and organizational restructuring); (c) introduction of three additional important 
trends that may have been driving hospitals to pursue specialization in recent years; 
(d) rationalization for why general, community hospitals might focus internally on 
inpatient service lines in making strategic choices about specialization; (e) theoretical 
argumentation that supports hospital specialization as a competitive strategy;  
(f) introduction of the research issues this study will address in studying hospital 
specialization; (g) summation of the methodology to be used; and (h) discussion of the 
potential significance of the research.  
This study offers a number of potentially important policy-related benefits:  
(a) applying alternative measures of service line specialization; (b) highlighting the roles 
of organizational and market factors in hospital specialization; (c) shedding light on 
whether general, community hospitals are, as a competitive response to rival threats, 
modifying their historical, general hospital model of delivering a broad, even duplicative, 
array of services to the community; and (d) examining the possible role cluster formation 
might play in rationalizing clinical capacities across clustered hospital members. 
Specialization, of course, leads to a loss of choice among hospitals for inpatient care and 
to the need for inter-organizational coordination to ensure that physically separated 
facilities collectively function as holistic systems of delivery. Loss of choice thus 
represents a dimension of the policy implications associated with specialization. Should 
the study produce limited findings, they may imply that specialization is restrained by 
inertia and resistance grounded in historic expectations for professional and institutional 
autonomy and long-held assumptions about the traditional functioning of general, 
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community hospitals. Nevertheless, the contributions of specialization toward improved 
efficiencies and quality could be significant, suggesting that continued research in this 
area is still very much needed in order to inform and complement policy making.  
Historical Background 
Development and Expansion of the General, Community Hospital in the United States 
The earliest general, community hospitals were voluntary, supported by local 
philanthropy, and often established by influential physicians. Between 1840 and 1900, 
hospitals in the United States underwent a dramatic transformation, mostly from 
supplying food, shelter and comfort to the sick and poor to broadly providing skilled 
medical and surgical attention and nursing to all people in a community (Raffel, 1980). 
Institutionalization of medical care advanced in conjunction with three forces: (a) 
technological discovery, such as anesthesia for performing surgery, (b) the emergence of 
physician power and prestige, and (c) the advancement of urbanization (Haglund & 
Dowling, 1993; Martensen, 1996). Growth in surgical volume, largely accompanied by 
techniques in anesthesia, provided justification to expand the number of hospital beds, 
and hospitals grew in size and number well into the 20th century (Roemer, 1961). Once 
medical education became science-based, its laboratory and clinical instruction tied the 
teaching of physicians to hospitals as institutions for medical education (Anderson, 
1990). As science progressed, advanced medical training became established, resulting in 
professional specialization that has remained a hallmark of American medicine. In turn, 
professional specialties influenced clinical service line investment and expansion by 
hospitals, especially in urban areas, where physicians trained and practiced. 
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In the first decade following World War II, the government assumed a central role 
in the country‘s healthcare through the funding of four major programs, which exerted 
lasting, transformational effects on the healthcare system‘s structure and support. The 
programs were: (a) funding for medical research through congressional appropriations to 
the newly created National Institutes of Health (NIH), (b) funding for hospital and 
medical care for war veterans through the Veteran‘s Administration, (c) funding for 
mental health, and (d) funding for community hospital constructions initiated with the 
1946 Hill-Burton Act. Administration of all four programs demonstrates a common 
pattern of respecting the sovereignty of both medical professionals and local medical 
institutions (Starr, 1982). This single factor – the preservation of autonomy/ institutional 
sovereignty – allowed doctors and hospitals to share broadly in the postwar expansion of 
the healthcare system without regulatory interference and fueled the growing influence of 
specialty physicians on their local, community hospitals. 
Three structural elements in the early second half of the 20th century contributed 
to the rise in specialization in medicine and growth in the breadth of services within 
general, community hospitals. These were: (a) an absence of regulation governing the 
number and geographical distribution of physicians entering a specialty, (b) the presence 
of financial incentives for individuals trained in medical and surgical specialties, and (c) 
the more rapid development of insurance covering hospital services as opposed to office 
services, thereby encouraging doctors to move into hospital-oriented specialties instead 
of office-based primary care (Starr, 1982).  
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The enactment of Medicare in 1965 provided a huge boost both for physician 
specialists and general, community hospitals. Medicare Part A covered the cost of 
hospitalization for the elderly and disabled, while Medicare Part B provided government 
subsidized, voluntary insurance to cover bills from physicians. Although community 
hospitals were largely constructed with the financing of local hospital bonds, federal 
monies for Medicare payments reimbursed hospital costs including depreciation. This 
revenue stream provided new capital for expansion. The hospitals with the largest, newest 
and most expensive facilities received the highest reimbursements because their  
non-cash, depreciation expense was higher than the depreciation expense of older, 
smaller hospitals (Starr, 1982). Meanwhile, physicians were paid by Medicare based on 
what were termed ―prevailing‖ fees, and higher payments were made for identical 
services performed in a hospital versus an office (Blumberg, 1979). 
Therefore, not only were physician incomes higher for those specialties that 
performed the most procedures in hospitals, this distorted pricing generally favored 
inpatient services. These biases produced overuse of hospital care and encouraged even 
more doctors to enter specialties, particularly in surgery, than the country needed. 
Wishing to serve the highest volume of patients, please physicians in exchange for their 
choice of hospital facility, and secure community support, hospitals offered the maximum 
range of services and the most modern technology, often regardless of whether they were 
duplicating services of other local institutions (Starr, 1982). This historical context 
produced the general, community hospital that has emerged as the dominant delivery 
model for hospitals nationally. It is the limitations of this model, however, that may now 
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be driving hospitals to consider service line specialization in today‘s rapidly changing 
environment. 
Influences Bringing Change to the Hospital Sector 
Advancements in medical technology, shifts in market dynamics in the form of 
corporate hospital ownership and expansion of multi-hospital systems, and organizational 
restructuring through the formation of systems in clusters are all reshaping the hospital 
sector. In particular, these developments may be leading hospitals to engage in service 
specialization as a strategic choice. These changes began in the late 20th century and 
continue into the 21st. The environment in which the general, community hospital 
operates is thus dramatically different than it was in the pre-1990s era.   
The Influence of Medical Technology 
The impact of Americans living with chronic illnesses. Modern technology and 
advanced pharmaceuticals have rendered Americans less vulnerable to mortality from 
infectious and other forms of disease that in earlier decades led to imminent death. For 
example, current diagnostics can more quickly identify patients with risk factors for 
disease or with the early onset of a disease, thereby allowing intervention to preempt 
premature death. In addition, aggressive marketing on the part of industry including 
direct-to-consumer advertising has enabled consumers to identify symptoms of chronic 
conditions, contributing to diagnosis and prevalence statistics. As a consequence, half of 
all Americans are said to be living with one or more chronic conditions and illnesses such 
as heart disease, osteoarthritis, and chronic pulmonary conditions (Anderson & Horvath, 
2004). Advances in pharmaceutical and medical device technology have allowed chronic 
  
9 
conditions and illnesses to displace infectious diseases and accidents as the primary 
causes of death. Health services in the United States are, therefore, increasingly caring for 
patients with chronic illnesses. More than 75% of healthcare spending is devoted to 
medical costs to treat chronic illness across multiple healthcare delivery settings 
(Anderson & Horvath, 2004), as people with multiple chronic conditions often see 
multidisciplinary providers for monitoring different illnesses and conditions (Berenson & 
Horvath, 2003).    
Overnight hospitalization of the chronically ill now occurs only in the event of a 
need for surgical intervention or other disease-related episode requiring extensive 
invasive, diagnostic assessment or treatment. Some inpatient facilities, however, appear 
to be better prepared than others to serve the needs of chronically ill patients. For 
example, a wide disparity exists in charges billed for inpatient hospital care for patients 
with chronic conditions in their last 2 years of life, varying by nearly 100% between 
some of the best known institutions such as Mayo Clinic versus University of California 
at Los Angeles (Pear, 2008). The reasons some hospitals are better prepared than others 
to manage the chronically ill have not been fully studied, but the wide variances suggest 
that different strategies may be in place (Foundation for Accountability, 2001).   
The link between specialty physician referrals and hospital investment in 
technology. Most general, community hospitals with more than 100 beds tried in the 
second half of the 20th century to become clinical centers offering medical services in all 
major specialty fields. To fill beds, these hospitals sought to associate with specialty 
physicians to gain referrals (Friedenberg, 1996). Although investment by a hospital in the 
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latest equipment played an important role in the 1970s and 1980s in influencing 
specialists to bring their patients to that facility (Robinson & Luft, 1985), hospital 
incentives for such investments diminished when Medicare reimbursement schemes 
shifted from cost-plus to diagnostic groups (Eastaugh, 1992). Nevertheless, the interest of 
specialty physicians in performing procedures in acute care facilities with the most up to 
date technology has remained intact.  
In response to continuing advances in medical technology, general, community 
hospitals are viewed as trying to distinguish themselves from each other by opening 
centers for specialties such as cardiac services. The first decade of the 21st century is thus 
associated with spending and specialization, unlike the 1990s when managed care 
constraints forced cuts and consolidation. It is likely that the consolidations of the 1990s 
paved the way for the subsequent decade of specialization (Ain, 2002). 
Entrance of Corporate Hospital Ownership and Expansion of Multi-hospital Systems 
The earliest multi-hospital systems, defined by the American Hospital Association 
(AHA) as two or more hospitals that are owned, managed, or leased by a single 
organization (American Hospital Association, 2008), date back to early years of the 20th 
century, when denominational and other faith-based organizations sought to provide 
acute care (Starr, 1982). These not-for profit systems were mission-driven and 
demonstrated a commitment to serve the broader needs of the local community. 
Consequently, each hospital within these systems tended to function independently from 
other same-system members. Thus, while their hospitals shared scale advantages and 
mission, they effectively remained independent as providers of clinical services. 
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With entirely different objectives, for profit multi-hospital systems emerged in the 
late 1960s, in response to the continued growth in private insurance for hospital services 
and the emergence of Medicare and Medicaid payments. In the two decades to follow, a 
dramatic corporate-owned expansion of multi-hospital systems ensued. The traditional, 
highly autonomous, freestanding general hospital governed by its own board thus gave 
ground to rapidly growing systems run by corporate governance. The rise of the for profit 
chains introduced managerial capitalism to the American hospital sector, in contrast to 
independent or nonprofit hospitals over which community boards and medical staff 
exerted management and strategic direction (Starr, 1982). Up to the 1990s, however, 
most not-for profit, non-Catholic, hospitals remained independent, although a few not-for 
profit systems had emerged by that time.  
In the 1990s, rising concerns over costs, uninsured Americans, and the threat of 
managed competition brought many more hospitals into multi-hospital systems. 
Moreover, these concerns changed the spatial configurations of systems and local 
patterns of competitive behavior in the period between 1989 and 2005 (Luke, 2010). As 
can be seen in Table 1, the numbers of for profit and Catholic systems actually declined 
in that period by an average annual rate of 0.7% and 2.4%, respectively, due to system 
mergers and acquisitions within their ownership categories. The number of hospitals per  
system grew slightly by 1.7%, especially within the Catholic system group. By contrast, 
the not-for profit systems grew at an average annual rate of 3.9%. 
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Table 1     
      
Growth of U.S. Multi-hospital Systems by Ownership Type 1989-2005  
            
      
 1989 No. of 1989 Average 2005 No. of 2005 Average Average Annual 
Ownership Multi-unit No. per Multi-unit No. per Growth in No. 
Type Systems System Systems System of Systems (%) 
      
Catholic 76 7.0 51 11.0 (2.4) 
      
For profit 47 14.3 42 15.8 (0.7) 
      
Not-for profit 173 4.6 319 4.4 3.9 
      
Total 296 6.8 412 6.4 2.1 
      
No. of hospitals 2,013  2,637  1.7 
      
Percentage of 38  55   
U.S. community      
hospitals (%)           
Note: Sourced from "System Transformation: USA and International Strategies in Healthcare 
Organization and Policy," by R. D. Luke (2010), International Journal of Public Policy. 
 
The advantages of multi-hospital system (MHS) affiliations are generally well 
known. They include: (a) economies of scale that spread administrative overhead, (b) the 
ability to provide a wide spectrum of services across multiple care settings, (c) 
purchasing leverage in negotiation with vendors, and (d) increased access to capital 
markets to fund growth (Snook, 1995). With increased emphasis on management and 
efficiencies, it is reasonable to expect growth in MHSs to increase the likelihood that 
hospitals will engage in cost containment and quality-enhancing measures, including 
possibly specialization. To date, however, little research has considered the effect of 
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system growth on hospital specialization, particularly with regards to competitive 
strategy. 
Organizational Restructuring: The Formation of Local and Regional Systems in Clusters 
The consequences of the 1990s restructuring reach well beyond system 
efficiencies and increases in market concentration (Cuellar & Gertler, 2003, 2005). As 
discussed earlier, the most significant changes in system formation occurred within the 
not-for profit, non-Catholic sector. Often, larger, urban hospitals led in the system 
formation as they sought market strength by merging with and acquiring other, typically 
smaller hospitals in and around their local markets (Luke, 2010).  
The consequences of such organizational restructuring within the not-for profit 
sector, when combined with the overall system consolidation that occurred among 
Catholic and among for profit systems, are significant and could be relevant to this study. 
First, all of these changes produced a large number of local, urban-based hospital clusters 
that dominate most markets across the country. Second, the clusters provide important 
configurations within which system hospitals might engage in specialization – as same-
system, same-market members seek to rationalize service capacities by sharing and 
trading service functions locally. The clusters, in other words, offer powerful mechanisms 
for minimizing duplications of services when service capacities are redistributed among 
local same-system hospitals. Thus, they have the potential of facilitating and hastening 
the pace of specialization in hospitals, at least within selected members of their hospital 
clusters. With few exceptions (Clement et al., 1997; Trinh, Begun, & Luke, 2008), 
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researchers have not assessed the impact of cluster formation on hospital efficiencies or 
specialization. 
In his study of clusters and competitive advantage outside of the healthcare 
industry, Michael Porter defines a cluster generically as ―a geographically proximate 
group of interconnected companies and associated institutions in a particular field,‖ 
linked by what he termed ―commonalities‖ and ―complementarities‖ (Porter, 1998, p. 
199). Whereas Porter‘s focus is mostly on collectives of otherwise independent 
companies within local areas, the clusters of interest in this study are those that systems 
form, through mergers and acquisitions in markets. From the perspective of this research, 
the important features Porter describes are geographic proximity and the 
interconnectedness, or configuration, of cluster members. The connectivity specifically 
allows smaller, outlying community hospitals to coordinate service capacity with larger, 
patient accessible, often tertiary care referral centers (Luke, Walston, & Plummer, 2004). 
The cluster organization thus offers the coordinative structure within which hospitals can 
engage in specialization by sharing and trading service capabilities among same-system 
members. Such configurations and possibilities are yet to be fully examined empirically. 
Potential Drivers of General, Community Hospitals Toward Specialization 
Against the foregoing backdrop of technological advancements, changes in 
market structure, and organizational restructuring, three overarching trends could 
potentially drive the general, community hospital to adopt clinical service line 
specialization as a competitive strategy. These are: (a) demand for improved hospital 
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quality and safety, (b) the need for greater efficiencies to curb ever-spiraling costs, and 
(c) increased rivalry among hospital competitors surviving consolidation of the 1990s. 
The Call for Improved Hospital Quality and Safety 
Demand for improvements in the U.S. healthcare delivery system has been on-
going since the Committee on the Costs for Medical Care issued its final report 
(Committee on the Costs for Medical Care, 1932). This report revealed a growing body 
of evidence substantiating medical errors as a leading cause of death and injury in the 
United States and appealed to the nation for remedies to lower the error rate. Discussion 
reached new heights in 1999 when the Institute of Medicine (IOM) of the National 
Academy of Sciences issued ―To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System‖ and 
―Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century‖ (Institute of 
Medicine, 1999). In combination, these two contemporary studies recommended a 
sweeping redesign of the U. S. healthcare system in order to foster innovation and 
improve the delivery of quality care (Committee on Quality of Health Care in America, 
Institute of Medicine, 2001).  
One recommendation stemming from the IOM report urged that patients be 
directed to hospitals and doctors performing the greatest volume of identical procedures, 
particularly costly, high risk, highly specialized surgeries with high mortality rates. This 
recommendation was based on surveys of hospital case volumes and the number of 
deaths occurring during, or shortly after, selected surgical procedures that provided 
evidence of an inverse relationship between case volume, as a measure of experience and 
expertise, and inpatient mortality, both for hospitals and operating surgeons (Begg, 
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Cramer, Hoskins, & Brennan, 1998; Luft, Bunker, & Einthoven, 1979). A growing body 
of research, most of which is supportive, has been published since 2000 documenting the 
relationship between lower patient mortality rates and surgeons and hospitals possessing 
greater procedure-specific experience and expertise (Birkmeyer et al., 2003; Hannan et 
al., 2005; Kahn, Ten Have, & Iwashyna, 2009; Moscucci et al., 2005). Such findings 
support strategic choices by hospitals to concentrate high demand for particular clinical 
resources through specialization.  
The Leapfrog Group also has actively encouraged specialization by directing 
patient case volumes for purposes of improvements in healthcare quality and patient 
safety (The Leapfrog Group, 2000). With funding in 2000 by the Business Round Table 
and comprised of Fortune 500 chief executive officers, The Leapfrog Group began 
incorporating a volume/quality relationship into its evidence-based hospital referral 
(EBHR) criterion. The EBHR criterion encourages payers, hospitals, and physician 
groups to support hospital and physician providers demonstrating relatively larger 
volumes in particular procedures in the interest of improving patient safety (Birkmeyer & 
Dimick, 2004; Birkmeyer et al., 2002; Galvin & Milstein, 2000). Specialization across 
one or more entire service lines, as examined in the research, is consistent with the 
volume/quality relationship encouraged by The Leapfrog Group for particular, high risk 
surgical procedures.  
Importantly, nowhere in the literature is there consideration of how hospitals 
might move to specialize or how their multi-hospital system clusters might facilitate 
specialization that would be consistent with the EBHR criterion for hospitals and the 
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IOM recommendations. Moreover, how general, community hospitals have responded to 
these opportunities is unclear. One possibility is that general, community hospitals are 
seeking a disproportionate share of cases in high volume, high revenue-generating service 
lines housing procedures targeted for analysis by The Leapfrog Group, such as cardiac 
surgery housing the coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) procedure. The goal of the 
research is to determine if hospitals are pursuing rational strategies of specialization by 
service line, especially among hospitals in same-system clusters, in part as a response to 
demands for improved quality and patient safety.  
The Need for Greater Efficiencies 
Despite the recent shift of service capacities to outpatient settings, approximately 
one-third of total national health expenditures in 2005 were for inpatient hospital services 
and supplies. Inpatient care costs increased from $417.0 billion to $611.6 billion in just 
five years between 2000 and 2005, for an average annual increase of 8.0% (Health, 
United States 2007, 2008). Reflective of the untenable escalation in healthcare costs, 
workers‘ health insurance premiums increased more than five times faster than their 
wages between 2000 and 2007 (Families USA, 2008).   
With the ever-spiraling rise in healthcare costs, the pressure on hospitals to 
increase the efficiency with which they provide costly services remains intense. There are 
two basic forms by which a general, community hospital might engage in specialization 
in the pursuit of increased efficiency: (a) establish institutes or centers of excellence 
(Porter & Teisberg, 2006), or (b) prune services of low profitability lines (Eastaugh, 
1992), each aimed to derive overall lower per unit costs per case. Regardless of the 
  
18 
approach, both involve strategies of specialization and need to be examined in future 
research as this study does not examine cost considerations in analyzing service line 
specialization strategies or choices. A third option, the shifting of service capacities 
within local or regional hospital clusters to ―lead hospitals‖ within those clusters, is 
however considered in the research. 
Increased Rivalry Among Hospital Competitors 
In addition to the call for improved hospital quality and safety and the need for 
greater efficiencies to curb costs, the third trend potentially driving general, community 
hospital specialization is a heightened competitive environment following the merger and 
acquisition wave of the 1990s in the United States. While economic theory suggests that 
increased concentration, as occurred in healthcare in this period, should lead to lower 
price competition (Kovacic & Smallwood, 1994), consolidation can also increase non-
price competition, of which specialization is a recognized form (Fennell, 1980, 1982; 
Luke et al., 2004; Succi, Lee, & Alexander, 1997). Little research has examined inpatient 
service line specialization as a strategic response to heightened market concentration. 
Specialization in the Hospital Sector: Rationale for Focusing Internally 
While the number of general, community hospitals has steadily declined in the 
wake of consolidation during the 1980s and 1990s, dramatic growth has subsequently 
occurred in the specialty surgery category. As shown in Table 2, the number of facilities 
in this category has doubled in just five years, between 2000 and 2005. This is consistent   
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Table 2    
     
Structure of the U.S. Community Hospital Sector: Number of Facilities 
          
     
Type of Hospital 2000 2005 % Change 
          
     
General, short-term 4,915 4,936 4.3 
     
Long-term care 1,856 2,108 13.6 
     
Specialty surgery      46       91 97.8 
     
Total  6,817 7,135 4.7 
          
Note: Sourced from "The Economics of Specialty Hospitals," by J. E. Schneider, T. R. Miller, R. L. 
Ohsfeldt, M. A. Morrisey, B. A. Milner, & P. Li, 2008, Medical Care Research and Review. 
 
with the overall expected shift toward specialization, whether such capacity is located 
within general or single-focused, specialty hospitals in the community.  
Specialty hospitals – which historically have included long term psychiatric, 
rehabilitation, children‘s and other hospital types – fill particular service niches, serving 
targeted groups of patients with narrowly defined needs and condition. More recently, 
specialty hospitals have emerged that offer single-focused, specialist-provided procedures 
such as ophthalmic or orthopedic surgery. Many of these facilities are under physician-
ownership or established through corporate financing (Shi & Singh, 2004). 
One important counter response of general, community hospitals is to offer their 
own specialty centers or to focus on one or more lines of service. Service line 
competition is attractive as a hospital strategy for a number of reasons. It locks in 
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physician admissions to hospitals, taps into demand for consumer choice, creates profit 
centers, captures scale efficiencies, builds on the advantages of volume and quality, and 
enhances community image and reputation (Berenson, Bodenheimer, & Pham, 2006). 
There is growing evidence that the pre-1990s pattern of competing for physician loyalty 
by building the best facilities and obtaining the most up-to-date technologies is re-
emerging (Berenson et al., 2006). The formation of hospital systems and clusters and the 
alliances with physicians in the early 21st century signal the likelihood that general, 
community hospitals are again giving greater attention to clinical service line strategies. 
In the wake of technological advances described earlier, many general, 
community hospitals have opened free-standing, same-day surgery centers for the 
provision of lower risk, minimally invasive procedures such as cataract or laser vision 
surgeries. Pursuit of this defensive option by general, community hospitals is aimed at 
preventing physicians, for profit corporations, or local hospital rivals from opening their 
own ambulatory care centers. As a point of distinction for discussion purposes, this is 
termed ―external specialization.‖  
In contrast to ―external specialization,‖ the intentional shift by general, 
community hospitals in the mix of cases treated is a form of specialization that might be 
referred to as ―internal specialization.‖ Both strategic options are enhanced by the 
presence of local clusters because they provide a platform for hospital partners to 
collectively plan the community-wide delivery of care through shared resources and 
strategic commitment. All such forms of specialization are consistent with the 
recommendation that general, community hospitals reorganize around narrower ranges of 
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clinical activities, distinguish themselves on quality and service, and restructure their 
relationships with physicians (Grote, Levine, & Mango, 2006; Luke, Luke, & Muller, in 
press). Internal specialization, in particular, achieves the objective of insulating revenues 
of the institution‘s bedrock, inpatient services. If done within clusters of hospitals under a 
common ownership, internal specialization can preempt loss of shares to competitors, 
since such specialization is coordinated with same-system members. While considerable 
research is increasingly focusing on ambulatory, out-patient services, or external 
specialization, little attention is being paid to internal specialization, which is the focus of 
this study.  
Theoretical Perspectives on Specialization 
Michael Porter‘s book on healthcare reform, in which he advocated the need for 
hospitals and other providers to specialize in defined clinical areas (Porter & Teisberg, 
2006), highlights the role specialization might play in competitive strategy. Perhaps of 
greater importance is his emphasis on market structure and concentration (Porter, 1980) 
as determinants of market change. In other words, Porter emphasized the key role 
external forces in markets might play in driving strategic response. An alternative 
argument, known as the resource-based view (Penrose, 1959), is also consistent with 
specialization as a competitive strategy. By contrast, however, this perspective 
emphasizes internal resources and capabilities as the necessary foundations organizations 
need to be able to establish distinctive positions, such as through specialization, in 
markets. Penrose postulates that the existence of superior, internal resources and core 
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competences gives organizations long-term advantages by enabling them to establish 
sustainable positions over time and, especially, in the face of on-going change.  
Both the market structure and resource-based perspectives point to the need for 
hospitals to engage in specialization strategies as a key means by which they might attain 
competitive advantage in highly uncertain and rapidly changing healthcare environments. 
While they emphasize different economic arguments, market structure and internal 
resource and capability considerations are highly interdependent (Porter, 1985). Effective 
positioning requires an understanding of market structures and competitor conduct, while 
internal competencies shape the choices organizations make, including determining the 
exigencies of positioning.  
Work by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) serves as a basis for viewing the role 
clusters might play in facilitating specialization among member hospitals. The Lawrence 
and Lorsch perspective would view inter-organizational structures such as same-system 
hospital clusters as a contingent response to environmental turbulence and change. It also 
explains the need for clusters, once formed, to balance two responses characteristic of 
complex organizations – differentiation through specialization (as between the respective 
hospital members) and integration (the unification of facilities that as a consequence of 
differentiation need greater coordination). As noted in Chapter Two and borrowing from 
Dayhoff and Cromwell (1993), differentiation, as applied to the study of hospitals, 
contrasts the services offered by individual hospitals to those provided by same-system 
members located in the same market. Integration refers to the processes and structures 
needed to unify the differentiated entities. The work of Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) 
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provides a framework for explaining the conditions under which same-system hospitals 
might collectively engage in a coordinated scheme of service line specialization through 
both differentiation and integration. Their perspective is thus important to the research 
because it serves as the platform for explaining inter-organizational coordination of 
services in the local delivery of care.   
Research Issues in Hospital Specialization: Options in Selecting Service Lines 
It remains to be determined what areas of specialization general, community 
hospitals are most likely to pursue. Hospitals could emphasize service lines that reflect 
local community needs, are preferred by influential medical staff members, have a high 
financial impact on the hospital, enhance community image, or offer other benefits. 
Undoubtedly, any one hospital will have multiple reasons for seeking to develop selected 
service lines over time, should it choose to pursue such a strategy.  
Given the substantial capital investments in high technology equipment discussed 
earlier, an increase in selective patient volumes is required to generate adequate returns to 
financially justify such outlays. Meanwhile, deep discounts on general, community 
hospital charges are demanded by private payers in exchange for the preferred provider, 
in-network status necessary to give community residents ease of access to a particular 
hospital. Uncompensated care (charity cases and bad debt) continually rises for U.S. 
community hospitals, having increased from $10.0 billion in 1988 to $36.4 billion in 
2008 and reached 5.8% of total hospital expenses (American Hospital Association, 2009). 
Thus, only a fraction of the gross charges billed are actually collected. The pressure on 
hospitals therefore to fill beds with patients whose diagnoses will generate meaningful, 
  
24 
collectible revenue streams is both great and complex. Consequently, selecting top 
ranking service lines representing a combination of highest patient volume and highest 
revenue-generating potential based on charges captures two important dimensions that 
hospital administrators are likely to consider in judging what to emphasize in the pursuit 
of specialization strategies. Although it is acknowledged that actual costs and therefore 
profits by service line vary among hospitals, it is assumed that charges, in combination 
with patient volumes, can serve as a proxy for relative importance and thus a basis for the 
designation of service line priority. 
Thus, a two-step process is used in identifying and selecting the nation‘s top 
service lines to study. Two separate steps are necessary because the top ranking hospital 
cases measured by patient volume are not necessarily the same as those ranked by total 
charges, and thus an effort is made to assess both lists in search of those major diagnostic 
classifications that appear among both top rankings. Both sets of rankings are drawn from 
the Clinical Classification System (CCS) of diagnostic categories from the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) national Healthcare Cost and Utilization 
Project (HCUP) data (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2007). The first step 
ranks categories by annual patient case volumes. As a second step, AHRQ‘s national 
statistics from HCUP are again utilized to identify leading diagnostic categories with one 
or more service lines providing hospital care ranked by aggregate dollar charges. 
Regardless of whether service lines are selected based on their ranking of aggregate 
charges by principal diagnosis or on the basis of total inpatient case volumes, the same 
six service lines emerge among the top 10 for selection over others and thus are chosen 
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for this study, namely: (a) labor and delivery, (b) pulmonary services, (c) cardiology, (d) 
invasive cardiology, (e) cardiac surgery, and (f) orthopedics. These same six service lines 
also emerge among the top ranking lines by patient volume and in terms of patient 
charges for the sample states in the research.  
Overview of Research Methodology 
The study uses a retrospective, nonexperimental, correlational design to analyze 
secondary data relating to service line specialization by acute care general, community 
hospitals located in three states: Florida, Virginia, and Nevada. The study uses 2007 data, 
the most recent year for which hospital information is available from a combination of 
government and private sources. Hospital discharge data are obtained from Intellimed, a 
private company that provides to hospitals all-payer data made available to it by state 
hospital associations of individual states. Market and organizational measures used as 
independent variables are obtained from both the U.S. Census Bureau (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2008) and AHA (American Hospital Association, 2008), as well as the Area 
Resources Files (ARF) collected by the Office of Data Management within the Health 
Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) of the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (DHHS).  
The study uses regression modeling to analyze cross-sectional relationships 
between market and organizational characteristics as independent variables and selected 
measures of specialization as the dependent variables. Five measures of specialization are 
examined as dependent variables: (a) Internal Service Concentration, measured by 
calculating an internal Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) that compares service line 
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shares within each hospital; (b) Internal Share, measured by the percentage of cases for 
each of the six service lines selected for study derived separately from among a single 
hospital‘s total cases across all service lines; (c) Expected Market Share, a hospital‘s 
variance from expected share, defined by the hospital‘s overall share in the market, in 
each of the six selected service lines; (d) Market Change, the change between 2003 and 
2007 in a hospital‘s share of its local market in each of the selected service lines, and  
(e) Cluster Change, the change between 2003 and 2007 in a hospital‘s share of its 
cluster with sister hospitals in each of the selected service lines. The internal HHI, as a 
measure of concentration, represents the classic use of the index defined further in 
Appendix A. In the derivation of Cluster Change, a cluster is defined as a local market 
in which two or more hospitals in the same-system reside. Alternative methods for 
measuring specialization are discussed in Chapter Four on Methodology. 
The study examines the influence of internal, organizational factors, including the 
tax status of a hospital system ownership (Ownership), whether a hospital in a same-
system cluster enjoys leadership in share of service line case volume (Cluster Lead 
Hospital), and facility size based on inpatient bed count (Hospital Size). In addition, the 
study examines external, market factors, including population density (Density), 
population growth rate (Growth), the population‘s proportion of persons 65 years and 
older (Age), those living in poverty (Poverty) as a percentage of the market population, 
the local presence of specialty physicians relative to the size of the residential population 
(Physicians) and degree of competitiveness (Competitiveness) as measured by the 
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inverse of each hospital‘s market HHI (Zwanziger & Melnick, 1988). State is treated as a 
covariate and entered into regression as a group. 
Significance of the Research 
This study offers a number of potentially important benefits. First, it attempts to 
measure service line specialization, which is a likely response hospitals will make to 
increased financial and market pressures and significant organization and market 
structural change within the hospital sector. Second, it can contribute to understanding 
what might be some of the organizational and market correlates with hospital 
specialization. Third, findings may shed light on whether general, community hospitals 
are narrowing services as means by which competing local rivals modify their historical, 
general hospital model of delivering a broad, even duplicative, array of services to the 
community. Fourth, it examines the possible role cluster formation might play in the 
rationalization of clinical capacities across the clustered hospital members.  
Service line specialization in hospitals is central to a number of management, 
research, and policy considerations. First, it highlights the interdependencies between the 
well-known economic and other performance advantages of specialization and the 
strategic advantages of increased market concentration. In order to assess this 
relationship, it is considered important to understand what factors might be associated 
with hospital specialization. Is it being done in a coordinated way within hospital system 
clusters or is it distributed across hospitals in ways that might have more to do strictly 
with local market forces? Second, does it reflect financial motivations, such as might be 
implied if hospitals were to emphasize the highest revenue-generating service lines that 
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are the focus of this study? As a corollary, to what extent are patterns of specialization 
reflective of increased preparedness by general, community hospitals to respond to an 
aging populace with multiple chronic diseases and conditions? Third, is this a growing 
trend in the hospital sector and, if it is, are the markets consolidating beyond that which 
occurred as a result of the recent wave in mergers and acquisitions? Fourth, what might 
be the implications for management and system design, if specialization is present across 
all top ranking service lines or not present at all? Additionally, what role might the 
clusters play in facilitating specialization, over what might be possible for free-standing 
hospitals? Fifth, how would information on patterns of hospital specialization help in 
confirming organizational responses to turbulent, environmental uncertainties? Sixth, 
how does the study of specialization within hospitals increase an understanding of  
non-price competitive responses typical of oligopolistic structure and behavior (Luke et 
al., 2004). Such comprehension can elevate the level of understanding of healthcare 
market strategy by hospital management and policymakers alike.  
Findings and conclusions may ultimately point to ways by which hospitals might 
improve efficiencies, for example, by reducing redundancies within multi-hospital 
clusters. They could also highlight benefits of quality and safety improvement potentially 
available when patient volumes are increased in selected facilities where expertise, 
knowledge, and experience are concentrated. Depending on findings, new light could also 
be shed on how hospital systems navigate relationships among physicians, same-system 
hospitals in clusters, and even payers.  
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Addressing the identified gaps in research surrounding the presence of service 
line specialization by general, community hospitals will potentially guide future strategic 
thinking, decision-making, and resource allocation in the hospital sector (Birkmeyer, 
2000). Commitment to a focused, clinical service lines orientation will allow traditional 
full-service, community hospitals to optimize their competitive positioning in local 
markets, capitalize on core competences, and leverage their value to sister companies or 
system affiliates, either locally or regionally. Attuned to such opportunities, they can 
avoid capitulating to niche, specialty hospitals (Devers, Brewster, & Casalino, 2003), 
possibly better integrate and even improve the quality of care they deliver to their 
patients. Such research benefits provide insights into potential strategies for the means by 
which higher quality, lower costing inpatient healthcare might be delivered in response to 
changing needs of our population.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss what is known about whether general, 
community hospitals compete using specialization strategies and, more specifically, 
whether they specialize in high volume, high revenue-generating service lines. For 
simplicity of discussion, acute care hospitals providing both medical and surgical services 
to the public will be referred to as general hospitals throughout this and subsequent 
chapters. This chapter is divided into four sections. The opening section focuses on the 
historical context for the influence of specialty physicians on a general hospital case mix. 
The second section discusses three major trends potentially driving the general hospital to 
adopt clinical service line specialization as a competitive strategy: (a) demand for 
improved hospital quality and safety, (b) the need for greater efficiencies to curb spiraling 
costs of inpatient services, and (c) increased rivalry among hospital competitors 
following the rapid consolidation of the 1990s. This section integrates brief commentary 
on the growth in and countervailing pressure against specialization by acute care 
hospitals. The third section draws on the literature to offer a rationale for the service lines 
chosen as the focus of this study. It concludes with a fourth section and discussion of 
gaps in the literature and thus support for the research.
  
31 
Influence of Specialty Physicians on the General Hospital‘s Service Offerings 
Specialization is a key area of research interest because of the longstanding 
influence specialty physicians exert on the mix of services hospitals offer. The steady 
growth in the science and complexity of medicine not only produced increased 
specialization in the medical profession, but a growing need for an institutional base 
within which physicians could be trained and practice (Anderson, 1990). Considered a 
hallmark of American medicine, professional specialization has directly influenced the 
breadth and depth of services general hospitals offer (Starr, 1982). It also has increased 
greatly the dependency of hospitals on physicians, as hospitals wishing to attract patients 
need to please specialty physicians who perform revenue-generating procedures and 
secure community support for them. The pursuit of physician patronage has thus 
contributed to high levels of service capacity duplication across local institutions (Starr, 
1982).  
The rise of private insurance, combined with passage of Medicare legislation in 
the mid-1960s, produced added financial incentives for hospitals to compete for 
physician loyalties by providing greater levels of service capacity. This incentive 
diminished somewhat when Medicare reimbursement shifted from cost-plus to a 
prospective payment system (PPS), with some arguing that the supply of specialized 
service capacity is actually determined solely by the extent to which substantial scale 
economies can be demonstrated with economic modeling (Dranove, Shanley, & Simon, 
1992). Regardless, hospitals continued to grow in complexity, duplication increased, and 
the strong relationship between hospitals and specialty physicians remained intact. Given 
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the importance of this history, it is surprising that the relationships among specialty 
medicine, competition, and service line specialization by the general hospital have 
received relatively limited health services research attention. 
Despite the tendency to increase complexity and duplicate services, market 
pressures on general hospitals have increased the need for them to reduce costs and 
increase revenues, especially after the introduction of coverage of the elderly and 
disabled by Medicare and the indigent by Medicaid. This has fueled service line 
competition, which has produced key secondary effects: (a) locking in physician 
commitment to specialized hospital services that are compatible with physicians‘ 
professional and financial interests, (b) tapping into heightened consumer expectations 
for quality, particularly influenced by the demands of the aging baby-boomer generation 
for evidence of technical expertise, (c) creating profit centers to focus on high margin 
services, and (d) enhancing community image and reputation (Berenson, Bodenheimer, et 
al., 2006).  
Hospital specialization options that flow from the above pressures include: (a) 
internal specialization (formation of centers or institutes within a general hospital), (b) 
building free-standing, specialty hospitals, and (c) spinning off ambulatory-based 
specialty facilities, typically in collaboration with local physicians (Berenson, 
Bodenheimer, et al., 2006). All such options produce tensions between hospitals and 
specialty physicians, as shifts in capacity and location of services disrupt patterns of 
practice and realign established competitive and cooperative relationships between 
hospitals and members of their medical staffs (Berenson, Ginsburg, & May, 2006). One 
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option for reducing such tensions is for hospitals to employ their physicians, which has 
become an important and growing trend in the hospital sector (Casalino, November, 
Berenson, & Pham, 2008). 
It is well documented that physicians can strongly influence the choice of 
hospitals by their patients (Sarel, Brendaly, Marmorstein, & Barach, 2005; Smithson, 
2003), although there is mixed evidence that they generate demand to protect their 
incomes (Rice & Labelle, 1989). When choosing specialists and facilities for medical 
procedures, most patients rely on physician referrals, with relatively few making choices 
based on word of mouth or rankings provided by media, government, and private 
organizations (Tu & Lauer, 2008). Patient dependency on physicians thus increases the 
power that medical specialists are able to exert over hospitals, in managed care contract 
negotiations and in other valuable domains (Dranove & White, 1996). In fact, physicians 
are found to respond to economic incentives in making hospital referrals and admission 
decisions (Nakamura, Capps, & Dranove, 2007).  
Still, the connection between specialty physicians and hospital choice is not 
seamless. Although hospitals have pursued acquisitions of physician practices as 
strategies to lock in referrals, analysis shows that just under one-third of such acquisitions 
actually led to increased referrals (Nakamura et al., 2007). Researchers have documented 
evidence of growing friction between hospitals and specialty physicians over competing 
services, in instances of newly established, physician-owned specialty hospitals and 
ambulatory surgery centers. Tension with community physicians over hospital emergency 
department (ED) call schedules has intensified the friction, as doctors especially in small, 
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single-specialty practices are reluctant to devote attention to high numbers of the 
uninsured, likely to seek medical treatment in the ED (Berenson, Ginsburg, et al., 2006).  
The evidence suggests that doctors are choosing either to be in competition with hospitals 
or employed by them (Casalino et al., 2008). In light of inconsistencies between intent 
and results, it is possible patient referrals may be more successfully restructured through 
local cluster arrangements than by reliance on hospital/physician relationships alone. 
Trends Driving the General Hospital to Consider Service Line Specialization 
Three major trends are driving the general hospital to adopt clinical service line 
specialization as a competitive strategy: (a) demand for improved hospital quality and 
safety, (b) need for greater efficiencies to curb costs of inpatient services, and (c) 
increasing non-price rivalry among local hospital competitors. These trends have 
surfaced against a backdrop of technological advancements that are extending the age of 
Americans with chronic conditions and facilitating growth in outpatient, same-day 
surgery services, rendering acute care inpatient services for the gravely ill and invasive 
procedures. In combination, all of these factors have spurred system restructuring, which 
includes an expansion of multi-hospital systems and, more recently, the formation of 
local and regional systems in clusters. 
The Call for Improved Hospital Quality and Safety 
Calls for improvements in the U.S. healthcare delivery system have continued 
since the Committee on the Costs for Medical Care issued its ―Final Report: Medical 
Care for the American People‖ (Committee on the Costs of Medical Care, 1932). Two 
influential reports published in the 1990s by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) of the 
  
35 
National Academy of Sciences have increased concern about performance: ―To Err is 
Human: Building a Safer Health System‖ and ―Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New 
Health System for the 21st Century.‖ The former revealed a growing body of evidence 
substantiating medical errors as a leading cause of death and injury in the United States 
and appealed to the nation for remedies to lower error rates (Institute of Medicine, 1999). 
The latter recommended a redesign of the American healthcare system to foster 
innovation and improve the delivery of quality care (Committee on Quality of Health 
Care in America, Institute of Medicine, 2001).  
One key recommendation to come from these reports was that patients should be 
directed to hospitals and doctors who have performed the greatest volume of identical 
procedures, particularly costly, high risk, highly specialized surgeries with high mortality 
rates. This recommendation was based on the assumption that high volumes are 
correlated with high experience, high expertise, and thus high quality. The Leapfrog 
Group, which represents a coalition of Fortune 500 companies and group purchasing 
organizations (The Leapfrog Group, 2000), formalized a volume-driven recommendation 
for improving quality in the standards it circulated to participating hospitals. The 
standards established minimum, annual hospital volume levels for seven high-risk, costly 
procedures (Every et al., 1999; Harmon et al., 1999).   
The Leapfrog Group based its recommendations on an extensive literature that 
provided albeit mixed support for the relationship between volume and quality (Begg et 
al., 1998; Eastaugh, 1992; Luft et al., 1979). A growing body of research has been 
published since 2000 that generally supports a positive relationship between patient 
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mortality rates and surgeons with greater procedure-specific experience (Birkmeyer et al., 
2002; Birkmeyer et al., 2003; Brahmajee, 2006; Halm, Lee, & Chassin, 2002; Hannan et 
al., 2005; Milstein, Galvin, Delbanco, Salber, & Buck, 2000; Murin, 2005; Peterson, 
Coombs, DeLong, Haan, & Ferguson, 2004).  
Based on mixed findings in these and other more recent studies, researchers have 
increasingly recommended that referrals to hospitals be based on demonstrated, superior, 
risk-adjusted outcomes and the adaptation of evidence-based therapies rather than on 
patient volume alone (Kumbhani et al., 2009). As an example, however, of the 
complexity in making choices, referrals to hospitals with the best outcomes for even 
high-risk obstetrics – where the choice may appear obvious – unfortunately remain the 
exception rather than the rule (Milstein, 2005). There is also evidence that mortality rate 
differences between high volume and low volume hospitals are mediated by unmeasured 
characteristics of patients and that surgeon volume alone may provide a more reliable 
indicator of quality, even if those physicians perform surgery in more than one hospital 
(Dimick, Birkmeyer, & Upchurch, 2005). There are some who argue that qualitative 
research methodologies should be used in assessing quality, rather than strictly traditional 
quantitative approaches (Christian, Gustafson, Betensky, Daley, & Zinner, 2005). This 
includes taking into consideration the impact on patient outcomes of multidisciplinary, 
inpatient care teams beyond the surgeon, and even across service lines in the case of 
patients with multiple co-morbidities. 
Still, The Leapfrog Group‘s underlying message remains central to the call for 
increasing volumes to improve quality. By 2005, over half of all U.S. hospitals and two-
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thirds of California‘s hospitals responded to its annual survey, even though reporting of 
adherence to The Leapfrog Group‘s standards for case volume and other quality measures 
remained voluntary (Murin, 2005). In October 2006, The Leapfrog Group announced its 
first-ever list of top hospitals based on its survey results from over 1,200 hospitals. The 
report revealed weak adherence to the volume requirements, as nine in ten responding 
hospitals failed to meet the standards for performing two high-risk procedures, coronary 
artery bypass graft (CABG) and abdominal aortic aneurysm (AAA) repair. Additional 
significant shortfalls were also noted (The Leapfrog Group News Archive, 2006), all of 
which raised questions about whether The Leapfrog Group should continue to promote 
volume-based specialization by general hospitals for the treatment of high-risk 
procedures. Consequently, The Leapfrog Group has more recently shifted its attention to 
―efficient‖ delivery of care in naming its 2009 top hospitals on the basis of adherence to 
standards in computer order entry systems, performance standards for high-risk 
procedures, ICU staffing, quality outcomes, length of stay, readmission rates, and 
incidence of hospital acquired infections (The Leapfrog Group, 2009).  
Most hospitals in the U.S. are considered general, community hospitals (Shi & 
Singh, 2004), although a number of specialty hospitals fill particular service niches by 
serving targeted groups of patients with narrowly defined diagnostic needs or treatment 
requirements. Historically, specialty hospitals have tended to fall into such categories as 
psychiatric or rehabilitation hospitals. In recent decades, they have expanded into a 
number of procedural categories, such as cardiac and orthopedic surgery, many of which 
have been established under physician or corporate ownership (including many local 
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hospitals and clusters) arrangements. Table 3 documents a trend towards specialization 
within the entire hospital sector. 
Table 3    
     
Trend in Specialization by All U.S. Hospitals  
          
    
Type of Hospital 2000 2005 % Change 
     
General, short-term 4,915 4,936 4.3 
     
Psychiatric 491 481 (2.0) 
     
Rehabilitation 1,102 1,235 12.1 
     
Long-term care    263   392 49.0 
     
Subtotal non-surgical 1,856 2,108 13.6 
     
Special surgery
a
     46     91 97.8 
     
Subtotal specialty 1,902 2,199 15.6 
     
Total community hospitals 6,817 7,135 4.7 
     
Percentage of general, 72.1 69.2  
short-term community    
hospitals       
a
Special surgery includes orthopedic, cardiac, and general surgery centers.  
Note: Sourced from Kaiser Family Foundation (2007) and the Medicare Payment Advisory 
Commission (2005-2007).  
 
Over the period 2000 to 2005, growth in the relatively small sub-sector of 
hospitals, specialty surgical, far outpaced their general, short-term hospital counterparts, 
showing an increase of 97.8% compared to 4.3%, respectively. Taken together, the 
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growth rate in all specialty hospitals of 15.6% is nearly four times that of the general, 
short-term community hospital category (Schneider et al., 2008). This could be explained 
by a new emphasis on hospital-specialist partnerships (Lake, Devers, Brewster, & 
Casalino, 2003). Initial reports from site visits indicate that physician-owners of specialty 
hospitals are more likely than others to refer to their own facilities, treat a healthier 
population than general, community hospitals, and deliver generally higher quality care 
to more satisfied patients (Greenwald et al., 2006). However, subsequent, larger scale 
studies have found that the quality of care received at cardiac hospitals is only equivalent 
to, but no better than, care provided at general, acute care hospitals. Moreover, patients 
with co-morbidities undergoing procedures at niche, special surgery hospitals 
experienced poorer 30-day mortality rates after discharge. Such findings suggest that 
single-focused, specialty hospitals may not be the best choice for patients requiring 
greater coordination and management of care (The Robert Woods Johnson Foundation, 
2008). In fact, researchers undertaking a retrospective cohort study of over 700,000 
Medicare patients at 1,130 hospitals who underwent coronary artery bypass graft 
(CABG) surgery during 2001 to 2005 concluded that greater cardiac specialization by the 
hospitals based on higher proportional discharges in cardiac surgery was not associated 
with clinically significant improvement in patient outcomes (Girotra et al., 2010). How 
the general hospital of the future staffs and organizes to accommodate patients having 
higher acuity and multiple co-morbidities remains a challenge (The Joint Commission, 
2008). Inpatient service line specialization could be an alternative, by enabling 
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specialization, while retaining coordination internally as well as spatial and 
organizational integration with other established, general hospitals in the local market.  
Despite the incentives to promote high patient volumes through targeted hospital 
specialization, general hospitals may still be reluctant to specialize. For example, it may 
be that hospitals in markets with excess hospital capacity are more inclined toward 
consolidation than those in markets in which capacities are constrained (Birkmeyer, 
2000). Case mix also is likely to be a factor. Sowden, Deeks, and Sheldon (1995) have 
suggested the need to carefully assess case mix, which should reflect the need for 
multidisciplinary teams  – resources typically available in general hospitals – to be 
available to treat patient populations that have greater severity and co-morbidities. In 
cancer treatment, for example, the benefit of access to team resources over a highly 
specialized treatment center has been demonstrated (McCarthy, Datta, Sherlaw-Johnson, 
Coleman, & Rachet, 2008). There is also the issue that distances and travel times limit 
patient access to specialty care provided in more distant facilities. This is especially 
important when planning rural access to specialized capabilities in urban centers (Onega, 
et al., 2008). It is also a concern in the transfer of patients from one urban area to another, 
especially for high risk patient populations and those requiring urgent, high level care 
such as burn victims.  
Payers are increasingly recognizing that hospitals need to be compensated more 
fairly in treating more severe cases, based on the level of care required to treat them. In 
late 2007, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) replaced its 538 
Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs) with 745 Medicare Severity Diagnosis Related 
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Groups (MS-DRGs), a move aimed at redistributing payments among different types of 
inpatient cases in order to account for complications and co-morbidities upon hospital 
admission (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2008). A year later, CMS 
announced an end to payment for hospital acquired complications, making coding upon 
admission and case-mix management in general increasingly important to a hospital‘s 
financial health. Not only are these changes to the Medicare inpatient prospective 
payment system likely to result in payment increases to urban hospitals that treat more 
severely ill patients, but also the new payment policy could serve to promote 
specialization strategies by general hospitals. 
These issues notwithstanding, specialization is already well advanced in most 
local markets. Academic medical centers generally have long functioned as centers 
receiving referrals for the provision of specialized services, especially for rare conditions 
and illnesses (Moses, Thier, & Matheson, 2005). Recognizing the unique qualities of 
hospital categories, a benchmark study designating the nation‘s top 100 hospitals in 
cardiovascular care for their superior clinical and financial value segregated general 
hospitals in tiers – major teaching hospitals, teaching hospitals, large community 
hospitals, medium community hospitals, and small community hospitals - to compare 
performance among peer hospitals in each group (Foster, 2009). Still, researchers have 
not confirmed that vertical integration, pursued by ―hub‖ hospitals that acquire outlying 
―feeder‖ hospitals drives referrals to the hub or has improved efficiencies and/or 
outcomes (Nakamura et al., 2007). 
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Many issues remain to be addressed in the volume/quality arena, such as the role 
of intensivists and other hospital-based physicians, appropriate minimum volumes for 
particular procedures and diagnoses, risks associated with patient profiles including age, 
the indirect consequences of local redistributions of capacity, and differences in the 
validity of the volume/quality relationship across the medical specialties (Christian et al., 
2005; Glance, Dick, Mukamel, & Osler, 2007; Goshima, Mills, Awari, Pike, & Hughes, 
2008; Grilli, 2001; Konety, Allareddy, Modak, & Smith, 2006; Urbach & Baxter, 2004). 
Also, performance varies by a number of factors unrelated to volume, such as surgeon 
characteristics, how often a doctor performs a given procedure, subspecialty training and 
certification, and the hospital setting in which the surgeon operates (Birkmeyer, 2004; 
Dimick & Birkmeyer, 2008). These all show that hospital volume may be a weak proxy 
for quality of performance and thus outcomes for most surgical procedures. Individual 
quality measures have significant limitations for assessing surgeon performance, and a 
simple composite of mortality and volume may be a better predictor of performance than 
either measure alone.  
Beyond the many confounding factors that could affect the volume/quality 
relationship, there is also the endogeneity problem – known as the ―practice makes 
perfect‖ hypothesis – that volume could produce better performance, while at the same 
time, better performers could attract greater demand and thus higher volumes. Clearly, it 
is important that the direction of causality be established. And, finally, there are policy 
issues, including, in particular, the diminishing effect specialization could have on 
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competition and market-driven innovation (Epstein, 2002; Shortell, Morrison, & Hughes, 
1989). 
In sum, while the literature suggests that many factors affect performance and 
outcomes, in addition to volume and experience, it also provides general support for the 
relationship between volume and quality. Aside from the many conceptual, practical, and 
clinical arguments, general hospitals and their systems are motivated by competitive 
pressures and community expectations to provide the best care possible to their local 
populations (Dayhoff & Cromwell, 1993; Leander, 1993). On the other hand, it often 
appears that many hospitals today remain possibly suspended in the tension between two 
competing, strategic agendas: the need to compete for the same patients – leading to an 
emphasis on broadening the range of services offered – and the need to establish 
uniqueness and differentiation – leading to greater service line specialization. Research 
on organizational transformation reveals that organizations do not change their 
fundamental properties quickly, even when environmental opportunities and constraints 
change. Such structural inertia is even viewed as pathological (Carroll & Hannan, 2000). 
Approaches for Achieving Greater Efficiencies 
As recently as 2005, approximately one-third of total national health expenditures 
occurred in inpatient hospital facilities, despite the shift of services to outpatient settings 
to lower costs of patient care. Inpatient care costs thus remain a concern for policymakers 
and payers, having increased from $417.0 billion to $611.6 billion in just 5 years between 
2000 and 2005, for an average annual increase of 8% (which was more than twice the 
rate of inflation over the same period) (Health, United States 2007, 2008). Partly as a 
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result of this, workers‘ health insurance premiums have increased more than five times 
faster than wages between 2000 and 2007 (Families USA, 2008). With the continuing 
spiral in healthcare costs, the pressure on hospitals to increase efficiencies remains 
intense.  
One approach to improving efficiencies is to emphasize specialization, for 
example, by shifting capacity among hospitals in the same-system in a given market to 
eliminate redundancies and capture economies of scale (Dranove et al., 1992). While 
much research has examined economies of scale in hospitals, there is limited evidence of 
the role service line specialization might have played in generating efficiencies, either 
within individual hospitals or among same-system hospitals operating locally. Economies 
might apply to hospital specialization at three basic levels: (a) a pruning of service lines 
by individual hospitals to lower per unit costs per case (Eastaugh, 1992; Farley & Hogan, 
1990), (b) the development of specialty institutes or centers within the walls of general 
hospitals, and (c) the shifting of service capacities within local or regional hospital 
clusters to ―lead hospitals‖ within those clusters. The degree to which these are pursued 
and whether they are being pursued with success is not known, as there is little published 
research on patterns of specialization in hospitals. For example, despite the publicly 
announced designations of ―centers of excellence‖ in bariatric surgery (to encourage 
payer coverage of procedures in quality institutions based on mortality statistics), there is 
limited evidence of the degree to which this has created greater efficiencies in the 
delivery of care for obesity (Surgical Review Corporation, 2007). 
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The rationale for specialization is rooted in the industrial revolution, with its 
concomitant focus on experience, economies of scale, the assembly line, and a division of 
labor. Henry Ford was one of the first to apply such concepts by introducing the assembly 
line to American automobile manufacturing in 1908 (―Henry Ford Changes the World, 
1908,‖ 2005). By applying the concept of ―division of labor,‖ the industrialist pursued the 
dual objectives of maximizing error-free quality while minimizing per unit costs of 
production. The learning strategies emphasized the benefits of repetition, retention and 
ultimately competence, as B. F. Skinner (1969) documented in his experiments about 
behavioral learning decades later.  
In the hospital sector, specialty hospitals apply the concept that core 
competencies, cultivated by specialized routines and focused activities, can result in 
quality improvement, competitive advantage, and production economies (Shortell et al., 
1989). While by comparison to the smaller, single focused hospital, the general hospital 
would be expected to experience efficiency losses attributable to their broader scope of 
services and accompanying internal politics and information impediments (Schneider et 
al., 2008), there is little evidence that specialty hospitals are more efficient than general 
hospitals (Carey, Burgess, & Young, 2008).  
The alternative to single-facility specialization is internal specialization, which 
hospitals pursue by emphasizing selected, inpatient service lines. To the extent that this is 
tied to local hospital clusters, this configuration would build on an historic stream of 
arguments for specialization within complex multi-plant organizations. Skinner (1974), 
for example, argued that multi-plant firms engaged in producing multiple product lines 
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should restructure production such that individual plants specialize in narrower ranges of 
products and production activities. This would produce economies of scale in single-plant 
production, while maintaining the advantages attributable to economies of scope through 
multi-plant coordination. Skinner‘s ―focused factory‖ approach is consistent with the 
concept of coordinated specialization within geographic clusters of hospitals. Skinner‘s 
concept relies on three premises that are relevant to hospitals and the hospital-based 
clusters, in particular: (a) there are multiple ways to achieve competitive advantage, (b) a 
general hospital, like a conventional factory, cannot easily achieve superior performance 
in every service line, and (c) simplicity, repetition, experience, and homogeneity of tasks 
contribute to improved performance.  
In fact, one of the hallmarks of changes in U.S. industry during the second half of 
the 20th century was the adoption of lean production, flexible specialization, and focused 
factories, resulting in many business establishments becoming less diverse and more 
specialized (Schneider et al., 2008). Skinner‘s points suggest that specialization can be 
considered a strategy for collaborating hospitals within the same multi-hospital system, 
following the notion that hospitals, like manufacturing plants, may divide the functional 
service line tasks they share. The application of Skinner‘s focused factory principle for 
achieving efficiencies in sub-units is discussed further in Chapter Three, as the work of 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) is called upon to integrate same-system general hospitals 
with cluster analysis.  
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Increased Rivalry Among Hospital Competitors 
In addition to the call for improved hospital quality and safety and the need for 
greater efficiencies to curb costs, the third trend potentially driving the general hospital to 
adopt clinical service line specialization is the increased rivalry generated by the merger 
and acquisition wave of the 1990s in the U. S. It produced two important effects related 
to specialization. First, it has greatly increased the levels of market concentration, as 
hospitals and other providers have formed system clusters at local and regional levels 
(Luke, 2010). Although economic theory postulates that increased concentration can lead 
to lower price competition (Kovacic & Smallwood, 1994), concentration can also 
increase non-price competition, of which specialization is an important form (Fennell, 
1980, 1982; Luke et al., 2004; Succi et al., 1997).   
Second, increased concentration in the acute care hospital sector has intensified 
the level of non-price rivalry among the much-reduced number of competitors in local 
markets (Alpha Center for Healthcare Planning, 1997; Douglas & Ryman, 2003). Some 
researchers find the growing importance of non-price competition among hospitals has 
revived tactics of the hospital‘s pursuit of individual physician referrals with renewed 
investments in high technology equipment and facilities, which Robinson and Luft (1985) 
described in the 1980s as a ―medical arms race‖ (Devers et al., 2003). As evidence of the 
latter, hospitals invested nearly $20 billion in imaging equipment such as MRIs in 2000 
(a year just following the most intense phase of the merger and acquisition wave), 
publicly affirming the expectation that the growth in spending on this technology would 
increase by 133% in the decade, 2000 – 2010. Based on a jointly published study by the 
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AHA and The Lewin Group, hospitals are expected to invest an estimated $200 billion on 
new hospital construction between 2004 and 2014 (American Hospital Association and 
The Lewin Group, 2005). Although retail clinics and ambulatory surgery centers captured 
much of the attention of healthcare professionals during the decade, the 29th Annual 
Construction & Design Survey published by Modern Healthcare shows that in 2007 most 
healthcare construction dollars were spent on inpatient hospital facilities, underscoring 
the continuing importance of non-price competitive strategies in an increasingly 
concentrated acute care sector (Robeznieks, 2008).  
Others attribute the boom in hospital construction during the first decade of 2000 
to more than the effects of market concentration, but also to changing demographics and 
psychographics, including, in particular, the prevalence and aging of baby boomers 
(Albert, Johnson, Gasperino, & Tokatli, 2003). With relatively greater wealth in 
approaching retirement, the graying consumer tends to demand not only more 
comfortable and convenient accommodations in healthcare (e.g., private rooms and valet 
parking) but access as well to the very latest developments in specialty equipment 
technology (e.g., robotics for surgery) than consumers in the past. Additionally, some 
acute care providers feel pressured to build or remodel facilities to be more 
environmentally friendly than structures of earlier eras, indicative of their hospital 
marketing efforts to cater to even the ideologies of targeted consumer audiences 
(Robeznieks, 2008). Such factors have led to substantial, increased capital spending in 
recent years by general hospitals. These investments, in one form or another, could well 
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signal targeted marketing strategies by general hospitals, consistent with a move toward 
specialization, especially in high volume, high revenue-generating service lines. 
Service Line as a Target of Specialization by Hospitals 
In the wake of technological advances, an increasing number of surgical and 
diagnostic procedures are being performed on an outpatient basis. Consequently, many 
general hospitals have opened free-standing, same-day surgery centers for lower risk, 
minimally invasive procedures such as cataract or laser vision surgeries. Considered a 
defensive strategy in communities where physicians or for profit corporations are 
opening ambulatory care centers and special surgery facilities without regulatory 
interference, this physical unbundling of services by a general hospital, historically 
offering only inpatient care, could be viewed as a means of ―external specialization.‖ 
While an option, such a segregation of services does not directly contribute volume to 
inpatient bed capacity utilization or provide service backup of the general hospital with 
acute care and emergency services. Consequently, outpatient services as a means of 
external specialization are not the focus of this research, even though they do constitute 
an important possible form of hospital specialization.  
An alternative strategy for the general hospital is specializing along selected, 
inpatient service lines, or ―internal specialization.‖ It is consistent with the 
recommendation that general, community hospitals reorganize around a narrower range 
of clinical activity, distinguish themselves on quality and service, think more like the 
service retailers they are fast becoming, and overhaul their relationships with physicians 
(Grote et al., 2006). Choice of this strategic option is enhanced by the coordinated 
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involvement of geographical cluster members because cluster membership provides a 
pathway for hospital partners collectively to plan for a community-wide delivery of care 
through shared resources. It also achieves the objective of insulating patient volumes and 
thus revenues of a hospital‘s bedrock, namely inpatient services. This goal can be 
accomplished without losing shares of patients to competitors, since such specialization 
can be coordinated with same-system members. The concept is parallel to the creation of 
academic magnet schools within a citywide or countywide public school system (Brooks, 
Stern, Waldrip, & Hale, 1999). Specialization by internal, clinical service line thus 
emerges as a key strategy worthy of study and a concept proven to work outside of 
healthcare.  
Prior to the early 1970s, the major variable employed for the analysis of 
community hospitals was hospital size, measured by number of inpatient beds. Among 
the early analyses of service scope was research conducted by Carr and Feldstein (1967) 
that grouped hospitals by the number of facilities and services. Research by Edwards, 
Miller, and Schumacher (1972) used four specific indices to classify community hospitals 
by scope of service. Another early study was conducted by the American College of 
Physician Executives in 1988. This study found that half of the hospital respondents to a 
survey indicated that they conducted service line management or operated ―centers of 
excellence.‖ The most prevalent service lines emphasized by hospitals at the time were 
categorized as cardiopulmonary, emergency care, intensive care, and oncology (Hammon 
& Davis, 1989). During this era, service line management grew in importance in the 
hospital sector. 
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While service line management has gained strength, the actual definition of a 
service line continues to vary from organization to organization (Tesch & Levy, 2008). 
Complicating comparative analysis is the fact that it is not strictly defined by the AHA. In 
fact, there are many ways to define service lines, including groupings along medical 
specialties, DRGs, specific patient conditions, surgical procedures, different patient 
services, or other clinical categories (Desai & Margenthaler, 1987). Whichever definition 
is chosen, a service line is traditionally considered a separate and distinct business unit 
within the hospital and often evaluated by management as a profit-and-loss center 
(Nackel & Kues, 1986).  
Regardless of how services are segregated and defined, analyzing competitive 
position in the market based on specific hospital services rather than the volume of 
discharges in the aggregate is needed (Shi, 1997). For nearly two decades, hospitals have 
granted exclusive contracts with specialty physicians in hopes of securing a targeted 
stream of patients, offering evidence of service line specialization (Dranove & White, 
1996). With the escalating battle between hospitals and physicians for control over 
specialty services in what may be a new medical arms race (Berenson, Bodenheimer et 
al., 2006), there is an even a stronger rationale for analyzing specialization in the general 
hospital sector, by assessing those inpatient service lines that can generate meaningful 
streams of revenue (and ultimately operating profit to cover administrative overhead) 
based on charges and patient volumes. In light of Americans living longer and with 
multiple co-morbidities, some researchers are placing more emphasis on coordination of 
care with a patient-centered service line model inclusive of primary care, disease 
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management, and prevention/education and wellness spanning multiple venues of service 
intervention (Porter & Teisberg, 2006; Tesch & Levy, 2008). This further complicates 
service line segregation for meaningful analysis. 
Selecting Service Lines to Study: A National Perspective 
There are various dimensions of inpatient specialization on which hospitals might 
focus. Three that might be considered are: (a) highest average patient charge per case, (b) 
highest demand as measured by patient volume, and (c) highest aggregate hospital 
revenue as measured by charges upon patient discharge. Focusing solely on patient 
volume without taking into consideration revenue-generating capability, by charge per 
case or in the aggregate, could highlight service lines that may not generate sufficient 
dollars to cover adequately the overhead of infrastructure needed to support high volumes 
of patients. A possible example is patients with mood disorders, classified among 
inpatient psychiatric services, ranked ninth in hospital patient volume by service line but 
22nd in terms of aggregate charges, according to national HCUP statistics. Alternatively, 
selection of service lines based on the highest charge per case is likely to include highly 
specialized services for costly, rare conditions and thus lack relevancy to the broader 
needs of the local population. Instead, selecting top service lines representing a 
combination of high patient volume based on numbers of discharged cases and high 
revenue-generating ability based on charges captures two important dimensions that 
hospital administrators are likely to consider in judging what to emphasize in the pursuit 
of specialization strategies. This is especially true since profits after direct operating costs 
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and returns on specialized capital equipment by service line vary from hospital to hospital 
and are not publicly reported. 
Thus, a two-step process is used in identifying and selecting the nation‘s top 
service lines to study in the sample of hospital data used for the research. The first step 
ranks the leading diagnostic categories by patient volume relying on AHRQ‘s national 
statistics derived from HCUP data (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2007), 
associating each leading CCS-classified category with one or more service lines 
providing hospital care for such patients, the top 10 of which are illustrated in Table 4. 
Aside from general surgery and general medicine service lines that virtually all 
general hospitals offer, the top ranking service lines based on national statistics for 
inpatient volumes are likely to include: (a) labor and delivery, (b) pulmonary services, (c) 
cardiology, (d) cardiac surgery, (e) orthopedics, and (f) invasive cardiology. As a point of 
comparison, Thomson Healthcare, a private healthcare data services company, reports 
that its top five inpatient services lines, in descending order, based on number of patient 
visits for the most recent year (2007), and used in proprietary analyses for clients of 
Thomson Healthcare, are: cardiology, internal medicine, pulmonary, gastroenterology, 
and orthopedics (Strach & Young, 2007). 
Still, hospital billing data for public or private payers are not organized by service 
lines but rather by diagnosis code upon discharge and are comprised of procedures that 
may cross multiple services lines. Indicative of support for aggregating charges by 
diagnosis for purposes of analysis in the research, HCUP staff published findings based  
 
     
  
54 
Table 4 
      
Top Ten Inpatient Diagnostic Categories Based on 2007 Volume of Discharges 
      
    Total Cases Rank by     
Diagnosis Represented (000) Diagnosis Service Line(s) 
      
Liveborn 4,542.7 1 Labor and Delivery 
      
Pneumonia 1,171.5 2 Pulmonary Services, 
    General Medicine 
      
Congestive heart failure 1,024.9 3 Cardiology, General Medicine 
      
Coronary atherosclerosis 963.9 4 Cardiology, Invasive  
    Cardiology, Cardiac Surgery, 
    Vascular Surgery, General 
    Medicine 
      
Trauma to perineum 867.8 5 Labor and Delivery 
      
Osteoarthritis 814.9 6 Rheumatology, General 
    Medicine, Orthopedics 
      
Other maternal birth 810.4 7 Labor and Delivery 
Complications     
      
Nonspecific chest pain 788.4 8 Not determinable 
      
Mood disorders 774.3 9 Psychiatric Services,  
    General Medicine 
      
Cardiac dysrhythmias 731.5 10 Cardiology, Invasive Cardiology 
Note: Sourced from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) State Inpatient Databases (SID) of the 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). Retrieved October 24, 2009, from 
http://hcupnet.ahrq.gov/HCUPnet.jsp. U.S. National Statistics are represented by $1,033.835.7 million in charges 
and 39.5 million cases. 
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on its HCUP data indicating that one-fifth of the national hospital bill was for treatment 
of five conditions: coronary artery disease, mother‘s pregnancy and delivery, newborn 
infants, acute myocardial infarction, and congestive heart failure, with circulatory 
diseases accounting for six of the 20 most expensive conditions billed to Medicare 
(Andrews, 2008). Similarly, the selection of service lines for purposes of this research is 
further examined using the CCS-classified diagnosis categories from AHRQ‘s national 
statistics based on national HCUP data. Ranked by aggregate dollar charges, the top ten 
are depicted in Table 5. 
As illustrated by Table 5, regardless of whether service lines are selected based on 
their ranking of aggregate charges (revenues) by principal diagnosis or on the basis of 
total caseloads (volumes) of patients by principal diagnosis based on national statistics in 
2007, the top six service lines selected for study readily emerge among the top ten 
rankings are represented by: (a) labor and delivery, (b) pulmonary services, (c) 
cardiology, (d) cardiac surgery, (e) orthopedics, and (f) invasive cardiology. (While 
septicemia, or blood infection, is ranked third in charges [and 11th in volume], and 
complication of device implant or graft, is ranked seventh in charges [and 14th in 
volume] according to the HCUP data, both defy categorization in a service line and thus 
are excluded from choice.) All six service lines, rather than only one or two, have been 
selected for study because they broadly represent inpatient treatment of both acute care 
needs and chronic diseases and conditions and span a high percentage of community 
dwellers of different ages potentially served by their local, general hospital. They are also 
  
56 
 
Table 5     
      
Top Ten Inpatient Diagnostic Categories Nationwide Ranked by 2007 
            
      
  Hospital  Total  
 Charges Rank by Cases  
Diagnosis ($ Millions) $ Charges (000) Service Lines(s) 
      
Coronary atherosclerosis 44,868.3 1 963.9 Cardiology, Invasive 
    (4th) Cardiology, Cardiac 
     Surgery, Vascular 
     Surgery, General  
     Medicine, General 
     Surgery 
      
Liveborn infant 9,624.5 2 4,542.7 Labor and Delivery 
    (1st)  
      
Septicemia 38,828.1 3 675.4 Not determinable 
    (11th)  
      
Myocardial infarction 33,826.7 4 624.9 Cardiology, Invasive 
    (6th) Cardiology, Cardiac 
     Surgery 
      
Osteoarthritis 33,595.1 5 814.9 Rheumatology, 
    (5th) General Medicine, 
     Orthopedics 
      
Congestive heart failure 32,312.1 6 1,024.9 Cardiac, Invasive 
     Cardiology, General 
     Medicine 
      
Implant complication 30,580.3 7 623.9 Not determinable 
    (14th)  
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Table 5-continued     
            
      
  Hospital  Total  
  Charges Rank by Cases  
Diagnosis ($ Millions) $ Charges (000) Service Line(s) 
      
Pneumonia 29,864.3 8 1,171.5 Pulmonary Services, 
     General Medicine 
      
Spondylosis  25,813.3 9 633.7 Orthopedics 
    (12th)  
      
Respiratory failure (adult) 23,944.0 10 385.8 Pulmonary Services 
        (28th)   
Note: Sourced from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) State Inpatient Databases (SID) of the 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). Retrieved October 24, 2009, from 
http://hcupnet.ahrq.gov/HCUPnet.jsp. U.S. National Statistics are represented by $1,033,835.7 million in charges 
and 39.5 million cases. 
represented among the top ranking service lines, measured by charges and case volume, 
in the sample database for study.  
Alternatives to Selection of Service Lines Based on Volume and Revenue 
Alternative criteria for the selection of service lines exist. Previous research, for example, 
has focused on specialization as a means of reducing costs and thus improving economic 
efficiency. Such was the focus of much analysis in the 1980s by Eastaugh (1992), Farley 
and Hogan (1990), and others. More recently, Gu (2005) examined the effect of 
specialization on hospital financial performance using indicators of profitability from 
HCUP data for 11 states. However, these studies did not isolate the strategic choices  
by a hospital among service lines. Alternatively and from a competitive strategy 
perspective, this study seeks to identify patterns of relationships in response to 
opportunities or constraints externally in a hospital‘s marketplace, such as population 
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characteristics, or to strengths and resources internally, such as bed count or ownership 
tax status, which could influence its choices in specialization. Therefore, the identity of 
targeted service lines for study based on major national trends serves a useful purpose. 
Since net profitability by service line is not reported publicly by hospitals and thus 
unavailable in the databases used for analysis, the selection of service lines for study 
based on rank by profitability is not considered an option. The benefits of utilizing 
HCUP‘s clinical classification system as a means of consolidating scores of diagnoses 
and associated procedures are described further in Chapter Four on Methodology. 
Gaps in the Literature Bridged by the Study 
With this backdrop, the research aims to determine if evidence exists of 
specialization in the form of high volume, high revenue-generating service lines among 
general hospitals. Where evidence of such targeted specialization surfaces, descriptive 
characteristics of hospitals will help fill the following gaps in the literature:    
1. A focus on service lines which most, if not all, general hospitals could readily 
offer, in assessing specialization as a local, competitive strategy, as opposed to highly 
specialized, rarely performed procedures that do not necessarily relate to widespread 
healthcare needs across a population;   
2. Analysis of high demand, high revenue-generating service lines within a 
hospital as a unit of study rather than the clinical outcomes of the patient, concentrating 
on competitive strategies rather than clinical outcomes or cost efficiencies as is seen 
throughout the literature in discussions about case volumes of hospitals or surgeons; and 
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3. Analysis of general, community hospital cluster relationships in a common 
multi-hospital system in the context of service line specialization. 
This opens a vast opportunity for analysis of inpatient service line specialization 
as a competitive strategy by the general, community hospital. This endeavor could well 
be important in the study of specialization because of the new ground to be traversed for 
subsequent research. The potential value of undertaking this research is that: 
1. Leaders in the hospital sector might gain insight into the factors associated with 
strategic choice, with an emphasis on specialization; 
2. Healthcare outcomes might well be improved in those instances in which better 
outcomes follow higher volume, more narrowed focus. Understanding both the 
determinants of specialization and the relationships between specialization and outcomes 
could contribute to our improving quality; 
3. Guidance for future research about specialization options by general 
community hospitals could be better framed; and 
4. Hospitals may realize a strategically feasible pathway for avoiding duplication 
of services and for pruning marginal service lines without sacrificing responsiveness to 
the broad, acute and chronic care needs of their local community. Skinner‘s concept of 
focused manufacturing, and other arguments point to the need to include in the analysis 
an examination of the role cluster membership might play in shaping patterns of general 
hospital specialization. 
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Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter reviewed the historical context for the influence of specialty 
physicians on a general, community hospital‘s case mix and thus its service lines. Three 
major trends driving the general, community hospital to adopt clinical service line 
specialization as a competitive strategy were discussed. The drivers are: (a) demand for 
improved hospital quality and safety, (b) the need for greater efficiencies to curb spiraling 
costs of inpatient services, and (c) increased rivalry among hospital competitors surviving 
consolidation of the 1990s. Briefly, the impact of surgical specialty hospitals, the 
influence of The Leapfrog Group on high-volume, specialty services, and countervailing 
pressure against volume-supported specialization were also discussed. The advantages 
and disadvantages of different measures of hospital specialization were compared, and 
the justification for selected measures was offered. Rationale for isolating the six highest 
revenue-generating, clinical service lines with highest patient case volume was presented. 
With the individual hospital as the unit of analysis, the last section isolated descriptive 
characteristics of hospital organizations and their market environments based on the 
literature, for correlation with each of the service lines targeted for study. The designation 
of lead hospitals in clusters is suggested as a possible facilitator of specialization and thus 
included among the descriptive variables chosen as predictors in the analysis. The gap in 
literature to be filled by the research concludes this chapter and lays additional 
justification for such a study as outlined.
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CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL SETTING 
 
Introduction 
This chapter introduces the broad bodies of strategic management and 
organization theory as possible conceptual bases for explaining the pursuit of 
specialization by general hospitals. Following a summary of the origins and evolution of 
strategic management perspectives, the second section of the chapter briefly surveys 10 
different views of strategic management classified as ―schools of thought‖ by Mintzberg, 
Ahlstrand, and Lampel (1998). The objective is to identify those frameworks that might 
serve as a theoretical foundation for the formulation of constructs and hypotheses. Two 
perspectives emerge from this review, and both are subsequently discussed in greater 
depth: (a) the market structure perspective (called the ―positioning‖ school by Mintzberg 
et al. and largely comprised of Porter‘s [1980] contributions drawn from industrial 
organization economics) that addresses organizational responses to external marketplace 
forces; and (b) the resource-based view that emphasizes core competences (resources and 
capabilities) and addresses the responses of organizations to external stimuli. The third 
section examines four prominent perspectives in organization theory. From this review, 
one theoretical perspective - based largely on the contributions of Lawrence and Lorsch 
(1967, 1969) – is identified as potentially helping to explain the role that complex 
organizations, specifically hospital clusters, might play in enabling hospitals to engage in
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specialization. As a response to turbulent conditions in the environment, their perspective 
recognizes the need for organizations, as uniquely differentiated units internally, to be 
concatenated and fused into an integrated whole. This is consistent with the necessity for 
general hospitals that are members of clusters to be differentiated (e.g., through service 
line specialization) as well as unified through inter-organizational coordination. The 
fourth section uses these three perspectives to identify the primary constructs of interest 
in this study. The market structure perspective draws attention to the key factors external 
to organizations, while resource-based view focuses on those elements considered 
internal to organizations. The perspective of Lawrence and Lorsch (1967, 1969) 
considers the role hospital clusters might play in facilitating service line specialization 
within selected cluster-member hospitals. The chapter concludes with a fifth section that 
formulates a series of hypotheses that guide the empirical analysis of general hospital 
specialization through highest patient demand (volume) and highest revenue-generating 
(based on charges) service lines.  
Strategic Management Perspectives 
The Origins and Evolution of Strategic Management 
Strategic management, as a field of scholarly inquiry, comprises a number of 
perspectives that address how organizations formulate strategy – a process focus – and 
what factors are important in strategic choice – a content focus. The latter perspectives 
are of interest to this study, as they apply to the rationale for strategic choice. The former 
apply more to the mechanisms organizations use in decision making and thus do not 
apply to this study.  
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The origins of strategic management as a discipline in the 1950s and 1960s rest on 
the founding principles chiefly provided by Drucker, Selznick, Chandler, and Ansoff. 
Peter Drucker (1954), a prolific strategy theorist and organizational consultant, made 
many valuable contributions on the process side of strategic management, including the 
concept of management by objectives (MBO). Philip Selznick (1957) made many 
important contributions to organization theory that have application to the management 
of strategy, including his focus on mission and distinctive competencies in determining 
organizational responses to the environment. His work thus constitutes some of the early 
contributions to the assessment of internal organizational resources and capabilities as 
bases for gaining competitive advantage. He advocated for strengths and weaknesses to 
be assessed in light of opportunities and threats in the business environment, ultimately 
laying the foundation of thinking for the ubiquitous SWOT analysis performed by 
organizations the globe over. Alfred Chandler (1962) recognized the value of 
coordinating all aspects of management under a single, all-encompassing strategy for the 
organization. In his seminal work on strategy and structure, he advocated for a long-term, 
coordinated strategy to give a company structure, direction, and focus. Igor Ansoff 
(1965) built upon Chandler‘s early work by introducing a range of concepts for applying 
strategies aimed at directing market penetration, product development, market 
development, and diversification. He contributed as well by emphasizing the need for 
organizations to visualize and fill the distance between where a company is and where it 
wishes to be. 
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By the 1970s, much of the attention of theorists addressed issues of organizational 
size, growth, and portfolio (Buzzell & Gale, 1987). During the 1980s, strategic 
management concerned itself with corporate values, giving rise to a renewed interest in 
continuous process improvement to achieve both productivity gains and enhanced 
competitiveness (Deming, 1982) at a time when Japanese corporate culture supporting 
―kaizen‖ and total quality management were in vogue (Ohmae, 1982; Pascale & Athos, 
1981). Hamel and Prahalad (1990) advanced the concept of core competency and the 
importance of identifying one or two key capabilities that distinguish an organization 
from its competitors. One of the most influential strategists of the 1980s was Porter, who 
introduced the concepts and tools of industrial organization economics for use in the 
analysis of strategy. Porter‘s work contributed importantly to the identification of market 
determinants and, therefore, will be used in identifying constructs of interest in this study.  
Other perspectives were added in the 1990s and the subsequent decade, including 
the application of complexity theory and chaos theory to help explain the dynamic and 
adaptive nature of strategic decision making and the important role information plays in a 
knowledge-driven environment. During its evolution, the psychology (Barnard, 1938; 
Isenberg, 1984, 1986) and the limitations (Hamel, 2002) of strategic management were 
added as recognized dimensions. In summation, the body of strategic management 
represents a vast array of contributions by many individuals over recent decades, 
focusing either on the mechanisms of strategic decision making (processes) or the 
determinants of strategic choice (content).  Because the research seeks to understand the 
drivers and thus the content of strategic choice (McClelland, 1953), perspectives on 
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content rather than process will be used in formulating research constructs. The next 
section attempts to sift through the different perspectives spanning much of the body of 
strategic management in search of concepts and frameworks that could be used in this 
research.   
The Ten Mintzberg “Schools” 
In an effort to synthesize the major conceptual perspectives in the field of 
strategic management, Mintzberg et al. (1998) suggested that the field could be 
summarized by grouping them into what they called ―ten schools of thought.‖ They 
assigned the following names to the schools: (a) design, (b) planning, (c) positioning, (d) 
entrepreneurial, (e) cognitive, (f) learning, (g) power, (h) culture, (i) environmental, and 
(j) configuration. Eight of the ten are readily discarded as they address process 
considerations: (a) design school (Selznick, 1957) for its emphasis on steps in decision 
making and the need to achieve a fit between strengths and weaknesses and external 
threats and opportunities; (b) planning school (Ansoff, 1965) for its emphasis on formal 
processes; (c) entrepreneurial school for its emphasis on intuitive thinking and visioning 
and the role of the chief executive in decision making (Schumpeter, 1942); (d) cognitive 
school for its focus on cognition as a means of  information processing, knowledge 
mapping, and concept attainment (March & Simon, 1958); (e) learning school for its 
focus on the chaotic steps of strategy formulation (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1980; 
Lindblom, 1959); (f) power school for its focus on the process of negotiation and the use 
of power over others in alliances, joint ventures, and other network relationships, 
rendering a discontinuous process to the formulation of strategy (Alison, 1971; Astley & 
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Sachdeva, 1984; Hedberg & Jönsson, 1977); (g) culture school for its anthropologic focus 
on a social process of coalescence with perpetuation rather than introduction of change 
(Normann, 1977; Rhenman, 1973), and (h) configuration school for its historical 
emphasis on organizational transformation, combining the view of organizations as 
dynamic forms of characteristics and behaviors undergoing the process of start-up, 
turnaround, and integration (Chandler, 1962).   
Mintzberg et al. (1998) maintain that only two schools focus directly on content. 
One is the positioning school, with its emphasis on market structure (concentration, 
barriers to entry, degree of differentiation) and rival conduct. The other is the 
environmental school, with its emphasis on external determinants (political, economic, 
social, and technological) of strategic change. Another perspective, the resource-based 
view, while not included among the 10 schools discussed by Mintzberg and colleagues, 
also focuses on content over process and thus will be examined for its relevancy to this 
study. The environmental school actually includes a fairly diverse collection of 
theoretical perspectives and analytical tools. For example, the authors include within this 
school such perspectives as contingency theory and population ecology. The 
environmental school will thus not be considered explicitly, but some perspectives will 
be discussed subsequently in this chapter.  
Market Structure Perspective 
Classifying Porter‘s contribution as the positioning school, as Mintzberg et al., 
(1998) and many others have done, actually misrepresents what Porter brought to field of 
strategy. Rather than positioning, Porter‘s most important contribution was to incorporate 
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the structural concepts and tools of industrial organization (IO) economics into the 
analysis of strategy (Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan, & Yiu, 1999). Grounded in decades of 
theoretical and empirical development, IO economics emphasizes the role market 
structure plays in driving competitive moves by rivals. Among the most important 
structural features are: market concentration, height of entry barriers, and degree of 
differentiation in the market (Bain & Qualls, 1987). Increased consolidation, higher entry 
barriers, and greater differentiation in the markets mean that fewer competitors exercise 
greater market power and, therefore, pose greater competitive threat than would be the 
case under other market conditions. In addition, Porter broadened the structural reach to 
include threats from buyers, sellers, new entrants, and substitutes. 
Market concentration is an important factor in the analysis of the sector of 
healthcare services, given the significant consolidation that occurred in the 1990s, 
especially in the hospital sector. Following the wave of mergers and acquisitions in the 
1990s, small numbers of often large and relatively powerful hospital rivals dominated 
competition in most urban markets across the country. Thus, it is important to include 
measures of market structure into an analysis of general hospital specialization, 
particularly market concentration. 
Positioning, as a key dimension of strategy, helps to clarify the importance of 
specialization which can be viewed as a form of positioning. As Porter suggests, 
organizations in their competitive maneuvering generally decide among three generic 
competitive strategies or positions – cost leadership, differentiation, and focus (Porter, 
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1980). Each of these has direct application to service line specialization because each 
calls for an element of distinction among competitors, if successful.  
It is noteworthy that in their analysis of the healthcare industry itself, Porter and 
Teisberg (2006) highlight the need for healthcare organizations, hospitals in particular, to 
move away from the general hospital model in place for over a century toward 
specialization strategies. Their specific criticisms of the industry include: (a) the range of 
services is too broad for distinction to be found; (b) the focus on individual, discrete 
services in the form of isolated procedures is too narrow, whereas a broader, more 
integrative focus on care for diagnosed health problems (service line) would be better; 
and (c) the geographic focus is too localized, whereas a broader geographic reach 
inherent in specialization strategies is preferable. The general hospital model, they argue, 
fails to capture the advantages of concentrating effort and identity on the treatment of 
defined clinical problems. As a result, hospitals and other providers are too costly, not 
sufficiently responsive to specific needs in the population, not sufficiently integrated, and 
do not achieve the level of quality otherwise attainable with higher volumes in specific 
areas.  
What Porter and Teisberg (2006) miss in their analysis is how individual, free-
standing hospitals can specialize successfully in highly competitive environments. In 
particular, they do not consider the role that hospital clusters, which now exist in nearly 
all markets across the country, can play in facilitating the restructuring of service 
capacities among local hospital same-system members. In other words, they did not 
consider the impact of mergers, acquisitions, or other strategic maneuvers both on market 
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structure and on the ability of hospitals to restructure their clinical functions within local 
systems. Put another way, Porter and Teisberg argue for specialization but overlook the 
opportunities inherent in a focused factory strategy that same-system hospital clusters 
could offer. The discussion of clusters resumes later in this chapter in the context of work 
by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967, 1969). 
Some have criticized the positioning school for its emphasis on consolidation, 
dominance, and mature markets (a criticism also leveled against the field of strategic 
management overall). An overemphasis on analytically derived strategies focused on 
market power could create blind spots to new information and emerging strategies. 
Bower and Christensen (1995) criticize the market structural approach for its lack of 
emphasis on new entrants and substitutes relative to threats within the vertical channel 
from buyers, sellers, and, of course, rivals. Given the increasingly important role 
technological change is playing in today‘s economy, they also point to the need for 
organizations to become more aware of the possibility that disruptive technologies in the 
form of innovations could change the bases on which markets are defined, the forms 
competition takes, and the players involved in that competition. Examples of disruptive 
technologically-based changes include the refrigerator replacing the icebox for chilling 
and the personal computer replacing mainframes for processing. Still another example is 
the retooling of the reservations process, boarding, and scheduling procedures by 
Southwest Airlines, which represented a major disruptive, technological change that 
structurally altered the forms of competition in the airlines industry. 
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The foregoing criticism is relevant because the healthcare industry is especially 
vulnerable to disruptive technological change, given the rate and degree of change in 
such areas as surgical devices, drug therapies, gene therapy, electronic medical records, 
and other innovations. It is therefore considered valuable to view specialization as not 
only a response to changes in market structure and relative market power but also as part 
of an evolving technological revolution in the healthcare field. It is important for 
providers to revisit traditional ways of organizing and delivering services in order to keep 
up with unexpected changes, in part, driven by changes in technology. 
The Resource-based View 
The resource-based view argues that competitive advantage is generated from 
distinctive resources and capabilities internal to an organization. It also suggests that if 
these resources and capabilities are protected against imitation, transfer, or substitution, 
they can help secure long-term advantages for an organization. Edith Penrose is credited 
with the founding idea of viewing a firm as a bundle of resources and linking a firm‘s 
performance to the interaction between material and human resources (Hoskisson et al., 
1999). She argued that it is not the resources or capabilities themselves but the 
contributions they make to improving production processes that produce competitive 
advantage. Managerial capability, Penrose maintained, is a particularly important 
constraint that limits the growth of firms, a scenario generally known as the ―Penrose 
Effect‖ (Penrose, 1959). More generally, this perspective suggests that an entity‘s growth 
is a function of firm-specific, distinctive resources and capabilities.   
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Decades later, Prahalad and Hamel (1990), Barney (1986; 1986; 1991; 1991), and 
others applied the resource-based view to strategy. Barney, for example, argued that 
superior performance relative to rivals results from acquiring and exploiting unique 
resources. Others maintained that well-chosen strategies allow firms to exploit their core 
competencies in the marketplace (Hoskisson et al., 1999). Figure 1 summarizes the 
application of the resource-based view to the achievement of sustainable competitive 
advantage in the marketplace. 
 
Competitive Advantage Phase                      Sustainability Phase 
           
 
 
 
Figure 1. The resource-based view: sustaining competitive advantage over time. 
Note:  Sourced from Wade, M. & Hulland, J., (2004).  The resource-based view and information systems 
research:  review, extension, and suggestions for future research. MIS Quarterly, 28, 107 – 142. 
 
The resource-based view can be seen as representing a hybrid of the learning and 
culture schools (Mintzberg & Lampel, 1999), as it highlights the assessment of core 
capabilities and competences as part of internal organizational design strategies and 
processes. The more descriptive learning school, reminiscent of the work of Itani and 
Roehl (1987), is compatible with the resource-based view to the extent that individual 
facilities, systems, and human resources are enhanced based on experience and learning. 
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The learning school sees strategies as emergent and derived from resources and 
capabilities that reflect an organization‘s core competencies.   
As it is resistant to significant change, culture infuses an organization with the 
discipline to follow protocol and thus to insulate itself against errors that otherwise might 
be incurred were it to operate outside standard procedures. Such thinking reflects the 
influence of Japanese management practices especially prevalent in the 1980s (Hedberg 
& Jönsson, 1977). The culture school focuses on competencies rooted in an 
organization‘s culture rather than relying on leadership to direct its strategic focus. This, 
too, supports a focus on core competencies (distinctive resources and capabilities) that 
specialization presumably could refine and improve, building on evidence-based 
practices and experience. While not initially recognized by Mintzberg (1998) and 
colleagues among their 10 schools of thought, the resource-based view addresses the 
distinctive internal resources and capabilities needed for an organization to capture the 
advantages of specialization.  
The resource-based view has been applied extensively to the information 
technology services sector, given the key role distinctive resources and capabilities play 
in that industrial arena. Some even consider it the dominant view of business strategy 
(Barney & Clark, 2007). With its focus on the internal sources of advantage and tie it to 
performance, it should instead be seen as providing an ideal complement to the market 
structure perspective with its emphasis on external factors and analysis.   
In sum, the field of strategic management includes a collection of concepts, tools 
and analytical frameworks drawn from the study of organizations, business management, 
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and markets (Hoskisson et al., 1999). These have application not only to firms generally 
but also to healthcare organizations. The perspectives of strategy are especially 
applicable, given the rapidity and pervasiveness of change that have occurred in 
American healthcare in recent decades (Trinh & O‘Connor, 2002). It is essential that one 
focus not only on an organization‘s external environment but likewise on the many 
internal resources and capabilities that enable organizations to produce distinctive 
responses to the many threats in their environments (Shortell & Zajac, 1990). By drawing 
specifically on Porter‘s concepts of market structure as an external determinant and 
Penrose‘s focus on distinctive resources and capabilities as internal determinants of 
service line specialization, the competitive response of general, community hospitals to 
their opportunities and threats can be examined in the context of theoretical constructs.   
Organization Theory 
Organization theory studies individual and group dynamics in an organizational 
setting as well as whole organizations, how they adapt, and the strategies and structures 
that guide them. The field has evolved to include a focus on power, culture, and the 
interaction among whole populations and among organizations. The relationship between 
environment and organizational structure is especially important in organizational theory 
and thus should provide additional conceptual support for the study of specialization by 
general hospitals.   
The Origins and Evolution of Organization Theory 
While the roots of organizational theory can be traced back to the ancient Greek 
philosophers Plato and Aristotle who recognized the influence of leadership, 
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organizational theory developed most meaningfully in the first half of the 20th century 
when Frederick Taylor (1917) established scientific management theory (Walonick, 
2008). Taylor's principles, in addition to their focus on matching workers with tasks and 
closely supervising them, charged management with the task of planning and control. The 
Second World War shifted the emphasis externally to the field logistics and operations 
research. The early 1970s through the 1980s witnessed the introduction of four prominent 
perspectives amidst an explosion of theories developed in the body of organization 
theory: resource dependency theory, population ecology theory, exchange theory, and 
contingency theory.  
Assessing the Theoretical Perspectives 
Resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) argues that organizations 
respond to demands made by external actors or organizations upon whose resources they 
are heavily dependent. Given such dependency, they will try to minimize those 
dependencies, especially should access to them be threatened (Pfeffer, 1982). They do 
this in part by entering into inter-organizational arrangements in order to minimize risk 
and augment organizational power. Unlike the resource-based view, resource dependency 
theory is developed from the perspective of relationships with other organizations as 
opposed to internal strengths, distinctiveness, and uniqueness. This perspective does not 
per se focus on internal restructuring strategies, such as those included in hospital 
specialization. As a result, resource dependency theory is not directly applicable to the 
study of general hospital service line specialization. 
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Population ecology theory (also called organizational ecology), developed by 
Hannan and Freeman (1989), suggests that social processes on a macro level play a 
greater role than managerial action in determining an organization's success or failure. 
This perspective analogizes to Darwinian evolution to explain founding and death rates of 
organizations as they respond to environmental stimuli. Population ecology theory asserts 
that: (a) organizations develop routines that ensure reliability and accountability, (b) 
reliability and accountability require organizational structures that are highly 
reproducible, (c) the reproduction of routines that are similar across organizations is the 
cause of organizational inertia, considered a consequence of selection, and (d) the 
environment will favor organizations with high inertia. This rather fatalistic perspective 
of organizational behavior, however, does not point to specific adaptive responses 
organizations might make to their environments. It therefore provides little help in 
formulating specific responses by hospitals to external stimuli, whose responses in this 
study include decisions to engage in service line specialization. Population ecology 
theory is therefore rejected for lack of applicability to the study. 
Social exchange theory explains social change and stability as a process of 
negotiated exchanges between parties. The theory posits that all relationships are formed 
by the use of subjective cost-benefit analyses and comparisons of alternatives. While 
sociologist Homans (1958) is generally credited with consolidating the early foundations 
from which the theory took shape, Thibaut and Kelley (1959) are credited for having 
developed and promoted the theory of social exchange. They framed the theory on the 
premise that anticipated reciprocity, gain in reputation and influence over others, and the 
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perception of efficacy and thus even altruism constitute the reasons people engage in 
social exchange. During the 1970s and 1980s, Emerson and Cook (1978) expanded upon 
the theory in the study of power, equity, and the creation of commitment during 
bargaining processes between individuals, undertaken always with the goal of achieving 
balance. While widely applied in the study of organizational behavior, social exchange 
theory is principally relevant to vertical relationships and thus often paired with 
transaction cost analysis. Again, as with the former two perspectives, exchange theory 
does not address the kinds of strategic responses that would lead hospitals to engage in 
specialization for purposes of gaining competitive advantage for themselves in their 
markets and thus is not considered applicable to this study.  
A fourth prominent framework, contingency theory, also addresses organizational 
adaptation to environmental change. However, it is set apart from the three previously 
discussed perspectives by its focus on horizontal strategies and coordination. This point 
of distinction renders it potentially applicable to the study of inter-organizational 
coordination among hospitals in their pursuit of service line specialization. In studying 
four large U.S. corporations, Chandler (1962) proposed a precursor to the theory‘s full 
development that the structure of an organization naturally evolves to accommodate 
strategy, in a rational, sequential manner in response to an organization's external 
environmental elements and forces. Specifically, this perspective has applications to the 
study of hospital clusters that could coordinate service line specialization by trading and 
shifting clinical capacities within systems in local markets. Proponents of the contingency 
theory (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Perrow, 1967; Rundall, 
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Starkweather, & Norrish, 1998; Thompson, 1967) suggest an organic form of 
organization is likely to be more effective than one less integrated when the environment 
is complex and dynamic, tasks and technologies are non-routine, and a relatively high 
percentage of professionals are involved.    
From the foregoing, the work specifically by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) is 
selected to serve as a theoretical bridge between externally driven, market-based 
challenges and internal capacity restructuring, as might be required by hospitals that are 
members of clusters in the pursuit of clinical specialization. The perspective provided by 
Lawrence and Lorsch thus justifies looking at the restructuring of clinical capacities 
within same-system hospital clusters as a contingent response to environmental 
turbulence. In more turbulent environments, complex, multi-organizational arrangements 
are expected to adopt two inter-related organizational strategies as they seek efficiencies 
and stability: (a) differentiation across facilities to achieve efficiencies as well as 
improved market positioning, (b) and integration to achieve unity among the 
differentiated, but otherwise interdependent entities. As noted in Chapter Two and 
borrowing from Dayhoff and Cromwell (1993), differentiation, as applied to the study of 
hospital specialization, contrasts the services offered by individual hospitals to those 
provided by competitors in the same market. This form of specialization focuses on 
―external‖ diversity. Integration is the process of fusing and unifying differentiated 
entities through inter-organizational coordination. The work by Lawrence and Lorsch 
therefore provides a framework for explaining the conditions under which same-system 
hospitals might collectively engage in a coordinated scheme of service line specialization.  
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Their perspective suggests that complex organizations must balance their pursuit 
of external, market opportunities for differentiation with increased efforts to integrate 
organizational activities. Organizations that do both and achieve a unity of effort, 
Lawrence and Lorsch suggest, should be better able to adapt to environmental turbulence. 
More diversification implies a greater need for coordination, given that specialized, but 
interdependent functions and processes need coordination across organizations. In this 
sense, the framework provided by Lawrence and Lorsch is well suited to the analysis of 
hospitals that are members of the same-system and located in the same market.  
Many clusters are experimenting with mechanisms to integrate clinical functions 
across their local facilities. While the formation of hospitals into clusters is in itself a 
means of integration, this study does not examine integration as such. Instead, it 
examines the possibility that clustered hospital members might locally redistribute 
specialized capacities among their members in response to market threats.  
It is unlikely, however, that all hospitals within a cluster will become more 
differentiated. While this study is not intended to offer empirical evidence of whether 
cluster hospitals differ hierarchically by the level and complexity of specialized services 
they offer, it is logical that where such differences exist among cluster hospitals at least 
one member will emerge as the site to which one or more targeted lines of services are 
shifted. Observation of such evidence is expected if clusters do indeed collaboratively 
engage in service redistribution. This suggests the need to identify the likely specialty 
service leaders within clusters, as their increase in specialization might be accomplished 
with a commensurate decrease in specialization by other hospital cluster members. It is 
  
79 
also possible, of course, that clusters will designate a single hospital as the cluster‘s 
designated ―center of excellence‖ for a given specialty and another hospital for another 
specialty. Both possibilities – a single lead hospital within the cluster for all specialty 
areas or designated lead hospitals for individual specialties – are possible. This suggests 
the need for an independent variable that indicates whether or not a single hospital serves 
as lead hospital for each service line and cluster being examined.  
Healthcare clusters facilitate the coordination of strategies across organizational 
boundaries. The work by Lawrence and Lorsch thus provides a useful framework within 
which to study the inter-organizational coordination of capacity and, more specifically, 
individual hospital specialization (Conrad & Shortell, 1993; Robinson, 1997; Shortell & 
Kaluzny, 2000). In this regard, it is particularly relevant that Lawrence and Lorsch (1969) 
also studied how organizations adjust to accommodate their environments, granting 
managers at all levels the authority to make decisions contingent on the current situation. 
Such a perspective gives the local hospital management the freedom to specialize in a 
service line based on its local environmental factors even if other clusters elsewhere in 
the system exercise the freedom not to specialize similarly because market circumstances 
differ. In fully applying this thinking, the study recognizes such freedoms for strategic 
choice at the local market level and therefore does not assess service line specialization 
across the same multi-hospital system or across market borders. Lastly, the risks of such 
choice are implicit, as a general hospital can only pursue specialization in certain services 
generating high patient volumes and revenues at the expense of forfeiting or lowering 
investment in lower volume, lower revenue-generating service lines. 
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The Conceptual Frame 
As summarized in Figure 2, the review of the strategic management and 
organizational theory perspectives has identified three likely determinants of general 
hospital specialization, the first being external and the latter two being internal to the 
organization: market structure, resources and capabilities, and system configuration. 
While each is assumed to have an independent effect on the decision to specialize, some 
measures selected to represent each construct are likely to be correlated with measures 
for other constructs. This is because there is considerable endogeneity between external 
and internal factors. For example, highly concentrated markets are likely to produce 
greater numbers of clusters, larger clusters, and clusters that are more hierarchically 
configured (combinations of large, referral hospitals with smaller community hospitals). 
The latter is likely to be associated with greater specialization, given the greater 
possibilities for capacity restructuring that might exist within large, complex hospital 
clusters. It will be important, therefore, to minimize inter-correlations among the 
variables in selecting measures to represent the constructs.  
Hypotheses for Empirical Analysis 
Stemming from the simplistic graphic in Figure 2, three constructs are considered 
to be associated with patterns of service line specialization in general hospitals: market 
structure, distinctive resources and capabilities, and system configuration. This section 
discusses the indicators considered for inclusion in the analysis of hospital specialization, 
first examining external factors followed secondly by internal factors. The hypotheses are 
based on relationships derived from each set of theoretical arguments presented below. 
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Figure 2. Determinants of service line specialization in general hospitals. 
 
Characteristics of the Market Structure Representing the External Environment 
A number of market factors are likely to be associated with variations in patterns 
of hospital specialization. Consistent with Porter‘s framework on competitive 
positioning, these external opportunities and threats include characteristics of market 
structures such as competitive factors as well as characteristics of demand factors by the 
local populace. With regard to the latter, it is expected that certain local population 
characteristics are likely to be associated with the propensity of hospitals to focus on high 
volume, high revenue-generating service lines.  
Based on the arguments from industrial organization economics, it is assumed that 
broad characteristics of markets are likely determinants of organizational conduct in a 
market context. The most important such factors represent the two sides of the market 
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exchange – consumers and suppliers. On the consumer side, these factors include 
indicators of demand differences across markets. On the supply side, the most important 
consideration is the degree of market concentration among hospital providers, which is 
assumed to represent relative levels of market competitiveness. Consumer and supply 
measures are discussed in this section. 
Growth 
Despite the continuing debate over the effect of hospital procedure volume versus 
surgeon volume on quality outcomes discussed at length earlier in Chapter Two, patient 
volume by whatever route is essential to supporting the caseload requirements of both a 
facility and a physician‘s practice. An example is illustrated by the study of Nathan, 
Cameron, Choti, Schulick and Panlik (2009) documenting that in specialty surgery, the 
relative contributions of hospital volume versus surgeon volume vary according to the 
specific procedure in question. Even for specialty hospitals, the creation and survival of 
hospital-owned specialty services depend on the ability to generate and sustain the 
required volume of referral cases (Furumoto, 1983). In addition, growth sustains the 
economy of a locale with an ever-increasing base of revenue for financing expanded, 
local hospital investment in new technology. This in turn attracts specialty physicians to a 
facility, potentially fueling the addition of services as discussed in Chapter One. 
An empirical analysis by Strunk, Ginsburg, and Banker (2006) found evidence 
that aging will drive 0.74% annual growth in demand for hospital inpatient services over 
the decade 2005-2015, with the highest rates of growth in services used most by elderly 
patients. They concluded, nevertheless, that aging is a much less important factor than 
  
83 
local population trends such as growth and changing practice patterns attributable to 
advancing medical technology.  Consequently, rate of growth in the local population is 
considered a good barometer of demand in the research, since it potentially spans all age 
groups and generally is associated with the strength of the local economy. Such features 
of a local area may influence as well diverse investment in medical technology.  
On the other hand, general, community hospitals in an area with shrinking or non-
growth may feel forced to cut clinical services because of the difficulty in attracting 
specialty physicians or in an effort to trim expenses on low-revenue generating services. 
The rate of population growth can affect a hospital‘s strategic choices in different ways, 
by either forcing a narrowing of services for differentiation or even survival in a low or 
no growth area or encouraging more diverse services for differentiation, especially within 
high growth urbanized areas, because of the demands placed upon the institution. For 
purposes of this research, it is assumed that high growth markets will support investments 
to expand specialized services whereas low or negative growth areas will not and thus 
impose a narrowing of services. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is offered:  
H1: Higher local population growth rate in a hospital‘s market is positively related to 
specialization as defined by an internal measure of relative narrowness of offerings in 
high volume, high revenue-generating service lines, other things being equal. 
Poverty 
The total number of individuals living below the poverty level as a percentage of 
the local population is a characteristic of external, market factors worthy of analysis for 
its association with general hospital specialization for several reasons. It recognizes the 
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strong relationship between birth rates and Medicaid recipients and obstetrical care in 
general (whose qualification for Medicaid depends on poverty status), as one in four 
children in the United States are born and raised in poverty. Medicaid recipients are more 
likely to be babies and older children than adults (Gold & Kenney, 1985; Guillory, 
Samuels, Probst & Sharp, 2003). Additionally, it reflects the strong relationships between 
the hospitalization of growing minority and disadvantaged groups already large in 
number and disproportionately covered by Medicaid (Fleishman et al., 2005), and 
between widely prevalent children‘s illnesses requiring hospitalization and Medicaid 
coverage (Frogel et al., 2008; Fuss, 2009). In addition, those living in poverty are also 
more likely to have a lower health literacy and practice inferior preventive health 
measures, making them more vulnerable to illnesses and recurrent, traumatic episodes 
requiring hospitalization due to poor disease management. Researchers have 
demonstrated that general hospitals have not competed for insured patients as specialty 
hospitals have done with their highly targeted services, but instead continued to respond 
to the care needs of financially vulnerable patients (Tynan, November, Lauer, Pham, & 
Cram, 2009). Because both inner-city urban hospitals and rural hospitals treat a patient 
mix that tends to be poorer and older, typical of those qualifying as Medicaid 
beneficiaries, a market descriptor of poverty level is not necessarily geography dependent 
(―The Comparative Performance of U. S. Hospitals,‖ 1997). 
Medicaid recipients expressed as a percentage of a hospital‘s charges is frequently 
used in health services research, but this statistic is not indicative of local, community 
demand. Instead, it reflects an individual hospital‘s payer contracts with its state 
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Medicaid agency. Therefore, poverty level statistics instead are used in the study as a 
socio-demographic demand factor driving hospital usage and reflective of the community 
being served rather than payer statistics unrelated to the research questions of this study, 
in an attempt to reflect characteristics of childbirth rates among the young and poor, as 
well as the effects of chronic, diseases of the underserved elderly and poor. Furthermore, 
research illustrates the difficulty of using hospital discharge data linked with Medicaid 
enrollment files simply on the basis of inaccuracies in coding (Chattopadhyay & 
Bindman, 2005). Expecting the indigent to be directed to a more narrowly focused 
facility, the following hypothesis is thus posited:  
H2: A greater percentage of the local population living below the federally established 
poverty level is positively related to hospital specialization in high volume, high revenue-
generating service lines, other things being equal. 
Population Density 
Population bases in the study are mapped from Core Based Statistical Areas 
(CBSAs), the standard definition issued by the U.S. Census Bureau in 2000 (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2008), representing both metropolitan (METSA) and micropolitan (MICSA) 
statistical areas. Density of population as a continuous variable provides more 
information for a descriptive study than a simple, dichotomous variable often used by 
researchers to denote rural versus urban areas. Hence, population density is considered a 
good indicator of the level of specialty care of hospital providers and thus the degree of 
specialization available to the local community. 
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It is believed that population density differences, even more than absolute 
population sizes, could affect the degree to which hospitals engage in service line 
specialization. Higher densities are associated with shorter distances per potential case. 
Clearly, greater concentrations of patients within service areas should make it easier for 
hospitals to capture the number of cases needed to support a highly specialized service 
line. In other words, a larger population base can generate sufficient admissions to make 
numerous, specialized services viable, but it is the density more than absolute population 
that more accurately reflects issues of access in matching demand with supply.  
Correspondingly, rural areas with lower density of population are less likely to 
have hospitals offering a wide range of specialty services. For example, despite parity in 
outcomes, healthcare costs are shown to be lower for patients with pneumonia in rural 
versus urban areas for several reasons, including treatment more often delivered by a 
family physician than by a specialist. In such cases, there are higher controls for 
hospitalization severity, a lower likelihood of intensive care admissions or for a patient to 
be mechanically ventilated, which explains differences in access to more specialized 
doctors and facilities in urban areas (Lave et al., 1996). In fact, research documents 
higher level specialty care, in general, for those patients diagnosed and hospitalized with 
pneumonia with urban residential zip codes (Dean, Silver & Bateman, 2000).  
Still, the study does not aim to assess the breadth of specialized services offered 
by a hospital, much less its costs, as an indicator of its specialization. Instead, it seeks to 
determine whether general hospitals are narrowing their focus on the highest volume, 
highest revenue-generating service lines. The findings of Zwanziger, Melnick, and 
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Simonson (1996), while seemingly counter intuitive, show that specialization decreases 
with population density.  In other words, the range of services offered by general 
hospitals in densely populated areas tends to increase as specialties are added, thereby 
decreasing specialization as defined by a disproportionate narrowness of offerings. While 
it is likely there are more specialists and sub-specialists in more densely populated, urban 
areas, this increases diversification through the addition of highly specialized services but 
not necessarily differentiation. It also could encourage duplication of services rather than 
a focused narrowing. Because of the mixed influences of urban competition among 
specialists and same-system, cluster hospitals, correlation analyses could be mixed. The 
following hypothesis is thus posed: 
H3: Population density in a hospital‘s market is negatively associated with specialization 
in high volume, high revenue-generating service lines, other things being equal. 
Age 
Two primary but related factors provide support for the selection of an 
independent variable depicting persons age 65 and older as a percentage of the local 
population in search of correlation with specialization by general hospitals. The first is 
the fact that half of all Americans are living with one or more chronic conditions and 
illnesses such as heart disease, osteoarthritis, and chronic pulmonary conditions 
(Anderson & Horvath, 2004), typically encountered in older age persons. Experts have 
long included congestive heart failure, heart disease, hypertension, and pneumonia 
among the top health topics to be examined in assessing quality of care for older people 
in acute care hospitals and other facilities (Fink, Sieu, Brook, Park, & Solomon, 1987).  
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Advances in pharmaceutical and medical device technology have allowed chronic 
conditions and illnesses to displace infectious diseases and accidents as the primary 
causes of death. Five of the six highest volume, highest revenue-generating service lines 
selected for study represent such conditions.  
The second, but related, factor is the increasing age of Americans allowing access 
at age 65 to Medicare coverage of healthcare expenses including hospitalization and care 
by specialists. Baby boomers, those Americans born between 1946 and 1965 and 
numbering 78.2 million in July 2005 (U. S. Census Bureau, 2006), commence eligibility 
for Medicare beginning in 2011. It is logical that the hospital sector would strategically 
prepare for this surge in demand with such responses as specialization in targeted service 
lines in the immediately preceding years. The U.S. Census Bureau (2006) projects that 
there will be 57.8 million baby boomers living in 2030 between the ages of 66 and 84, 
which could place a significant demand on healthcare services and facilities that provide 
care for chronic illnesses and conditions. In fact, the aging of baby boomers is believed 
by some to be driving the current hospital building boom, the strongest since the period 
immediately following World War II (Robeznieks, 2008). A skewed population mix with 
a relatively high percentage of persons age 65 years and older (and thus qualifying for 
Medicare insurance coverage) in proportion to the total local population is expected to 
directly influence local hospitals to specialize in service lines to meet demand in the 
chronically ill elderly. It is worth noting that such a variable will naturally be inversely 
proportional to a hospital‘s specialization in labor and delivery serving a child-bearing 
segment of the population. 
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The rationale for not simply using Medicare discharge billings as a percentage of 
a hospital‘s total charges, as is frequently done by health services researchers, as a 
descriptive variable is twofold:  
1. Medicare enrollment and therefore healthcare spending covers a portion of the 
population under age 65. Government data indicate that 14% of Medicare enrollees and 
13% of its spending are for those under age 65 and thus possibly less connected to the 
chronic diseases and conditions associated more directly with aging, and  
2. Patient charges by an individual hospital that are paid by Medicare may not 
necessarily represent the broad demand patterns of an entire, local community and thus 
would otherwise be considered a confounding variable in the data. 
In other words, for a variable to represent demand patterns it must be derived 
from the local population as a whole and not represent the case-mix of services of any 
one hospital in the dataset. The following hypothesis is therefore posed: 
H4: A greater percentage of the local population 65 years and older is positively related 
to hospital specialization in high volume, high revenue-generating service lines, other 
things being equal. Such a variable, however, will naturally be inversely proportional to a 
hospital‘s specialization in labor and delivery directly serving a patient population under 
age 65. 
Competitiveness 
While several means exist of quantifying the degree of competitiveness in any 
given market, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) has become the preferred means 
because it is derived from the market shares of all players in a single marketplace to 
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reflect concentration (Baker, 2001; Gresenz, Rogowski, & Escarce, 2004). The higher the 
index, the closer the market approaches a monopoly situation in the face of less 
competition. Based on standard economic theory, markets with a single, dominant 
hospital enjoying a relatively high share of market will depict a higher HHI representing 
a high degree of concentration and thus a lower degree of competitiveness. Conversely, 
markets with multiple rivals whose shares are equivalent will reflect a higher degree of 
competitiveness and a correspondingly lower HHI and thus less concentration 
(Zwanziger & Melnick, 1988). The classic calculation of the HHI and illustrations of 
these examples are provided in Appendix B.  
Zwanziger et al. (1996) noted intensity and presence of competitors dampen the 
degree of specialization in a given market by increasing the number of services offered. 
In other words, hospitals in more competitive markets with less concentration tend not to 
differ from their local peers as services are duplicated. This finding supports the need to 
include a variable quantifying competitiveness, in the study as one minus the HHI, where 
specialization strategies may be present among general hospitals.  
As discussed in Chapter Two, specialization is a non-price response to market 
pressures. Concentration is assumed to increase rivalry and thus translate into a positive 
association between the HHI and degrees of specialization. Conversely, competitiveness 
is equated with a negative association. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is thus 
posed: 
H5: Hospitals located in highly competitive markets are less likely to specialize in high 
volume, high revenue-generating service lines, other things being equal. 
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Physicians 
Specialty physicians have long exerted influence on the mix of services hospitals 
offer. The steady growth in the science and complexity of medicine not only produced 
increased specialization in the medical profession but a growing need for an institutional 
base within which physicians could be trained and practice (Anderson, 1990). Considered 
a hallmark of American medicine, professional specialization has directly influenced the 
breadth and depth of services general hospitals offer (Starr, 1982). It also has increased 
greatly the dependency of hospitals on physicians, as hospitals wishing to attract patients 
need to please specialty physicians who are licensed to admit patients and perform 
revenue-generating procedures. The pursuit of physician patronage has thus contributed 
to high levels of service capacity duplication across local institutions (Starr, 1982).  
Despite the tendency to increase complexity and duplicate services, market 
pressures on general hospitals have increased the need for them to reduce costs and 
increase revenues. Hospital specialization options that flow from these pressures include: 
(a) internal specialization (formation of centers or institutes within a general hospital), (b) 
building free-standing, specialty hospitals, and c) spinning off ambulatory-based 
specialty facilities, typically in collaboration with local physicians (Berenson, 
Bodenheimer et al., 2006).  
It is well documented that physicians can strongly influence the choice of 
hospitals by their patients (Sarel et al., 2005; Smithson, 2003). When choosing specialists 
and facilities for medical procedures, most patients rely on physician referrals, with 
relatively few making choices based on word of mouth or rankings provided by media, 
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government, and private organizations (Tu & Lauer, 2008). Patient dependency on 
physicians thus increases the power medical specialists are able to exert over hospitals, in 
managed care contract negotiations and in other valuable domains (Dranove & White, 
1996). Researchers have documented evidence of growing friction between hospitals and 
specialty physicians over competing services, in instances of newly established, 
physician-owned specialty hospitals and ambulatory surgery centers. As a result, 
increasing evidence suggests that doctors are choosing either to be in competition with 
hospitals or employed by them (Casalino et al., 2008). 
Based on the foregoing discussion, there are factors that can influence the 
relationship between a local general hospital and the specialty physicians in that market 
to be either a positive or negative one and thereby impact a hospital‘s pursuit of service 
line specialization. Based on trends, the following hypothesis is thus posed: 
H6: Hospitals located in markets with high concentrations of specialists in each of the six 
targeted service lines will positively engage in higher levels of specialization in those 
service lines, other things being equal. 
Characteristics of Internal, Organizational Factors 
As shown in Figure 2, of the three constructs considered to be associated with 
patterns of service line specialization in general hospitals, two are represented by internal, 
organizational factors: (a) distinctive resources and capabilities, and (b) system 
configuration. Consistent with Penrose‘s resource-based view pertaining to core 
competences of the organization, the study examines two organizational characteristics 
that are assumed to represent differing degrees of resources and capabilities in hospitals: 
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(a) hospital size defined by number of beds, and (b) the tax status of a hospital‘s 
ownership. With regard to system configuration, membership in clusters specifically will 
also be examined. Hypotheses framing these three internal, organizational factors are 
discussed in the section to follow. 
Hospital Size 
The resource-based view would consider size of facility to be a reflection of an 
institution‘s resources and capabilities. Breadth of specialty services is not to be confused 
with a focused factory approach of targeted services as a strategy of specialization. 
Larger hospitals, because of economies of distributing overhead costs over larger 
numbers of patients, are presumably better equipped to provide more complex and more 
specialized services. This allows an expanded breadth of services, even if these larger 
hospitals differentiate themselves from smaller hospitals by offering services for rarer 
conditions that others cannot. Conversely, smaller hospitals tend to be more specialized 
and focused in their offering of services. Still, patterns of specialization by service line, 
as a function of strategic choices, remain unknown. 
Eastaugh (1992) offers a landmark study of trends in hospital specialization 
across the 1980s, observing a rise in specialization concomitant with a decline in unit cost 
per admission and improved quality of care. For the period studied, he found that 
specialization was highest in competitive markets and lowest in highly rate-regulated 
states. In considering what drives specialization, Eastaugh acknowledged Farley and 
Hogan (1990) for their work documenting that specialization is higher in markets with a 
higher density of health maintenance organizations (HMOs), more hospital beds, a higher 
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ratio of physicians for the population, and a greater number of long-term care units. 
Eastaugh (1992) found, however, that specialization is actually highest in moderately 
sized (100-300 bed) hospitals and subsequently declines up to 760 beds. Beyond 760 
beds, he conjectured that scale allows specialization on a higher level or offers resources 
to support sub-specialties addressing rare conditions and diseases, experiencing low 
patient volumes. This, he considered, is still consistent with Farley and Hogan (1990), 
whose sentinel study assessed variables in five categories: (a) capacity as measured by 
number of beds in groupings by intervals of 100, (b) management, or ownership, (c) 
organizational focus, or teaching status, (d) competitive location and alternatives, and (e) 
state regulatory pressures because of specific research interests in cost efficiency.  
However, Zwanziger et al. (1996) documented that bed size of facility has a 
powerful effect, with specialization actually decreasing as hospital size by bed count 
increases. Gu (2005) similarly found that hospital size is negatively related to service 
specialization for hospitals in systems. Both used exclusively the internal HHI as their 
sole measure of specialization and thus dependent variable. Based on this discussion and 
the characteristics of specialization being assessed by the research, the following 
hypothesis is posed: 
H7: Hospitals with a greater number of inpatient, acute care beds are negatively 
associated with specialization in high volume, high revenue-generating service lines, 
other things being equal.  
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Ownership 
As covered earlier in Chapter One, the earliest multi-hospital systems were faith-
based, not-for profit systems that were mission-driven and demonstrated a commitment to 
serve the broader needs of the local community (Starr, 1982). With entirely different 
objectives, for profit multi-hospital systems emerged in the late 1960s, and a dramatic 
corporate-owned expansion of multi-hospital systems ensued. Studies by Zwanziger et al. 
(1996), Horwitz (2007), and others demonstrated there is evidence the tax status of 
hospital ownership has a significant effect on the range and mix of medical services 
offered by a hospital.  
Horwitz (2007), in particular, found significant and large differences by 
ownership type in services delineated by service line profitability provided by acute care 
hospitals. She noted that economists historically have assumed there is little difference 
between for profits and not-for profits in terms of overall market behavior (Schlesinger & 
Gray, 2006; Sloan, 2000). However, she argues that they are likely to be different, given 
variation in management motives, costs of capital, and sources of capital. From the 
perspective of this study, there is also reason to expect that differences will be observed 
in non-price rivalry, such as competition over quality outcomes, community reputations, 
and service line specialization (Cutler & Horwitz, 1998). Grouping services based on 
their profitability to the hospital, Horwitz (2007) found that corporate ownership plays a 
significant role in decisions to offer cardiac care, ranging from invasive and open-heart 
surgery to diagnostic cardiac catheterization. She also provided evidence that for profit 
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hospitals are much less likely than nonprofits and government-owned hospitals to offer 
low profitability services such as emergency-admission, inpatient psychiatric services.  
Based largely on her research, it is believed that profit motives are likely to be 
associated with more specialized offerings. While for profit hospitals are known to be 
somewhat smaller and thus narrower in their service line offering than not-for profits, the 
size of the owning corporation and its ability to finance investments for specialization are 
not reflected in any way among the independent variables. Of course, cluster hospitals in 
not-for profit systems could contribute to mixed results in analysis if local cluster 
hospitals designate a lead hospital in one or more service lines targeted for study.  
Although federally owned hospitals are excluded from the dataset, it should be noted that 
state and county-owned, public hospitals are included. Public hospitals managed under 
contract by a system are therefore categorized as system hospitals and assigned their 
ownership identity, even though they technically remain public. The following hypothesis 
is posed:  
H8: For profit ownership (compared to not-for profit) hospitals are positively associated 
with specialization in high demand, high revenue-generating service lines, other things 
being equal. 
Cluster Lead Hospital 
Consistent with the Lawrence and Lorsch organization management perspective, 
it is expected that same-system hospitals collectively coordinate service line 
specialization in which the cluster hospitals that had in prior years played a dominant role 
in those areas will increase their shares over time. A cluster is defined as two or more 
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acute care general, community hospitals that are members of the same-system and 
located in the same local market. This definition is consistent with that adopted by 
Cuellar and Gertler (2003, 2005) and applied more recently by Luke et al. (in press). 
Clusters are used in the subset analysis, in which each cluster‘s lead hospital is compared 
to its respective cluster overall. A lead hospital is defined as the cluster member that has 
the highest share in 2007 in its cluster. To the extent that cluster hospitals are more likely 
to be found in urban rather than rural areas, it is reasonable that rural, freestanding 
hospitals are dropped from this sub-analysis. The impact of eliminating such hospitals as 
a category could have a material impact on findings, as research has demonstrated that 
organizational characteristics (ownership and size) exhibit significant impacts on rural 
hospital financial performance and thus their strategic options (Trinh & O‘Connor, 2000). 
The study seeks to determine if cluster membership is correlated with 
specialization, given the cluster‘s ability to reduce service duplication by redistributing 
capacity among same-system hospital members in the same, local market. In doing so, it 
can reduce excess capacities, improve efficiencies, avoid duplication, and enhance the 
quality of services delivered to the patient (Luke, Ozcan, & Olden, 1995; McCue, 
Clement, & Luke, 1999; Luke, 2010). The extent to which clusters are able to facilitate 
capacity restructuring is not known. Nor is it known whether they are able to establish the 
procedures and protocols needed to accommodate transfers, consultations, and related 
inter-hospital communications as might be needed for hospitals that do not provide the 
full range of services.  
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It is assumed that specialization could move in opposite directions for different 
cluster members as hospitals ―trade‖ capacity within a cluster depending on the 
designated role each hospital plays. To capture such trading of capacity, it is necessary to 
differentiate cluster members that assume the lead role in delivering selected services in 
each cluster from their other cluster members. This lead hospital designation is the third 
organizational characteristic used in the research. In an effort to identify whether a 
strategy exists of focused factory specialization among same-system hospitals in a local 
cluster, a lead, or magnet, hospital with the highest share in each of the six targeted 
service lines is identified as an independent variable depicting an internal, organizational 
characteristic and the following hypothesis is posed:  
H9: Hospitals with a lead share of cases for their cluster in a high volume, high revenue-
generating service line are positively associated with specialization, other things being 
equal. 
Summary of the Chapter 
Chapter Three presents strategic management and connects it to the positioning 
school heavily influenced by Porter‘s framework utilizing market environment in setting 
strategy for the organization. This is counterbalanced by the resource-based view, also 
drawn from among strategic management perspectives, for its focus on the internal 
resources and core competences of the organization. The perspective of Lawrence and 
Lorsch suggests that complex organizations must balance their pursuit of external, market 
opportunities for differentiation with increased efforts to integrate organizational 
activities. On this basis, their work in organization management is thus selected as a 
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third, theorized grounding in support of the research, particularly for its application to the 
analysis of same-system hospitals functioning in clusters. Three constructs are in turn 
drawn from these theories, each addressing external or internal considerations. Factors 
depicting the external, market environment and internal organization are subsequently 
selected and discussed for their potential relationship with evidence of specialization in 
each of six high volume, high revenue-generating service lines offered by the general 
hospitals. For each independent variable representing descriptive characteristic, a single 
hypothesis is posed for quantitative analysis to be undertaken. Having decided what 
characteristics may influence service line specialization, the next step is to select the 
specific measures to be examined in this study. This next step is presented in Chapter 
Four.
  100 
CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
Overview 
Chapter Four includes a discussion of methods and corresponding data analysis.  
Following a restatement of research purpose and goals, the first section describes the 
study‘s design, offering a rationale for its structure and discussing its uniqueness by 
incorporating clusters of same-system hospitals among the variables. The rationale 
addresses the selection of service lines, defined according to charges (revenues) and 
caseload demand (volumes). Data sources are discussed in the subsequent section. The 
second section also presents those states for which data are analyzed and compares them 
as a composite to characteristics of the nation‘s general hospitals as a whole. The third 
section discusses measurement of both dependent and independent variables selected for 
inclusion in the analysis. Use of five different dependent variables depicting 
specialization by a hospital is justified as well in this section. The subsequent fourth 
section discusses analysis, statistical tests and procedures for interpretation. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of limitations and assumptions that could negatively affect 
the generalizability of results, acknowledging opportunities for future research. 
Summary of the Research Problem 
Sweeping changes in technology, market dynamics, and organizational structure
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including the formation of same-system hospitals in local clusters are pushing the general 
hospital to rethink the traditional concept that every general hospital must provide the 
same, wide variety of services to meet the chronic and acute healthcare needs of its local 
community. These changes come in the face of three major demands impacting strategic 
choices made by general hospitals: (a) improving quality and safety, (b) curbing costs to 
improve efficiency, and (c) confronting increased local hospital rivalry. To date, such 
arguments have not been applied to the quantitative analysis of the general hospital‘s 
strategies relating to high volume, high revenue-generating service lines. Moreover, the 
role of local clusters of same-system hospitals has not been investigated with respect to 
such service line specialization.  
Recapping the Purpose and Goals of the Study 
The purpose of the research is to determine if general hospitals show evidence of 
specializing in one or more of the nation‘s six highest volume, highest revenue-
generating service lines and, if so, to examine identifiable organizational and local market 
characteristics associated with such specialization. Additionally, the research will 
examine how same-system hospitals in local clusters are behaving with respect to service 
line specialization.  
Independent variables used in the analysis reflect: (a) external opportunities and 
threats (Porter‘s framework on competitive positioning), (b) distinctive internal resources 
and capabilities (Penrose‘s resource-based view pertaining to core competences of the 
organization), and (c) system configuration (organization management perspective as 
developed by Lawrence and Lorsch explaining the conditions under which same-system 
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hospitals might collectively engage in a coordinated scheme of service line 
specialization). Figure 3 summarizes the relationships to be examined in this study.  
 
Organizational
Factors
Market
Factors
Specialization
Preference for High 
Volume, Revenue –
Generating Service 
Lines
• Cardiac Surgery
• Cardiology
• Invasive Cardiology
• Orthopedics
• Pulmonary Services
• Labor and Delivery
• Physicians
• Competitiveness
• Population
 Density
 Growth
 Longevity
 Poverty
• Ownership
• Hospital Size
• Cluster Lead 
Hospital
• Change (2003 – 2007)
 In Market Share
 In Cluster Share
• Expected Market Share
• Internal Share
• Internal Service 
Concentration
(External 
Opportunities and
Threats)
(Distinctive Internal 
Resources and 
Capabilities and 
System Configuration) 
 
Figure 3. Market and organizational factors impacting specialization by general hospitals 
in highest volume, highest revenue-generating service lines. 
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Research Design 
Structure of the Research Design 
The study uses a retrospective, non-experimental, correlational design to examine 
secondary data on hospitals and their markets. A simultaneous, multiple regression is 
initially used to enter all independent, or predictor, variables into the equation at the same 
time, assuming all independent variables (IVs) are of comparable importance to the 
research questions (Polit & Beck, 2004). This is subsequently refined by performing a 
backward deletion, stepwise regression to improve the model‘s predictability and thus 
becomes the primary vehicle for analysis. The correlates being examined represent 
common descriptions of hospital organizations and their markets. Some multicollinearity, 
or redundancy, of variables may surface which, if left unaddressed, could produce 
unreliable results. Additional analyses will therefore help in the selection of an optimum 
set of variables. Justification of the variables chosen for analysis, as well as the question 
of endogeneity, is discussed in a later section of this chapter, and the elimination of any 
collinear variables will be detailed in a subsequent chapter.  
It is recognized that specialization patterns, if they exist, occur over time. Some 
previous research on hospital specialization has used lagged independent variables in an 
attempt to reflect the impact of time in making strategic choices (Gu, 2005). This study, 
however, should be viewed in that it examines the correlates of differential patterns of 
specialization as a first step of understanding, with the assumption that different kinds of 
organizations and markets produce different strategic responses. Once it is clear what 
factors might be associated with specialization patterns, it would be helpful in a 
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subsequent study to examine how hospitals and systems might sequence specialization 
patterns over time. Recognizing such limitations, this study includes two dependent 
variables that measure the ―change‖ that occurred between 2003 and 2007 in the 
percentages of cases treated (Luke et al., in press). The first of these is a Market Change 
variable that reflects an individual hospital‘s change in market share, measured for each 
of the six service lines examined in this study. The second is a Cluster Change variable 
that measures for each hospital that is a member of a cluster the change in its share 
among all same-system, sister hospitals that are members of its cluster for each of the six 
service lines examined in this study. This should provide a preliminary indication of the 
shifting that can occur as a result of specialization, whether by competing hospitals or 
among members of same-system clusters, respectively. 
In spite of the above discussion, cross-sectional design is generally considered 
well suited for describing relationships among factors present at a chosen point in time as 
this study largely represents. A weakness in cross-sectional studies is their inability to 
establish causal relationships. Thus, findings of significant associations in the analyses 
should be viewed as suggestive of causality and indicative of where further research 
might need to be focused.  
A unique feature of the research design is the examination of within-cluster 
patterns of specialization. As discussed in earlier chapters, this recognizes (a) the growing 
importance of systems and system clusters and (b) the key role clusters could play in 
facilitating the redistribution of patients among cluster hospitals. Such organizational 
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models can contribute to improved quality, greater cost efficiency, and heightened, non-
price strength against rivals. 
A mixed effects model allows multilevel linear modeling to assess sources of 
variation both within a cluster and between clusters. The model includes an additional 
error term associated with the effect of cluster membership of hospitals to determine if 
cluster effect can help explain a portion of underlying variance. In addition to estimating 
and testing the fixed effects, the model determines whether there is evidence that the 
variance of the random effects in the model is different from zero (Fox, 2002). A mixed 
effects model will thus be tested in the sub-analysis of hospitals in clusters.  
Choice of General Hospitals as the Unit of Study 
This study examines general, community hospitals in 2007 because: (a) they are 
the most numerous in comparison to other categories of hospitals, representing 69% of all 
short and long term care hospitals in the United States (Schneider et al., 2008) and 86% 
of all hospitals registered with the AHA (AHA Hospital Statistics, 2009); (b) they 
represent the largest hospitals in terms of size, based on inpatient bed count, averaging 
162 beds, in comparison to 104 for other hospitals listed in the 2007 AHA database 
(AHA Hospital Statistics, 2008); and c) they have led the movement toward the 
development of systems and the formation of local clusters in same-system hospitals and 
thus are considered at the forefront of industry-shaping strategic changes (Luke et al., 
2003).   
As discussed in Chapter Two, because little is known about whether the general 
hospital is specializing in targeted service lines to accommodate the demands for 
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improved quality and safety in delivering care to an aging population with multiple co-
morbidities, to address the need for improved efficiencies in the face of spiraling 
healthcare costs, or to combat rivals with non-price tactics especially in more 
concentrated markets, the non-federal, general hospital is designated the unit of analysis 
in this study. The research methodology does not regress performance measures on 
strategy choice variables, seek to pass judgment on specific service line specialization 
strategies by weighing their costs against benefits, or account for the effect of 
specialization on clinical, financial, or competitive outcomes of such a choice by the 
hospital entity. 
Choice of Service Lines for Analysis of Specialization 
Inpatient hospital data for uniform billing purposes uses ICD-9 codes to identify 
diagnoses and procedures at the patient case level. Currently, CMS publishes for use 
approximately 14,000 ICD-9 codes. Beginning October 1, 2013, an additional 55,000 
codes will be added to give payers even greater detail from providers of patient care at 
the individual case level. This, however, creates an overwhelming number of categories 
at too fine a level of detail for strategic study. To aid in the choice of service lines for the 
analysis, reliance is placed on national statistics derived with the help of HCUP‘s CCS 
that effectively consolidates ICD-9 codes from 14,000 to 260 diagnostic categories for 
aggregating and classifying data for statistical reporting and analysis, as noted in HCUP‘s 
Facts and Figures 2007 (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2007). Service 
lines are then assigned to the top-ranked case volumes and subsequently to the top-ranked 
charges by diagnostic categories to determine which service lines are most frequently 
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represented in both top 10 lists. This provides a logical means of selecting service lines 
for study as a function of how often they are among the top ranking CCS categories. 
First, the selection of service lines for purposes of this research is examined using 
the CCS-classified diagnosis categories from HCUP data ranked by numbers of 
discharges (volume), the top ten of which are illustrated in Table 6. 
As explained in the footnote to the table, the top six, selected categories as a 
percentage represent nearly one in four, or 23.8%, of all cases and 14.9% of aggregate 
charges for all, nationwide inpatient hospitalizations according to HCUP 2007 statistics. 
Most of these fit within multiple service line categories. However, after excluding general 
medicine and general surgery service lines (which are provided by virtually every general 
hospital) and excluding likely consultative services in sub-specialties such as vascular 
surgery and rheumatology, the highest volume service categories in the table represent 
the following service lines: (a) labor and delivery, (b) pulmonary services, (c) cardiology, 
(d) invasive cardiology, (e) cardiac surgery, and (f) orthopedics.  
Hospital billing data for public or private payers are not organized by service line 
but rather by diagnosis code upon discharge and are comprised of procedures that may 
cross multiple service lines. Thus, selection of service lines is additionally determined 
using the CCS-classified diagnosis categories from HCUP data ranked by aggregate 
patient charges, the top 10 of which are illustrated in Table 7.   
As shown in Table 7 and explained in the footnote, after eliminating specialty 
consults by sub-specialists in vascular surgery and rheumatology, the same six service 
lines emerge as those presiding in highest volume. (While septicemia, or blood infection, 
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Table 6     
      
Top Ten Inpatient Diagnostic Categories Based on 2007 Volume of Discharges 
            
  Cases No. of Charges Service Line(s) 
Diagnosis (000) Discharges ($millions) Represented 
Liveborn 4,542.7 1 39,624.5 Labor and Delivery 
      
Pneumonia 1,171.5 2 29,864.3 Pulmonary Services, General 
     Medicine 
      
Congestive heart failure 1,024.9 3 32,312.1 Cardiology, Invasive Cardiology 
      
      
Coronary 
artherosclerosis 963.9 4 44,868.3 
Cardiology, Invasive 
Cardiology, 
     
Cardiac Surgery, Vascular 
Surgery, 
     General Medicine, General 
     Surgery 
      
Trauma to perineum 867.8 5 7,322.10 Labor and Delivery 
      
Osteoarthritis 814.9 6 33,595.1 General Medicine,  
     Rheumatology, Orthopedics 
      
Other maternal birth 810.4 7 9,671.4 Labor and Delivery, 
complications    Gynecology 
      
Non-specific chest pain 788.4 8 11,620.3 Not determinable 
      
Mood disorders 774.3 9 11,176.5 Psychiatric Services, 
     General Medicine  
      
Cardiac dysrhythmias 731.5 10 20,393.2 Cardiology, Invasive Cardiology  
      
Top Six 23.8%   14.9%   
Note: Sourced from HCUP State Inpatient Databases (SID) of the Agency for Healthcare research and Quality 
(AHRQ). Retrieved October 24, 2009, from http://hcupnet.ahrq.gov/HCUPnet.jsp. U.S. National statistics are 
represented by $1,033,835.7 million in total charges and 39.5 million total cases in 2007. 
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Table 7      
       
Top Ten Inpatient Diagnostic Categories Ranked by 2007 Aggregate Charges 
              
  Hospital     
  Charges  Cases   
Diagnosis ($million) Rank (000) Service Line(s) Represented 
Coronary atherosclerosis 44,868.3 1 963.9 Invasive Cardiology, Cardiology, 
     Cardiac Surgery, Vascular 
     Surgery, General Medicine 
       
Liveborn infant 39,624.5 2 4,542.7 Labor and Delivery 
       
Septicemia 38,828.1 3 675.4 Not determinable 
       
Myocardial infarction 33,826.7 4 624.9 Invasive Cardiology, Cardiac 
     Surgery, Cardiology 
       
Osteoarthritis 33,595.1 5 814.9 Rheumatology, General Medicine, 
     Orthopedics 
       
Congestive heart failure 32,312.1 6 1,024.9 Invasive Cardiology, Cardiology 
       
Implant complications 30,580.3 7 623.9 Not determinable 
       
Pneumonia 29,864.3 8 1,171.5 Pulmonary Services, General 
     Medicine  
       
Spondylosis 25,813.3 9 633.7 Orthopedics 
       
Respiratory failure 23,944.0 10 385.8 Pulmonary Services, General 
     Medicine  
       
Top 6 as a % of total U.S. 22.6%   25.7%     
Note: Sourced from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) State Inpatient Databases (SID) of the 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). Retrieved October 24, 2009, from 
http://hcupnet.ahrq.gov/HCUPnet.jsp. National statistics are represented by $1,033,835.7 million in total charges 
and 39.5 million total cases in 2007. 
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is ranked third in charges and complication of device, implant or graft, is ranked seventh 
in charges, neither fits cleanly within a given service line. Blood infection can occur at 
any part of the body and therefore could appear in such diverse service lines as infectious 
disease, general medicine, and gastroenterology. Complication of device, implant or graft 
spans virtually every surgery service line depending on the organ or tissue receiving the 
implant.) When selected on the basis of revenue-generating ability, the top six selected 
service lines from HCUP constitute 22.6% of charges (revenue) and 25.7% of patient 
caseloads (volume), rendering them appropriate for study of service line specialization by 
general hospitals. The top six service lines broadly represent inpatient treatment of both 
acute and chronic diseases and conditions and span all adult ages of a local population 
served by their general hospitals. These six service lines also emerge as the top-ranking 
lines based on both charges (revenue) and patient caseloads (volume) in the sample states 
included in this study. 
As an alternative, the study could focus on single DRGs rather than service lines.  
However, it is unlikely that hospital specialization strategies would be based on any 
single DRG, totaling approximately 500 and still in need of aggregation in number for 
practical relevancy to strategic decision-making. Moreover, hospitals are neither 
organized nor are staffs managed by DRG categories. On the other hand, it is possible 
that they do try to narrow their specialization choices to clinical categories that are more 
narrowly or specifically defined than service lines. While historically DRGs have been 
grouped into 25 mutually exclusive sub-groups known as Major Diagnostic Categories 
(MDCs) and even used by researchers in studies of hospital specialization (Gu, 2005), 
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each MDC corresponds to a single organ system and is no longer reflective of the 
increasing proportion of hospital cases with multiple diagnoses present in acute, inpatient 
care. The acutely ill and those dying are more likely facing multiple organ failure. Thus, 
it is more likely that they will focus on somewhat broader strategies that could address 
the complex needs of larger numbers of patients, at least in part to project a positive 
image of broadly serving the needs of the community as general hospitals have 
traditionally done (Dayhoff & Cromwell, 1993). Therefore, the focus of this study is on 
service lines despite their broad, somewhat elusive definition. Regardless, it is possible 
that categories of cases at the individual DRG-level could underlie the strategies hospitals 
formulate when considering specialization. Such a question remains the focus of future 
research aimed at determining the appropriate level at which specialization is measured.  
The same arguments apply to a focus on single procedures, such as coronary 
artery bypass graft surgery (CABG). While such targeting – whether on the part of the 
facility or surgeon or both – has been the focus of some research, as discussed in Chapter 
Two, evidence of general hospital specialization strategies at this level as such does not 
appear in the literature. Instead, studies of specialization in particular procedures tend to 
focus on clinical patient outcomes, with the objective of directing patients to those 
surgeons and facilities performing high volumes of such procedures in an effort to raise 
quality with lower morbidity and fewer complications and to lower costs. This has been 
the goal of The Leapfrog Group, for instance, as discussed in Chapter Two.  
Still another argument could be made for focusing on cross-cutting service lines 
such as hematology, which involves patient diagnoses and care among some of the 
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highest volume, revenue-generating case types. The difficulty with selecting such service 
lines is they can overlap considerably with other service lines. Cancer treatment, for 
example, often relies on services such as hematology, internal medicine and other 
services, because of the involvement of multiple organs and clinical specialties. In 
addition, hematology itself may represent a stand-alone service line in larger academic 
medical centers but not in smaller, community hospitals (where hematology could be 
imbedded in laboratory services that are subcontracted or even offsite).  
Choice of Time Frame 
The most recent year in which inpatient data were readily accessible for the study 
of general hospitals was 2007, which thus is the year chosen for study. Note that the 
selection of 2007 rather than an earlier year allows for a decade or so for changes to have 
occurred since the rapid formation of clusters in the 1990s (Luke et al., 1995; Luke, 2010; 
McCue et al., 1999). The year 2003 is the earliest year for which hospital admissions data 
are available for use in this study from the same data source. Therefore, the four-year 
period, 2003 to 2007, is used in this study to measure changes in market share and cluster 
share. While it is possible that the four-year period between 2003 and 2007 does not 
represent sufficient time for specialization to have occurred, it should be noted that most 
of the clusters were created prior to the end of the prior decade, although changes have 
continued since that time, albeit at a much slower pace (Luke et al., 2003). Thus, most 
cluster hospitals and the clusters themselves have had almost a decade to consolidate and 
digest their mergers and acquisitions. This suggests that the chosen period – 2003 to 2007 
– should provide a sufficient span of time in which to examine possible shifts leading to 
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specialization. Nevertheless, this point is revisited in the discussion of limitations in the 
research design and opportunities for future research.  
Identification of Databases, Data Collection, and Data Integrity 
Databases Used for Analysis 
The study uses secondary data for all measures. The discharge data are obtained 
from a proprietary source, Intellimed International Corporation, which is a full-service 
provider of software and healthcare data services used by the healthcare industry. (The 
study uses 2007 HCUP national statistics only as the source of information for 
determining the selection of the service lines to be analyzed in this study.) Intellimed 
relies on the same state-level sources for data as do other data vendors, including HCUP 
(for its state inpatient database [SID]). Like HCUP, Intellimed obtains data from state 
agencies that require the participation of all licensed, community hospitals. As is true for 
all such data, Intellimed includes service line designations that are based on the primary 
diagnosis for each patient upon discharge. Note that over the course of a hospital stay, the 
elements of a patient‘s care could be assigned to more than one service line. The standard 
procedure is for each case to be assigned to a primary service line based on the primary 
diagnosis upon discharge, a designation typically verified by the hospital‘s discharge 
nurse administrator.   
Independent variables are measured using data obtained from a number of 
sources. The U.S. Census Bureau‘s FactFinder serves as a source of estimates of persons 
by CBSA living below the federally established poverty level (Poverty) and estimates of 
persons by CBSA age 65 and older (Age), both based on the 2005 – 2007 American 
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Community Survey (U.S. Census Bureau, 2008). Data depicting the ratio of specialty 
physicians for each of the six targeted service lines per one thousand residents 
(Physicians), population growth (Growth) and population density (Density) are obtained 
from the ARF, which provides population data and related statistics over the period 2000 
to 2008 obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau. Census data are based on survey input 
and, while subject to some sampling and non-sampling errors, such errors are unlikely to 
have any meaningful impact on the analysis, given the levels of aggregation to 
metropolitan areas. The AHA 2006 Annual Survey data serve as the source for 
information on hospital characteristics, including hospital bed count (Hospital Size) and 
CBSA location, while the 2007 Intellimed dataset is used to calculate the HHI depicting 
local market concentration (Competitiveness). Like the U. S. Census data, AHA Annual 
Survey data too are subject to errors upon submission to the AHA, the consequences of 
which for study results are likely to be minimal, given the ranges of differences across 
hospitals. 
The tax status of facility ownership for profit versus not-for profit designation 
(Ownership) and the system/cluster memberships, including designations of lead 
hospitals within clusters (Cluster Lead Hospital) are based on a 2007 update of AHA 
hospital system memberships, conducted internally by Virginia Commonwealth 
University‘s Department of Health Administration (R. D. Luke, personal communication, 
July 18, 2009). These data are based on original information provided by the AHA 
through its 2006 Annual Survey but are supplemented with information obtained from 
web sites, press releases, national reports, personal telephone contact with selected 
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hospitals to verify data, and other readily available public sources of information. These 
data provide the basis as well for defining clusters and thus for calculating the change in 
cluster share of hospitals in local system clusters as a dependent variable, or Cluster 
Change. 
Merging the published and updated AHA and ARF data and U. S. Census data 
with the Intellimed data and eliminating hospitals with fewer than 25 beds (not 
considered large enough to provide general and acute care for a community‘s population) 
produced a final sample of 303 nonfederal, general, short-term, community hospitals 
providing acute care for three states, namely: Florida, Nevada, and Virginia. Given the 
diversity across the three states with respect to hospital characteristics in particular, a 
state dummy variable as a covariate is included in the analyses of all 303 hospitals. The 
analysis of cluster hospitals is performed on a subset of this database including only 
hospitals that are in clusters, which reduced the number of hospitals for sub-analysis for 
this purpose to 175, representing a total of 50 urban clusters.   
Target Population 
The study population includes all general, community hospitals with 25 or more 
beds that are located in one of three states: Florida, Nevada, and Virginia. AHA defines 
community hospitals as all nonfederal, short-term, general, and other specialty hospitals, 
excluding hospital units of other institutions, such as prisons and colleges (American 
Hospital Association, 2008). In order to ensure comparability among the hospitals, 
specialty hospitals as defined by the AHA (which are devoted exclusively to a single or a 
small number of service lines, such as psychiatric care, rehabilitation, pediatrics, and, 
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more recently, cardiac surgery and orthopedics) are excluded. Only those acute care 
hospitals with 25 or more beds are included in this study. Very small acute care hospitals 
(many of which are critical access hospitals), in effect, specialize in low and non-
complex levels of care and are not likely to have the capabilities needed to compete with 
larger hospitals across most or all services lines. 
The Three States and Generalizability 
The three states used in this research represent the only states for which data were 
made available by Intellimed. Thus, it is important to consider the implications for 
generalizability of study findings.  
Florida has a well recognized, distinctive population, which could limit the 
generalizability of findings if these contributed to the likelihood that the hospitals in 
those states did or did not engage in specialization strategies. Distinctive demographic 
characteristics include: (a) an older population living with multiple chronic diseases and 
conditions; (b) a large, Medicare-age population (Florida ranks fourth in percentage 
among all state populations); (c) minimal regulation with respect to the corporate 
ownership of hospitals and therefore a relatively high percentage of for profit hospitals as 
well as hospitals under multi-system ownership (Robeznieks, 2008) and, therefore, 
formed into local clusters; (d) high density population with 296.4 individuals per square 
mile – 96% of its population reside inside the boundaries of a CBSA and thus have a 
relatively greater access to acute care hospitals; and (e) a diverse state population, over 
one-third or 36% that identifies itself culturally as either Hispanic or African-American. 
It is possible that this diversity in patient population could lead hospitals to engage in 
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service specialization in order to attract targeted sub-population groups. On the other 
hand, differentiation to accommodate demographic distinctiveness does not necessarily 
mean hospitals will pursue specialization strategies geared to enhancing volumes in the 
six service lines of interest to this study. It is also notable that Florida‘s population 
characteristics reflect many future demographic changes expected for the nation (U. S. 
Census Bureau, 2008). 
Nevada represents another version of demographic distinctiveness that could add 
to the possibility that hospitals will pursue differentiation strategies, although this would 
not necessarily lead to strategies focused on the six service lines per se. At a growth rate 
of 66%, Nevada experienced the fastest rate of growth in population of any state in the 
decade from 1990 to 2000. Because Nevada is relatively free of state government 
regulations that would impose restrictions on ownership, market entrance, or referral 
practices, Las Vegas, in particular, has experienced significant growth in national, for 
profit hospital corporations, the two largest being Universal Health Services (UHS) and 
the Hospital Corporation of America (HCA). Together, the two corporations own and 
operate eight of the 13 hospitals in the Las Vegas metropolitan area (Quality Care 
Nevada, 2009).   
By comparison to these two states, Virginia has a relatively high African-
American population. While its population‘s mix by age mirrors that of the nation, 
Virginia‘s proximity to Washington, D. C. has produced a higher than average median 
family income and lower rate of poverty, which affects the average for the state as a 
whole. Thus, Virginia has demographic diversity geographically, in both ethnicity and 
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income, which could add to the need for hospitals in one region of the state to engage in 
competition by comparison to hospitals in other regions. Although less dramatically split 
between populated and unpopulated areas than Nevada, Virginia has three principal 
metropolitan areas that exert strong influences on the shape of the hospital markets across 
the state: Northern Virginia (part of the Washington, D. C. metro area), Virginia Beach, 
and Richmond (Ormond & Bovbjerg, 1998). 
Together, these three states represent slightly over 9% of the U.S. population.  
Table 8 compares demographic and economic statistics for the three states to show that 
when they are combined and weighted by population, the three populations together are 
only slightly older, marginally more diversified culturally and racially, less poor, and 
more likely to live in an urbanized area than on average Americans overall. Otherwise, 
they are relatively similar to the U.S. as a whole. Composite health and mortality 
statistics for the three states are presented in Table 9. Again, the composite numbers track 
closely the nation overall. From an epidemiological perspective, the three states as a 
composite track the U.S. profile fairly closely, thereby minimizing the problem of 
generalizability to the nation as a whole. Table 10 additionally addresses generalizability 
in terms of the states comprising the study sample in comparison to national hospital 
statistics.  It is here that the three states are shown to deviate from statistics describing the 
nation as a whole. 
In combination, the three states together house 315 or 6.4% of the 4,897 total 
number of community hospitals in the nation, as defined by AHA‘s 2006 Annual Survey 
and updated through 2007. (Eliminating the 12 hospitals with fewer than 25 beds reduces  
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Table 8      
       
Comparative 2005-2007 Demographic and Economic Statistics 
for the Three-state Composite    
              
       
     Weighted  
Statistic FL VA NV Composite U.S. 
       
Population as of July 2006      
(millions): 18.1 7.6 2.5 28.2 299.4 
       
Population by race:      
  White  76% 71% 75% 74% 74% 
  Black  15% 20% 7% 16% 12% 
  Other  9% 9% 18% 10% 14% 
  Hispanic  20% 6% 24% 17% 15% 
       
Population by age:      
  Under 15 6% 7% 8% 6% 7% 
  18 and older 78% 76% 74% 77% 75% 
  65 and older 17% 12% 11% 15% 12% 
       
Employed  61% 67% 67% 63% 65% 
       
Owner-occupied housing 70% 70% 61% 69% 67% 
       
Family income (2007      
inflation adjusted $) $55,534 $69,609 $62,222 $59,929  $60,374  
       
Population living below      
poverty level 13% 10% 11% 12% 13% 
       
Population in metro and      
micro areas 96% 85% 95% 93% 88% 
Note: Sourced from "2005-2007 American Community Survey and FactFinder," U.S. Census Bureau. 
Retrieved October 18, 2009, from http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html?_lang=en. 
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Table 9 
       
Comparative 2006 Health Statistics of the Three-state Composite   
Versus the U.S. Population   
              
       
     Weighted  
Statistic FL VA NV Composite U.S. 
       
Heart disease deaths per      
100,000:       
   White  172 187 230 181 197 
   Black  219 233 278 249 258 
   Other  69 76 137 77 114 
       
Cancer deaths per 100,000 172 184 183 176 181 
       
Hospital admissions per 131 102 99 120 118 
1,000       
       
Disability prevalence 12% 11% 11% 12% 13% 
       
Birth rate per 1,000 13 14 16 14 14 
       
Community hospital beds 2.8 2.3 1.9 2.6 2.7 
per 1,000             
Note: Sourced from National Center for Health Statistics, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention. Retrieved on August 1, 2008, from http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/. 
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Table 10      
       
Comparative Hospital Characteristics of the Three-state Composite  
Compared to the United States     
              
       
     3-State  
Statistic FL NV VA Composite U.S. 
       
Hospitals 205 33 86 324 4,765 
       
Mean beds 239 147 202 220 157 
       
σ beds 203 164 161 191 161 
       
Minimum beds 15 4 15 4 3 
       
Maximum beds 1,500 588 927 1,500 1,500 
       
Range of beds 1,485 584 912 1,496 1,497 
       
For profit 44% 36% 21% 37% 15% 
       
System member 80% 67% 83% 80% 56% 
       
Urban  85% 61% 66% 78% 57% 
       
Cluster member 65% 39% 48% 58% 33% 
       
Urban hospitals in  74% 65% 72% 73% 55% 
clusters             
Note: U.S. and state data represent all nonfederal, short-term general, and other specialty hospitals, defined by 
AHA as community hospitals in 2006 and are sourced from AHA 2006 Annual Survey data (updated in 2007 
from public data to calculate percentages in multi-hospital chains and clusters (Luke et al., in press). In the 
final dataset used in the study, eight hospitals in Nevada, two hospitals in Virginia, and two hospitals in 
Florida with fewer than 25 beds are excluded from analysis, reducing the 315 hospitals shown in the table to 
303. The percentage in clusters represents percentage of urban hospitals in urban clusters, with a cluster 
defined as two or more same-system hospitals in the same local market. Urban is defined as either a 
metropolitan statistical area (METSA) or a micropolitan statistical area (MICSA), as distinguished from rural. 
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the 315 number of hospitals to the final sample of 303 used in analysis.) While the three 
states vary individually, collectively they are more likely to be for profit, in multi-
hospital chains, and located in urban areas than hospitals in the nation as a whole. Table 
10 thus suggests that the three states, as a composite, differ somewhat in the ownership 
and structural arrangements, whose differences could affect the generalizability of the 
results to the nation as a whole. Clearly, further research on specialization patterns, using 
data from other states, would be necessary to assess specialization as a general strategic 
response by hospitals and hospital systems nationally.  
In the particular circumstance of interpreting analysis of the same-system, cluster 
hospitals, it is noteworthy that the 175 cluster hospitals represent over half, or 57.8%, of 
the 303 hospitals in this study and 70.6% of all 248 hospitals linked to multi-hospital 
systems in the three states being studied. Moreover, of the 175 hospitals affiliated with 
one of 50 clusters, 32 are under a distinctly different system owner. The 32 clusters 
represent 7.8% of the 412 different multi-hospital systems operating in the United States. 
Given the diversity across the three states in the various dimensions shown and described 
above, a state dummy variable as a covariate is included in the analyses. To interpret this 
factor, Virginia is arbitrarily selected as the reference, or ―dummy,‖ and assigned a value 
of zero. The p-value measures whether there is a significant difference between Virginia 
and Florida and between Virginia and Nevada.  
Sample Size and Power 
Hulley, Cummings, Browner, Grady, and Newman (2007) point out that the 
concepts of power and the null and alternative hypotheses do not apply to decisions 
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about sample size for descriptive studies such as this study. This is because studies 
without outcome from intervention are not comparing different groups such as in 
randomized clinical trials with patients. However, we assess sample size and power as 
they relate to issues of representativeness and generalizability. Although all of the 
licensed, general, community, acute care hospitals with bed counts of 25 or more in each 
of the three states are included, the 303-hospital dataset still constitutes only 6.2% of the 
4,897 total number of general, community hospitals across the nation in 2007 (AHA 
Hospital Statistics, 2008). Thus, it is appropriate to address standard sampling 
considerations because a range of values about the sample mean is being reported in 
confidence intervals. The width of the confidence interval depends on the sample size.  
To avoid the common problem of inadequate power, it helps to turn to published 
tables based on the desired level and width of confidence interval (CI) associated with 
examining the number of community hospitals across Florida, Nevada, and Virginia. 
Because sample size is fixed and a power of 80% or greater is needed to detect a 
reasonable size effect, minimum desired requirements call for a sample size of 246 to 
justify a sample selection based on the following widely accepted standards: assuming a 
standard deviation of five points in the dependent variable such as internal HHI 
measuring specialization, a W/S value of 0.25 derived from a 1.25 desired total width 
divided by the standard deviation of the variable, and a 95% confidence level (Hulley et 
al., 2007).   
Compared to the desired sample size of 246, a study sample comprised of the 
available 303 hospitals with 25 or more beds is considered sufficient for establishing 
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external validity.  However, it is still acknowledged that findings about Florida, Nevada, 
and Virginia collectively may not necessarily be generalizable to the U. S. hospital 
market as a whole. Replication of this study in other states will be needed. Power analysis 
and effect size cannot salvage the non-representational nature of non-probability selection 
of these three states for study. The lack of external validity, or generalizability, thus 
remains a potential problem for this study and, thus, the research should be considered 
exploratory. Replicating the study in the future with general hospital data from additional 
states would be appropriate. Initial results of this study should therefore be conservatively 
interpreted. Such caveats notwithstanding, Polit and Beck (2004) continue to encourage a 
purposive sampling technique such as employed in this study, given the convenience 
sample of three states provided by Intellimed. 
Data Collection 
The Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project‘s SID and Intellimed‘s inpatient 
hospital data follow guidelines of the National Uniform Billing Committee (NUBC) used 
for the billing of institutional charges to state Medicaid agencies (Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services, 2008). The billing form UB-04 constitutes the basis for joining 
demographic, but de-identified, patient data with ICD-9 coded procedures and diagnoses, 
length of stay and billable charges.  
Data Integrity 
Not only do states store data in varying formats and follow different definitions, 
there are varying levels of files for each of the 38 states submitted to HCUP, as not all 
states release the same level of detail (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 
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2007). These potential problems with data integrity are avoided by using a source such as 
Intellimed. Its terms have been consistently defined and applied, the same levels of files 
have been pulled for each state, and the same calendar years have been accessed for the 
303 hospitals analyzed from all three states. When feasible, Intellimed staff applies 
generally accepted, standardized editing procedures following explicit rules, including 
confirmation that data values are valid, internally consistent, and consistent with 
established industry norms. In addition, standard quality checks of the data are performed 
by the commercial enterprise, including cross-checking patient gender-specific codes, 
such as female gender coding for a patient receiving obstetrical services or male coding 
for a patient receiving services involving the prostate gland. 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) Considerations 
Because of the reliance on secondary administrative data and purposive sampling 
methodology, there is no patient recruitment plan or screening criteria included in this 
study. Nor are there procedures, materials, or protocols for data collection in connection 
with this research. No subject-specific identifying information has been recorded within 
the data sets such that the researcher or others may be able to identify a patient or retrieve 
additional information on a particular research participant. In accordance with the types 
of IRB review, the program under study is delivering a public benefit and does not 
involve physical invasions or intrusions upon the privacy or safety of participants whose 
personal data have been collected (Virginia Commonwealth University, 2007). The 
existing dataset is provided to this researcher in a totally unidentified format, where even 
the source of the data could not re-identify subjects. As the data files have already been 
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de-identified by the data collection entities and the unit of analysis for this study is the 
hospital, there is no need to further transform data files, for compliance with the Health 
Insurance Portability Act (HIPPA) and related governing policy. Since this study does 
not involve human subject research, it qualified on May 31, 2010 for exemption by the 
Office of Research Subjects Protection of Virginia Commonwealth University according 
to 45 CFR 46.101 (b) Category 4 (Virginia Commonwealth University, 2007). 
Measurement 
Selected Measures of Specialization as Dependent Variables in the Research 
Specialization of hospitals can be measured both internally, comparing procedural 
or service line volumes to others within a hospital or among a cluster of same-system 
hospitals, and externally in the marketplace, comparing the relative competitive strength 
of one institution to another. The former is derived from internal case mix. The latter is a 
reflection of the marketplace and the shape of its supply and demand patterns. This 
section discusses measures of specialization applying to both perspectives.  
Zwanziger and colleagues distinguished between two forms of specialization – 
―diversification‖ and ―differentiation‖ (Zwanziger et al., 1996). According to Dayhoff 
and Cromwell (1993), ―diversification,‖ a term used in economic literature to describe the 
number of different types of businesses and products a company produces, can be applied 
to the study of hospitals as an indicator of the breadth of product or service diversity. 
This, in effect, serves as an ―internal‖ measure as it reflects an organization‘s product 
diversity. ―Differentiation,‖ as applied to the study of hospital specialization, contrasts 
the services offered by individual hospitals to those provided by competitors in the same 
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market. This form of specialization focuses on ―external‖ distinction. Both internal and 
external viewpoints are reflected in measures selected for the study.  
Specialization can be measured in a number of other ways as well. Using both 
conceptual and empirical analyses, Dayhoff and Cromwell (1993) demonstrated the 
sensitivity of the dependent variables used as measures of hospital specialization to 
standard market and organizational characteristics, supporting the use of multiple indices 
in evaluating hospital caseloads. Five measures are considered in this study. They are 
organized according to internal or external distinctions introduced above. Two of the five 
fit within the internal category: (a) Internal Service Concentration, measured by 
applying internally the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to measure concentration across all 
of a hospital‘s services lines (rather than across competitors as is traditionally done when 
this index is applied to the study of market concentration); and (b) Internal Share, 
measured for each of the six service lines selected for study and derived as a percentage 
of a facility‘s total cases. Three measures fall within the external category: (a) Expected 
Market Share, measured in each of the six selected service lines as a hospital‘s variance 
from expected volume, with expected volume defined by the hospital‘s overall share in 
the market across all service lines; (b) Market Change, measured as the change between 
2003 and 2007 in a hospital‘s market share in each of the selected service lines within its 
local market; and (c) Cluster Change, measured as the change between 2003 and 2007 
in a hospital‘s share in each of the selected service lines within its cluster of sister 
hospitals. Higher values in each of these measures are considered to depict a greater 
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focus by the hospital on particular service lines and thus greater degree of specialization. 
Each measure is discussed in the paragraphs to follow. 
The HHI used to measure Internal Service Concentration is calculated by 
summing the square of each service line‘s share of a hospital‘s total caseload (Zwanziger 
et al., 1996). The squaring of the shares exaggerates the values of the largest shares and 
diminishes those of smaller ones, thereby highlighting degrees of concentration. Many 
studies have used the HHI to measure market competitiveness in the healthcare industry 
(Farley, 1989; Gresenz et al., 2004; Phibbs & Robinson, 1993), but it has been much less 
widely applied to the study of a single hospital‘s service concentration (Baumgardner & 
Marder, 1991). Because this measure incorporates all cases within a hospital, it serves as 
a broad indicator of the overall pattern of specialization for each hospital in the study.  
The internal HHI measure, however, suffers from a limitation that it is sensitive to 
the size of the unit being measured, in this case the size of the hospital (Dayhoff & 
Cromwell, 1993). Larger hospitals tend to admit many more cases as well as different 
types of cases and thus are more likely to exhibit lower HHI scores than are smaller 
hospitals. This thus provides an additional reason to use multiple measures for depicting 
hospital specialization. This point is discussed further in the section to follow covering 
descriptive, independent variables, including a variable representing hospital size. 
The Internal Share measure draws on ideas developed first by Drucker (1963) 
who described how a company‘s product mix reveals the potential for future sales growth 
through the relative proportions of its products (or services) across an array of winners 
and losers. Management of an optimal mix in response to changing opportunities and 
  
129 
resources requires both planned deletions and additions over time on the basis of product 
mix and brand strategy (Kotler, 1976). Thus, the concept of measuring internal share of a 
service line lies at the very heart of the marketing rationale applied universally to product 
positioning and product line strategy. 
With a focus on case-mix specialization in the hospital services market, Farley 
and Hogan (1990) assume an external rather than internal perspective on measuring 
specialization. The researchers distinguish specialization from the concept of specialized 
hospital services or specialized hospital units that depend on sophisticated technology 
and unusual professional expertise. Their approach to measuring specialization is focused 
on hospital variance from its marketplace norm. Expected Market Share can be used to 
depict the norm. The larger the positive variance between actual versus expected share, 
the greater is the indication of specialization by the hospital in the chosen service line. 
The calculation for this dependent variable as a measure of specialization is: 
MSij – EMSjk where: 
MS = a hospital‘s market share in a service line, and 
EMS = Expected Market Share based on total cases across all service  
 lines for a hospital, with:  
i = service line,  
j = hospital, and  
k = market 
Because the key research questions of this study examine the associations 
between specialization by hospitals and descriptive characteristics of their markets and 
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organization, this study includes two change variables that compare the years 2003 to 
2007: (a) a Market Change dependent variable that reflects an individual hospital‘s 
change in market share, measured for each of the six service lines examined in this study; 
and (b) a Cluster Change dependent variable for each of the six service lines that 
measures, for each hospital that is a member of a cluster, the change in its share among 
all same-system hospitals that are members of its local cluster (Luke et al., in press). 
While the application of such variables to measure the impact of change in healthcare is 
relatively new, the concept of measuring change is found extensively in the literature, 
beginning in political and other social sciences research and widely applied in 
longitudinal studies in healthcare over the decades (Peterson et al., 2008; Sutherland & 
Steinum, 2009). Although Trinh and O‘Connor (2002) created study variables to measure 
change in hospital performance and change in strategy over several years to analyze the 
effect of environmental and organizational characteristics, the majority of published 
studies in healthcare research use longitudinal studies measuring change typically to 
assess clinical outcomes and a change agent of intervention. In the case of the Cluster 
Change variable, positive gains in share for a hospital functioning as part of a local, 
same-system cluster in each of the six service lines being analyzed are considered to 
indicate specialization in its cluster (Luke et al., in press). The interpretation is identical 
in this study when the change variable concept is applied as a measure of Market 
Change. 
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In sum, the five dependent variables to be examined in the regression analysis are: 
(a) a hospital‘s Internal Service Concentration, (b) Internal Share, (c) Expected 
Market Share, (d) Market Change, and (e) Cluster Change.  
Additional, but Rejected, Alternatives as Dependent Variables 
Other measures were considered for use in this study, but for various reasons will 
not be used in this study. Some of the more important options include: (a) the information 
theory index (ITI), (b) statistical measure of distance, and (c) dynamic market share.   
The ITI (Farley, 1989; Farley & Hogan, 1990) is a widely discussed but 
infrequently used measure. First introduced in 1967 (Theil, 1967), Evans and Walker 
(1972) applied this measure to the analysis of hospital case mix data. It is measured as the 
weighted log of hospital DRG proportions compared to national DRG proportions. 
Observed proportions are used as weights. The index is zero if no specialization occurs 
and increases to a value of one if a hospital is so specialized that it serves only one DRG. 
The ITI has been used effectively in earlier research on specialization (Barer, 1982), 
although these studies and earlier work by Evans and Walker (1972) largely focused on 
hospital costs. Using this index, Farley and Hogan (1990) found that hospital 
specialization increased from 1980 through 1985 and that costs were lower in those 
hospitals specializing and that had the greatest incentives to reduce costs. 
Farley (1989), however, notes multiple disadvantages of the ITI. It is biased 
upwards because the score increases with either fewer patients or more categories (which 
is also true of the HHI). This is because expected case mix proportions can only be 
approached with a finite number of patient discharges. Such biases decrease with hospital 
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size. This bias can be especially significant for small hospitals, meaning that they will 
always indicate some specialization. Consequently, Farley cautions against comparing 
values across hospitals, patient categories, or time periods. In addition, it suffers from a 
problem of interpretation. Furthermore, because the ITI does not measure differences 
between case mix proportions, it is difficult to assign meaning to the value of the index 
and thus interpret differences in the index across hospitals. Because the ITI measures 
deviation in a hospital‘s case volume from that of a ―typical‖ hospital serving as the 
norm, it captures only the magnitude but not the direction of a hospital‘s differences at 
the extremes of the spectrum (Zwanziger et al., 1996). Hospitals that treat a very narrow 
range of cases and thus are considered to exhibit differentiation will tend to have the 
same relatively high index values as hospitals that treat a very broad range of cases and 
thus are considered to exhibit diversification. This is a serious drawback for the index‘s 
use in measuring patterns of specialization (Dayhoff & Cromwell, 1993). Because of its 
complexity in derivation, difficulty in interpretation and multiple disadvantages that 
cannot readily be overcome in its application, it will not be used in this study.  
The statistical measure of distance has similar limitations. Zwanziger, Melnick, 
and Rahman (1990) used it as a measure similar to Farley‘s use of the ITI measure. It 
compares a hospital‘s case mix to those of an ―average‖ hospital. The researchers termed 
it the statistical measure of distance. Unlike the ITI measure, however, it weights all 
diagnostic categories equally. The researchers based their measure on 48 DRG clusters 
that differed by complexity of treatment and physician specialty. This measure thus 
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shares some of the same limitations as observed with the ITI measure in that it is complex 
to derive and difficult to interpret and consequently will not be used in this study.  
Dranove and White (1989) defined a hospital‘s specialization in a DRG as a 
situation in which there is a persistent increase in its market share for a given DRG over 
and above its initial average market share for all DRGs. While similar to Expected 
Market Share in concept because of its derivation from a baseline, it differs from the 
dependent variable chosen for this study in part because it defines specialization by DRG 
as opposed to an entire service line. Moreover, Dayhoff and Cromwell (1993) criticize 
this conceptual approach to measuring specialization because the definition potentially 
allows a hospital to specialize in all DRGs at once if its overall market share rises. Thus, 
growth is confounded with specialization. It too is rejected for use in this study, again in 
exchange for more simplistic, interpretable measures that do not require mathematical 
transformation for interpretation. 
Still other alternative measures exist and have been proposed by researchers. Two 
examples were conceptualized by Dayhoff and Cromwell (1993) but have not been 
widely adopted. These generally utilize DRGs in their derivation rather than the broader 
concept of service lines. The first is simply the number of distinct DRGs in which the 
hospital treats any number of cases, representing a linear measure and one without 
weighting, unlike the internal HHI. Such a measure is particularly successful at 
distinguishing tertiary care hospitals treating a large number of different DRGs and 
therefore highly diversified. However, it is not a measure that captures a narrowing of 
services but rather one of case mix and complexity of cases, representing a dimension of 
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admission patterns rather than specialization as a strategy. Nor is it a measure whose 
derivation aids in distinguishing general hospitals from each other. Such a measure is 
therefore rejected for its lack of application to the study.  
Another also easily calculated measure is simply the percentage of a hospital‘s 
cases in the top five most common Medicare DRGs. Since hospitals treating a higher 
percentage of patients in the common DRGs, by definition, treat a lower percentage of 
cases in other DRGs, this percentage would be indicative of fewer services and thus 
specialization in the form of differentiation. However, a strong rationale exists, amplified 
in the section to follow, for analyzing broad service lines in lieu of more narrow DRGs to 
view how hospitals are organized and managed, where physicians are trained and practice 
their specialties, and how the multidisciplinary nature of patient care is increasingly 
provided. Thus, a measure of specialization based on an aggregate percentage of DRG 
caseload is rejected for use in this study because it lacks relevancy to the increasingly 
complex realities of hospital management and patient care. 
Validity of Dependent Variables 
An important issue pertaining to the measurement of the dependent variables is 
whether they capture the essence of the central construct, hospital specialization. Few 
measures of specialization exist against which construct validity could be tested. The 
primary issue, however, is whether the particular measures reflect variations in other 
dimensions, other than specialization. As already noted, variations in the internal HHI are 
likely to be sensitive to variations in the size of a hospital. Larger hospitals, for example, 
tend to admit many more different types of cases purely because of their relative size and 
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thus exhibit lower HHI scores because there is less concentration of case types. The 
inclusion in the study of an independent variable for hospital size discussed in the 
following section should capture some of the size effect, but may not capture all of it. 
Although the internal HHI is the most widely used measure for specialization in the 
literature, face validity, content validity, criterion related validity, and construct validity 
may all be questioned (Polit & Beck, 2004) by the use of a hospital‘s internal HHI to 
measure specialization. Moreover, while an internal HHI may look as though it is 
quantifying what it purports to measure and thereby achieve face validity, it remains an 
interpretative judgment as to when the index is high enough to indicate that specialization 
has taken place. If used as the sole measure in this study, the index does not indicate 
whether a hospital is actually specializing in any of the six service lines to be analyzed. 
Therefore, the internal HHI cannot be used as the sole indicator of specialization for this 
study. The research draws on additional measures to supplement analysis and enhance the 
opportunity to reach meaningful conclusions. 
Since it is defined using percentages, the Internal Share measure should be 
relatively free of a size effect. On the other hand, it is possible that the distributions of 
services by size of hospital could affect the percentages at the service line level. The 
lower case mix diversity of smaller hospitals could lead to higher service line share 
percentages. Again, the hospital size and other measures in the regression model related 
to size (e.g., ownership where for profit hospitals tend to be somewhat smaller than not-
for profit hospitals as a category) should help to remove some of the influence of size. 
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The Expected Market Share measure, as it compares shares by service line to 
internal norms, should reflect individual hospital behaviors and not size. The two change 
measures, Market Change and Cluster Change, also are compared to an internal  
norm – the percentage share in 2003 for each hospital and service line. Change variables 
also tend to be influenced by other occurrences in the environment, such as changes in 
demographics, technology, overall business practices, clinical trends including the 
movement of surgery out of the hospital into ambulatory surgery centers, regulatory 
changes, and so on. The use of a cross-sectional design, however, removes much of this 
effect, since each hospital will be compared to every other hospital measured at the same 
moment in time. 
Table 11 summarizes the measurement of specialization in the study. 
Summary of Independent Variables in the Model 
This study assesses the correlations between organizational and market 
characteristics and hospital specialization. Associations with nine independent variables 
are examined: (a) whether or not a hospital in a cluster has the leading share for each of 
the six service lines, referred to as Cluster Lead Hospital; (b) tax status based on type of 
hospital ownership, referred to as Ownership; (c) facility size based on acute care, 
inpatient bed count, referred to as Hospital Size; (d) local market population density, 
referred to as Density; (e) local market population growth rate, referred to as Growth; (f) 
the percentage of the local population age 65 and older, referred to as Age; (g) the 
percentage of the local population living below the federally established poverty level, 
referred to as Poverty; (h) market competitiveness, referred to as Competitiveness,  
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Table 11      
     
Dependent Variables as Measures of Service Line Specialization* 
        
    Type of Data  
Variable Measurement Measure Source Interpretation 
       
Internal HHI ∑ squared shares of  Continuous 2007 Specialization increases 
(Internal Service  each hospital's service between Intellimed with higher values. 
Concentration) lines. 0 and 1   
     
A hospital's total Number of cases in Continuous 2007 Specialization increases 
cases in a single each of the service between Intellimed with higher share. 
service line lines as a percentage 0 and 1   
(Internal Share) of a hospital's total    
 cases.    
     
Variance between Actual minus expected Continuous, 2007 Specialization increases 
actual and expected cases in each of the  negative or Intellimed with higher positive 
cases (Expected six service lines,  positive  values. 
Market Share) divided by expected    
 cases based on a     
 hospital's share across    
 all lines.    
     
Increased hospital Difference in a Continuous, 2003 and Specialization increases 
local market share hospital's market share negative or 2007 with higher positive 
over time in a  between 2003 and positive Intellimed values. 
service line 2007 in target service    
(Market Change) lines, divided by its    
 2003 share.    
     
Increased hospital Difference in a Continuous, 2003 and Specialization increases 
share of its cluster hospital's cluster share negative or 2007 with higher positive 
over time in a between 2003 and 2007 positive Intellimed values. 
service line in target service lines,    
(Cluster Change) divided by its 2003    
  share.         
*Dependent variables named in parentheses.  
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measured using the reciprocal of the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI), which is 
commonly used to measure market concentration; and (i) the ratio of specialty physicians 
per one thousand residents in a CBSA, referred to as Physicians. Each of these nine 
variables is discussed more fully in the paragraphs to follow. 
Measurement of Organizational Characteristics 
The study examines three organizational characteristics: (a) Ownership, (b) 
Hospital Size, and (c) Cluster Lead Hospital.  
Ownership. There is evidence that the tax status implied by hospital ownership 
could have an effect on the mix of medical services offered by a hospital (Horwitz, 
2007). In this study, the hospital ownership is measured as a binary variable, coded as ―0‖ 
if a hospital is not-for profit (whether under ownership by a particular religious order 
such as the Catholic Church or non-religious but incorporated under the IRS code as a 
not-for profit entity) or coded ―1‖ if a hospital is commercial and incorporated as a for 
profit. This variable is constructed from a 2007 update of the 2006 AHA database (Luke, 
2010). 
Hospital size. Hospital size is measured using total inpatient, staffed beds based 
on the 2006 AHA Annual Survey data for all acute care general, medical surgical 
hospitals located in the designated CBSAs. Because there are many small to medium 
sized hospitals but many fewer, larger hospitals, the distribution of size is highly skewed 
and thus is far from being normally distributed, which is required for use in regression 
analysis. This variable is therefore measured using logarithmic transformation. This shifts 
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the tail towards the center and improves the normalization of the data. It is a continuous 
variable. 
Cluster lead hospital. A cluster is defined as two or more acute care general, 
medical-surgical, community hospitals that are members of the same-system and located 
in the same CBSA. This definition is consistent with that adopted by Cuellar and Gertler 
(2003, 2005) and applied more recently by Luke et al. (in press). Clusters are used in the 
sub-analysis, in which each cluster‘s lead hospital is compared to the remaining hospitals 
in the cluster. A lead hospital is defined as the cluster member that has the highest market 
share in a given service line in 2007. The lead variable is measured as a nominal 
dichotomous variable, coded as ―0‖ if a hospital is not a lead and ―1‖ if it is. Here, too, 
this variable is constructed from the 2006 system membership database, updated by 2007 
public records.  
Relevant to this sub-analysis is the fact that ―urban‖ is defined as either a 
metropolitan statistical area (METSA) or a micropolitan statistical area (MICSA), as 
distinguished from rural. The clusters are defined by the combination of hospitals within 
the boundaries of U.S. Census Bureau defined urban areas including MICSAs with 
METSAs and known as CBSAs. There is therefore an urban exclusivity for the analysis 
of specialization within cluster hospitals. The CBSA is chosen to define physical confines 
of markets because it represents ―a functionally integrated area in and around an urban 
center that has a population of 10,000 or more‖ (U.S. Census Bureau, 2008).  
Although a hospital designation as an academic medical center or teaching 
hospital is likely to be associated with hospital specialization, there are too few such 
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hospitals in the three state dataset for inclusion of this variable to be reliable. Across the 
three states, there are only 23 designated teaching hospitals, of which only 11 are 
academic medical centers. Therefore, this is not included as an internal independent 
variable in the analysis.  
Measurement of Market Characteristics 
Six market factors are measured in this study: (a) Growth, (b) Density, (c) Age, 
(d) Poverty, (e) Competitiveness, and (f) Physicians. 
Growth. The percentage of population growth reflects differences in the pace of 
change in demand across the markets, which could impact local hospital strategies. This 
measure is obtained from the Area Resource File (ARF) based on U.S. Census data and is 
calculated as the average annual change in population between the years 2000 and 2006.  
It is a continuous variable.   
Density. Population density is measured as the population per square mile in 
2006. Population density is associated with a number of market characteristics, including 
distance traveled to obtain care, proximity of hospitals to one another, and percentages of 
minority populations in a market. Thus, like population growth rate, it is expected to 
impact demand for hospital services and the ability of hospitals successfully to engage in 
specialization. As discussed in Chapter Three, hospitals are known to differ and thus be 
classified by location as either urban or rural. Because the study utilizes the CBSA to 
define each market, population density reflects the numbers and sizes of hospitals, their 
proximity to one another (spatial competition), and the proximity of local populations to 
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hospitals. It is obtained from the ARF, which provides population data obtained from the 
U.S. Census Bureau. It is a continuous variable.  
Age. The percentage of the total population represented by persons age 65 and 
older reflects the relative numbers of persons who are likely to experience high 
incidences of chronic and other diseases or illnesses with severities to warrant 
hospitalization, which could influence positively levels of inpatient demand. This is 
measured for each CBSA, using the 2005-2007 American Community Survey by the U.S. 
Census Bureau. (For smaller CBSAs for which this statistic is not available from the 
Survey, county population statistics from the U.S. Census Bureau are used.) The older 
segment of the populace is likely to be disproportionately represented in the six study 
service lines, given that these reflect chronic conditions and illnesses (specifically, 
cardiology, cardiac surgery, invasive cardiology, pulmonary services, and, to a lesser 
extent, orthopedics). It is noted that older populations generally require greater access to 
specialty physicians than do other population groups and the correlation between the 
specialty physician access and demand for inpatient care increases the likely importance 
of this measure for this study (Liu & Sharma, 2002). Expressed as a percentage, it is a 
continuous variable. 
Poverty. The percentage of the total population represented by those living below 
the poverty level is also obtained for each CBSA from the 2005-2007 American 
Community Survey by the U.S. Census Bureau and serves as an indicator of demand for 
hospital services including obstetrics. Because the indigent are not age dependent, the 
variable encompasses a significant number of pregnant women and their children as well 
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as the elderly and is thus a demographic, independent variable that should reflect a 
community‘s demand for acute care services such as labor and delivery as well as 
inpatient, chronic care services. In the case of general hospitals that have contracted with 
state agencies to provide Medicaid-funded services to their indigent, local populace, it 
potentially helps to identify those service lines a hospital may target for specialization or 
be forced to provide. Expressed as a percentage, it is a continuous variable.  
Competitiveness. Market competitiveness is measured using the difference 
between one and the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI), which is commonly used to 
measure market concentration. The HHI has become the preferred means of measuring 
concentration because the index is derived from the summation of squared shares of all 
players in a market (Gresenz et al., 2004). Many studies have used the HHI to calculate 
market competitiveness or price competition, among them Farley (1989), Phibbs and 
Robinson (1993), and international as well as domestic studies (Chen & Cheng, 2010). 
The index ranges between 0 and 1, with the higher value approaching a monopoly and the 
lower, pure competition. Subtracting the index from one indicates lower market 
competition as the HHI value becomes higher.  
The assumed inverse association between the HHI and market competitiveness 
reflects assumptions about price, rather than non-price competitive behaviors. As 
explained in previous chapters, non-price competitiveness, of which specialization is a 
particular form, could be directly related to the HHI. More concentrated markets produce 
smaller numbers of rivalrous competitors that could be expected to engage in 
specialization, a form of non-price competition. Hence, the higher the degree of 
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concentration, the higher the expected levels of service line specialization. The variable is 
calculated for each market identified as a CBSA, using the share of total cases for each 
hospital in the market based on the 2007 Intellimed dataset. The standard calculation of 
the HHI and illustrations of these examples are provided in Appendix B. It is important to 
reiterate a qualification on the HHI, in that its distribution is skewed, as discussed earlier. 
Physicians. The presence of local physicians in the market is measured using 
equivalent service-line specialty categories. Data for this are obtained from the American 
Medical Association (AMA) and made available through ARF. Each service line in the 
study is matched with those provider specialties most closely associated with that clinical 
hospital service, as follows: (a) cardiac surgery – matched with thoracic surgeons; (b) 
cardiology – matched with cardiologists; (c) invasive cardiology – matched with three 
internal medicine subspecialties added together (interventional cardiology, cardiac 
electrophysiology, and nuclear cardiology); (d) labor and delivery – matched with general 
obstetricians and gynecologists; (e) pulmonary services – matched with pulmonologists; 
and (f) orthopedics – matched with orthopedic surgeons. The figures exclude residents 
and administrators and represent only active, non-retired physicians. The data are drawn 
from the 2008 ARF Release (2007 data). Reported by county, the data have been 
manually organized by CBSA and measured using physician per capita ratios. Table 12 
summarizes the measurement of variables used in the study. 
Quality Control and Data Analysis 
Preparation of the Data for Analysis 
Steps will be taken to test for missing values and to perform appropriate data  
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Table 12    
     
Independent Variable Characteristics of General, Community Hospitals 
     
      Variable Data 
Variable Measurement Type Source 
Internal/Organizational Factors    
     
Tax status of hospital ownership 0 = not-for profit Binary: 0 or 1 2006 AHA 
(Ownership) 1 = for profit  (updated in 2007) 
     
Bed count of the facility Total staffed Continuous 2006 AHA 
(Hospital Size) inpatient beds  (logarithmic) 
     
Share leader of cluster 0 = non-leader Binary: 0 or 1 2007 Intellimed 
(Cluster Lead Hospital) 1 = cluster share leader   
     
External/Market Factors    
     
Percentage population growth ∆ population 2006-2000/ Continuous 2006 ARF 
(Growth) 2000 CBSA population   
     
CBSA population density 2006 population/2000 Continuous 2006 ARF 
(Density) CBSA square miles   
     
Competitiveness of market 1 = external HHI of  Continuous 2003 lagged  
(Competitiveness) CBSA  Intellimed 
     
Percentage of the population American Community Continuous U.S. Census 
65 years and older (Age) Survey 2005-2007 by   
  CBSA   
     
Percentage of the population American Community Continuous U.S. Census 
below poverty (Poverty) Survey 2005-2007 by   
  CBSA   
     
Ratio of specialty physicians AMA Continuous 2008 ARF - to 
population (Physicians)     release 
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cleaning. This will be done by producing a correlation matrix with estimates of missing 
values to determine whether line item entries can remain missing without having 
significant impact on analytical results. Otherwise, a statistically acceptable means of 
inputting missing data will be provided. This is not expected to be an issue due to the 
completeness of data sources. 
Choice of Statistical Technique 
A standard, fixed effects, multiple regression model is first used to assess the 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Given the diversity across 
the three states, a state dummy variable is included as a covariate in the model. The 
regression technique was chosen because it can be applied to a dataset in which the 
independent variables are correlated with one another and with the dependent variable to 
varying degrees (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The regression equation assumes the 
following structure:  
(SPECIALIZATION) = X + BCL (CLUSTER LEAD HOSPITAL HOSPITAL + 
BH (HOSPITAL SIZE) + BO (OWNERSHIP) + BG (GROWTH) + BD 
(DENSITY) + BCO (COMPETITIVENESS) + BL (AGE) + BP (POVERTY) + BPH 
(PHYSICIANS) + ZS (STATE as a COVARIATE) where X is the intercept value 
of (SPECIALIZATION) when all INDEPENDENT VARIABLES and 
COVARIATE are zero. 
To improve the quality of analysis, stepwise regression is chosen for refinement 
in methodology and the backward deletion method specifically is selected in an effort to 
determine the best fitting model.  Although several approaches can be taken for the 
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elimination of variables, the chosen method statistically excludes independent variables 
one at a time if they do not contribute significantly to the results, until the required p-
value threshold is met (in this case p < .05), or the Adjusted R
2
 value decreases 
dramatically upon deletion of a variable. The primary benefit in this approach is it 
identifies a subset of independent variables that could be considered statistically helpful 
for predicting a given dependent variable. All other independent variables that provide 
little incremental predictive power are screened out (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  
Backward, stepwise regression is thus the refined means of methodology to be employed 
in producing the primary analysis results of the study. 
Mixed Effects: Subset Analysis to Control for the Cluster Effect 
When a hospital belongs to a multi-hospital system and resides with same-system 
hospitals in proximity to each other, or cluster, whether a hospital decides to specialize or 
not may depend on what other hospitals do within its cluster. Therefore, all the 
specialization measures in this study may be correlated among the hospitals within their 
respective cluster. There are 50 such discrete clusters identified in the study. To be 
precise in trying to account for this cluster effect, ―cluster‖ as an independent, random 
effect variable must be segregated and assessed to determine if this cluster effect is 
explaining any portion of the error term in the regression equation. A mixed effects 
model is therefore selected for multilevel linear modeling to assess sources of variation 
attributable to cluster effect.  In other words, models will include an additional error term 
associated with the effect of cluster membership of hospitals to determine if cluster effect 
can help explain a portion of underlying variance. Statistical testing will determine if the 
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portion of the error term explained by cluster effect is different from zero and significant 
(Fox, 2002).  
Adequate Ratio of Cases to Number of Independent Variables 
Although sample size has previously been discussed in the context of 
generalizability and a minimum of 315 cases is estimated as required for the research 
design to detect relationships that exist among variables (Polit and Beck, 2004), a 
practical issue still to be considered in the use of multiple regression technique is the ratio 
of cases to the number of independent variables (Green, 1991). The two most common 
rules of thumb are: (a) N >/ = 104 + m where m is the number of independent variables, 
and (b) 50 + (8)m (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Applying these two rules indicate the 
need for 112 - 114 cases, a figure that is well exceeded by the 303 general, community 
hospitals with 25 or more beds in the database for the three states selected for study in the 
aggregate.  
A higher cases-to-independent-variables ratio is advised when the dependent 
variable is skewed, a small effect size is anticipated, or substantial measurement error is 
expected from less reliable variables. In such circumstances, a ratio of 20:1 for each 
independent variable is recommended in a simultaneous regression and 40:1 in a stepwise 
regression (Polit & Beck, 2004). An excessive number of cases is ill-advised because 
virtually any multiple correlation will depart significantly from zero if the number of 
cases becomes too large (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The eight descriptors in the study 
model (nine including Cluster Lead Hospital in the sub-analysis) would therefore require 
160 cases for simultaneous regression and 320 cases for stepwise regression. The final 
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sample size of 303 spanning three states is in this range, although shy by 17 hospitals of 
the desired number for the stepwise regression. Therefore, from several different 
perspectives, the sample size is considered sufficient but not so large as to diminish the 
explanatory value of any single independent, predictor variable. 
Absence of Multicollinearity and Singularity 
To identify multicollinearity in highly correlated IVs, the squared multiple 
correlation (SMC) of each IV will be examined with the rest of variables serving as 
independent variables in multiple correlation. Variables showing signs of 
multicollinearity or singularity (unstableness) will be eliminated or chosen on the basis of 
reliability or other reasons. Generally, multicollinearity does not introduce bias in the 
estimates as such but does alter the statistical estimates for the collinear variables. Thus, 
it is important to remove those variables that are redundant and the least reliable, 
especially variables that are .80 and above correlated with others (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007). This is a particular problem in the cross-sectional analysis of hospital behavior and 
structure, because so many factors are intercorrelated (size especially with other 
measures). Because of the limited inclusion of variables into the analyses, 
multicollinearity should not be a major problem. 
Normality, Linearity, and Homoscedasticity of Residuals 
Examination of scatterplots of residuals will be used as a pre-analysis screening 
procedure to assess normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity between predicted DV 
scores and errors of prediction to determine if further screening or transformation of data 
is necessary. Standard assumptions are that the residuals are normally distributed about 
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the predicted dependent variable scores, that residuals have a linear relationship with 
predicted DV scores, and that the variance of the residuals around predicted dependent 
variable scores is the same for all. Because extreme cases can impact regression results 
and can affect the precision of the regression weights, data will be examined with both 
statistical tests and visual inspection for the significance of multivariate outliers (Fox, 
1991). If outliers are not eliminated and lack of normality is considered severe, the data 
will be transformed by acceptable methods such as the square root for high positive skew 
or a log transformation or by truncating the extreme values in circumstances of high, 
positive kurtosis and skewed distribution of data (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Further 
discussion of data normality and outliers is addressed in Chapter Five. 
Endogeneity 
Variables are considered endogenous if they are predicted by other variables in 
the model. When an independent variable is correlated with the error term in the 
regression model, this reflects a biased regression coefficient. Sources of endogeneity can 
commonly be either an omitted variable that affects both an independent variable and the 
dependent variable or measurement error in an independent variable. Because firms 
choose strategies reflecting their internal attributes, industry conditions, and environment, 
those choices may be endogenous and self-selected (Shaver, 1998). In the absence of 
knowing which variables might be endogenous to others, one solution is to define and 
measure observations so as to avoid endogeneity. Another is to use a lagged independent 
variable as a proxy to control for possible selection biases in the correlational data 
(Newhouse & McClellan, 1998). Consequently, one minus the Hirschman-Herfindahl 
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Index as an overall measure of a hospital‘s market competitiveness will be lagged using 
2003 rather than 2007 data in calculating the independent variable‘s value. While there 
are other methods of addressing the problem of endogeneity such as the instrumental 
variable approach (Newhouse & McClellan, 1998), there is no overarching guidance in 
econometric literature strongly promoting the use of one over another as even the source 
of endogeneity could also influence how it is best tested, validated and corrected. 
Statistical Inference 
Statistical significance is considered established for variables with a P-value of 
less than 0.05. The F statistic for the analysis of variance will be used to assess the 
significance of the overall relationships. The F statistic is the ratio of the mean squares 
for regression and error, or MSR/MSE. The larger the F value, the smaller the P-value, 
and the stronger the evidence of association between the dependent variable and the 
independent variable (Canavos & Miller, 1999). The size of the R
2
 will indicate how 
much of the variability in specialization by general, community hospitals is predicted by 
the variables included in the equation, using a 95% confidence limit.  
Delimitations 
One full year of case activity is selected for this retrospective study. The research 
is not longitudinal. It is not a goal of this study to determine if change has occurred in the 
hospital sector over time, but rather to assess whether there is evidence specialization 
exists and, if so, what factors might be associated with indicators of specialization.  
Nor is case volume being studied in any connection to clinical outcomes inclusive 
of quality or safety improvement, despite the pressure that may be exerted on hospitals to 
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specialize in order to improve quality or patient safety. There is no judgment of whether a 
hospital is performing with good or poor clinical outcomes, either comparatively or in 
absolute terms. Instead, case volumes are used to calculate local market share within 
selected service lines, based on the highest volume diagnostic categories in those service 
lines chosen for analysis. As such, the value of specialization by service line is not being 
measured or assessed in any way in this study. Nor is cost or net profit considered among 
variables in any way. Hence, the research is not intended to offer any financial analysis 
and conclusion despite the fact that patient volumes and market share strength can exert 
economic implications. Because payer contracts with hospital providers dictate discount 
percentages against billed charges and these may vary among hospital systems, markets, 
and hospitals themselves, it is understood that net revenue in the form of collections is 
not reflected in charge data. Charges are intended merely to reflect the revenue-
generating capacity of a service line and not intended to imply profit performance. It is 
further understood that collections on hospital charges for uninsured patients are equally 
subject to variation and outside of the scope of this study. Similarly, the relationships 
with public or private payers and local physician organizations are not explicitly 
measured in any way. It is nevertheless recognized that the mix and concentration of 
payers and their contractual relationships with all providers in a local market could well 
affect the specialization strategies of general, community hospitals. Similarly, the 
strength that organized physician groups (across specialties and even including primary 
care doctors) might exert on local hospital specialization is acknowledged but not 
reflected in this study. Because the data concerns itself strictly with general, community 
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hospitals to the exclusion of specialty hospitals whether under physician or corporate 
ownership, the influence of this competitive element is also absent from analysis. It is 
recognized that specialization strategies undertaken by general, community hospitals may 
in fact be in response to the local competitive threats of specialty hospitals especially 
those with a focus on cardiac services or orthopedic surgery. Although an attempt is 
made to identify a lead hospital with the highest share in its cluster in each of the six 
service lines selected for study, it is recognized that this may not, in fact, reflect a 
strategy of specialization under the direction of the system of which it is a member. Also, 
a designated lead hospital may have only a marginally higher share than another same-
system hospital in its cluster and thus not be distinguished in terms of cluster 
specialization.  
Assumptions 
1. It is assumed that the data released to the public by Florida‘s Agency for 
Healthcare Administration, the University of Nevada‘s Center for Health Information 
Analysis, and Virginia‘s Department of Health Information represent a full and accurate 
accounting of each states‘ hospital discharges.  
2. It is assumed that Intellimed, a proprietary company, has processed the data 
accurately and completely. In particular, it is assumed that the definition and 
classifications applied by Intellimed are consistent with generally accepted definitions 
and classifications of service lines utilized by general, community hospitals nationwide. 
3. It is assumed that specialization by service line reflects a strategic response 
made by general, community hospitals. 
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4. It is assumed that the four-year interval between 2003 and 2007 represents 
sufficient time for hospitals and health systems to implement specialization strategies. 
5. It is assumed that the service lines selected for study represent the level at 
which hospitals engage in service line specialization. 
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CHAPTER 5:  RESULTS and ANALYSIS 
 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter is divided into three sections. Section one describes the final 
cleaning of data and presentation of descriptive statistics on market and hospital 
organizational characteristics. It also examines correlation statistics in search of possible 
multicollinearity and presents results of standard, simultaneous regressions using each of 
the dependent variables described in Chapter Four. Section two offers a rationale for 
further refinement in methodology, specifically focusing on the benefits of performing 
backward stepwise regression, the findings of which are shared in the third section. Tests 
for normality of distribution of data are also performed, followed by an assessment of 
outliers and a rationale for not eliminating extreme outliers. To improve normality for 
better predictability of regression models, transformation of dependent variables is 
undertaken. The third section presents the results for analyses using all 303 hospitals as 
well as discusses those hospitals in the cluster sub-group following application of 
procedures. This section also presents the testing of all nine hypotheses. The chapter 
concludes with a brief summary of findings and analysis. 
Introduction 
Final Data Cleaning and Descriptive Characteristics of Hospitals 
Population data were missing from ARF for seven local markets, six of which 
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were in Virginia and all too small for census data to be available from online sources. To 
remedy the gaps, means for population, population density, population growth, poverty 
level, and percentage of the population age 65 or older were calculated for populations 
under 10,000 in the study sample. These means were used to replace missing data.  
After merging sources of data and eliminating specialty, extended care and 
federally-owned facilities, hospitals falling outside of CBSAs and those with fewer than 
25 beds, the final study sample consisted of a total of 303 general, community hospitals 
residing in 87 metropolitan or micropolitan markets across Florida, Nevada, and Virginia. 
Hospitals treating cases in 2007 in the six service lines are shown in Table 13. 
Table 13     
      
Number of Hospitals Participating in High Volume, High   
Revenue-generating Service Lines   
            
      
  Hospitals in Final Study Sample  
Targeted Service Line Offering the Targeted Service Lines % of Total 
      
Cardiac Surgery 245 80.9 
      
Cardiology 303 100.0 
      
Invasive Cardiology 243 80.2 
      
Orthopedics 267 88.1 
      
Pulmonary Services 269 88.8 
      
Labor and Delivery 179 59.1 
      
All six service lines 166 54.8 
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The table illustrates that only slightly over half or 54.8% of all the hospitals 
discharged cases in all of the six high volume, high revenue-generating service lines. 
Hospitals were most selective about offering labor and delivery services, with only 179 of 
the 303 or 59.1% hospitals discharging such cases in 2007. On the other hand, all 303 
hospitals in the study sample reported inpatient cases in cardiology, reflecting the 
widespread prevalence of chronic cardiac disease in the general population requiring such 
services.  
Table 14 provides descriptive statistics for continuous, independent variables. 
Specifically, the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, and minimum and 
maximum values are presented for each characteristic in order to illustrate the variety and 
wide range of facilities across the three states in the study sample. Hospital Size is most 
easily interpreted by observing untransformed data, as the number of beds among the 303 
hospitals ranges from 25 to 1,500, with a mean of 248, median of 200, and standard 
deviation of 194. Data for bed counts transformed into logarithms as displayed in Table 
14 and used to measure hospital size reflect a tighter distribution than the  
untransformed data, as expected. Market factors vary considerably among hospitals 
across the study sample, as demonstrated by the range between minimum and maximum 
values for variables. While mean population growth rate in a hospital‘s local market over 
the period 2000-2006 (Growth) is 11.6%, this statistic ranges from severe shrinkage by 
32.1% to explosive growth of 66.7%. The age and economic prosperity of populations 
vary considerably as well, reflected by the percentage of the population age 65 and over  
in a hospital‘s local market (Age) ranging from 7.5% to 31.7%. Similarly, the percentage  
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Table 14      
       
Continuous Independent Variables     
              
       
Variable N Mean σ Min Max 
       
Organizational Factors      
       
Hospital Size (log values) 303 5.10 0.86 3.22 7.31 
       
Market Factors      
       
Growth 303 0.12 0.09 -0.32 0.67 
Density 303 620.01 417.20 2.28 2812.45 
Competitiveness 303 0.57 0.35 0 1.00 
Age 303 15.97% 4.97% pts. 7.50% 31.71% 
Poverty 303 12.79% 3.61% pts. 6.40% 26.60% 
Physicians      
     Cardiac Surgery 303 0.01 0.01 0 0.14 
     Cardiology 303 0.07 0.09 0 1.04 
     Invasive Cardiology 303    8.62
e-8
    6.64
e-8
 0    6.96
e-7
 
     Orthopedics 303 0.08 0.15 0 2.32 
     Pulmonary Services 303 0.03 0.03 0 0.51 
     Labor and Delivery 303 0.10 0.10 0 0.92 
 
of the local population living below the poverty level (Poverty) ranges from 6.4% to 
26.6%, respectively. Physician specialists (Physicians) do not necessarily practice in all 
hospital markets, as no doctors in any of the six categories of specialists are recorded in 
some of the smallest markets of hospitals. The physician ratios as a percent of the 
population range widely as well, as depicted by relatively large standard deviations 
compared to means. 
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Table 15 provides descriptive statistics for continuous variables measuring 
hospital specialization including number of observations, mean, standard deviations, 
minimums and maximum values for each dependent variable to illustrate variation across 
the three states in the study sample. The 303 hospitals in the study sample reflect 
considerable range in the extent to which they concentrate in any service lines, termed 
Internal Service Concentration. This is seen in both the minimum and maximum internal 
HHI values of 0.05 and 0.37, respectively, as well as the relatively high degree of 
concentration by hospitals in particular services, reaching a maximum Internal Share of 
0.58 in pulmonary services for at least one hospital in the study sample. This focus is 
reinforced by the fact that only 54.8% of all 303 hospitals provide inpatient care in all six 
high volume, high revenue-generating service lines targeted by this study. 
Table 15 also shows the variance in actual hospital share of cases relative to 
expectations in each service line relative to a hospital‘s share of market across all cases, 
termed Expected Market Share. The table shows that some hospitals exited three of the 
top six service lines: invasive cardiology, orthopedics, and labor and delivery. This is 
denoted by a variance of -1.00, representing the loss of 100% of a hospital‘s share of a 
market as it drops a service line altogether. Although not shown in the table, 14 or 7.4% 
of 187 hospitals stopped accepting cases in labor and delivery during the brief, four-year 
period, while six added the service for a net loss of eight hospitals delivering babies.  
Over the same period, eight of 249 hospitals or 3.2% stopped providing invasive 
cardiology, while two added the service for a net loss of six. Only one hospital or 0.4% 
eliminated orthopedics as a service line. Conversely, no hospitals dropped pulmonary  
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Table 15      
       
Continuous Variables Measuring Specialization    
              
       
Variable N Mean σ Min Max 
       
Internal Service Concentration 303 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.37 
       
Expected Market Share      
Cardiac Surgery 303 0.19 0.32 0 1.00 
Cardiology 303 0.11 0.41 -0.88 1.81 
Invasive Cardiology 303 -0.16 0.76 -1.00 6.31 
Orthopedics 303 0.01 0.54 -1.00 2.70 
Pulmonary Services 303 0.18 0.63 -0.53 6.39 
Labor and Delivery 303 -0.17 0.66 -1.00 1.81 
      
Internal Share      
Cardiac Surgery 303 0.01 0.01 0 0.08 
Cardiology 303 0.12 0.05 0.01 0.27 
Invasive Cardiology 303 0.03 0.03 0 0.26 
Orthopedics 303 0.07 0.05 0 0.32 
Pulmonary Services 303 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.58 
Labor and Delivery 303 0.07 0.07 0 0.33 
       
Market Change      
Cardiac Surgery 303 0.06 0.28 -0.77 1.00 
Cardiology 303 -0.01 0.20 -0.88 0.63 
Invasive Cardiology 303      -1.59
e-17
 0.24 -0.95 0.95 
Orthopedics 303     -1.75
e-5
 0.22 -0.95 0.95 
Pulmonary Services 303     -3.45
e-5
 0.20 -0.84 0.59 
Labor and Delivery 303 -0.01 0.23 -1.00 1.00 
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services, cardiac surgery, or cardiology. In fact, 98 hospitals, increasing from 147 in 2003 
to 245 in 2007 or 66.7%, added cardiac surgery over the brief, four-year period. 
In addition, dramatic, positive shifts in market share positions were experienced 
by some hospitals over the period. This occurred, for example, in invasive cardiology in 
which a hospital experienced a 630.6% point variance over market share expectations and 
in pulmonary services, in which a hospital experienced a 639.2% point variance. Only in 
cardiac surgery did hospitals in the study sample gain share on average, demonstrated by 
a mean change in market share of six percentage points during the 2003-2007 period, 
termed Market Change. This occurred because of so many new entrants competing in 
the service even at small case volumes. In all other service lines, hospitals actually lost 
fractional share points, on average. All of this suggests functional diversity and even 
possibly jockeying for competitive positions among hospitals. 
There are 45 different systems represented in the study sample, some of which 
operate facilities in multiple geographic markets. Among the 303 hospitals, 60 or 19.8% 
are not affiliated with any system in 2007. Of those in systems, 175 operated in clusters, 
defined as two or more hospitals in the same system in the same market. Together, these 
hospitals comprise 50 clusters operating in 25 markets in the three states. Table 16 shows 
that some of the cluster hospitals did not offer all six of the service lines. 
Table 16 shows that only two-thirds or 64.0% of all the hospitals in the cluster 
sub-group of the study sample treated patient cases in all of the six high volume, high 
revenue-generating service lines. Still, this represents a higher percentage compared to 
those in the total study sample offering all six service lines to their local communities  
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Table 16    
     
Cluster Hospitals Participating in High Volume, High 
Revenue-generating Service Lines  
          
     
 Hospitals Offering % in Cluster 
Service Line the Cells Analysis 
     
Cardiac Surgery 166 94.9 
     
Cardiology 175 100.0 
     
Invasive Cardiology 165 94.3 
     
Orthopedics 174 99.4 
     
Pulmonary Services 175 100.0 
     
Labor and Delivery 116 66.3 
     
All 6 service lines 112 64.0 
 
(54.8%), probably because cluster hospitals are only urban and thus larger, on average, 
than hospitals in the sample. The percentage of cluster hospitals offering labor and 
delivery is about the same as in the sample as a whole, with 116 of the 175 or 66.3% 
treating such cases in 2007 (compared to 59.1% of all 303 hospitals). All hospitals in 
clusters provided care in 2007 in cardiology and pulmonary services, and all but one 
treated cases in orthopedics. Table 17 reports the descriptive statistics for the continuous, 
independent variables. The numbers show the variety and range of facilities in the cluster 
sub-group of 175 hospitals. 
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Table 17      
       
Continuous Independent Variables: Cluster Sub-group  
              
       
Variable N Mean σ Min Max 
       
Organizational Factors      
Hospital Size 175 5.28 0.75 3.22 7.31 
       
Market Factors      
Growth 175 0.13 0.07 -0.06 0.30 
Density 175 654.38 362.33 60.64 1066.00 
Competitiveness 175 0.76 0.16 0.25 0.90 
Age 175 16.02% 4.91% pts. 9.80% 31.70% 
Poverty 175 11.86% 2.36% pts. 7.00% 21.90% 
Physicians      
     Cardiac Surgery 175 0.02 0.01 0 0.03 
     Cardiology 175 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.13 
     Invasive Cardiology 175    9.59
e-8
    3.99
e-8
    6.60
e-9
    2.83
e-7
 
     Orthopedics 175 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.07 
     Labor and Delivery 175 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.13 
 
Descriptive statistics for the cluster sub-group shown in Table 17 reveal slightly 
lower ranges between minimum and maximum values for Growth, Density, and Poverty 
compared to values for all 303 hospitals. The hospitals in clusters, however, appear to be 
responding to greater price competition/lower non-price competition on average, based 
on the comparatively higher mean value of 0.76 for Competitiveness compared to 0.57 
for the sample as a whole (see Table 14). With the exception of thoracic surgeons (the 
specialty physicians associated with cardiac surgery) for whom a minimum value of zero 
is displayed in Table 17, all of the cluster hospitals otherwise have access in their markets 
to specialty physicians. The same cannot be said for the 303-hospital dataset, as hospitals 
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in 18 of the 87 markets lack access to any local, specialty physicians as defined for this 
study. This reflects the disproportionately higher concentration of specialists in more 
densely populated, urban areas. 
Table 18 reports the descriptive statistics for the continuous variables measuring 
hospital specialization for the cluster sub-group of 175 hospitals. As reported in Table 18, 
cluster hospitals report the same degree of concentration, measured by the Internal 
Service Concentration, as do hospitals in the study sample as a whole (see Table 15). 
Except for cardiac surgery, standard deviations from means for Expected Market Share 
in each of the six service lines are also similar between the two groups. For the 175 
cluster hospitals, the mean for cardiac surgery is negative (-21%), compared to positive 
(19%) for all 303 hospitals (see Table 15). The range of variance from market share 
expectations is also wider for cluster hospitals (485% or -100% to 385%) versus only 
100% or 0% to 100% for all study hospitals). This could be attributable to a number of 
factors. Being only urban, cluster hospitals face greater competition within their markets 
in this particular service line, as evidenced by a higher mean Competitiveness pointed 
out in Table 17. Such statistics could also suggest less discipline on the part of same 
system hospitals in a cluster if some were new entrants to cardiac surgery and thus 
robbing share from sister hospitals in that particular service line. This is supported by a 
mean gain in market share in cardiac surgery between 2003 and 2007 of 1% for the 175 
cluster hospitals, compared to 6% for the 303 hospitals in the study sample as a whole.   
In fact, while not revealed in the tables but in the raw data, a possible illustration 
of this lack of cluster membership discipline is evident in the Baptist Health System –  
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Table 18      
       
Continuous Variables Measuring Specialization for the Cluster Sub-group 
              
       
Variable N Mean σ Min Max 
       
Internal Service Concentration 175 9% 4% pts. 5% 37% 
       
Expected Market Share      
     Cardiac Surgery 175 -21% 82% pts. -100% 385% 
     Cardiology 175 13% 41% pts. -88% 177% 
     Invasive Cardiology 175 -18% 88% pts. -100% 631% 
     Orthopedics 175 4% 65% pts. -100% 270% 
     Pulmonary Services 175 19% 68% pts. -53% 639% 
     Labor and Delivery 175 -17% 75% pts. -100% 181% 
       
Internal Share      
     Cardiac Surgery 175 1% 1% pts. 0% 8% 
     Cardiology 175 11% 4% pts. 1% 25% 
     Invasive Cardiology 175 3% 4% pts. 0% 26% 
     Orthopedics 175 8% 6% pts. 0% 32% 
     Pulmonary Services 175 10% 6% pts. 4% 58% 
     Labor and Delivery 175 8% 7% pts. 0% 33% 
       
Market Change      
     Cardiac Surgery 175 1% 13% pts. -54% 100% 
     Cardiology 175 1% 7% pts. -16% 82% 
     Invasive Cardiology 175 -1% 3% pts. -12% 14% 
     Orthopedics 175 1% 4% pts. -15% 13% 
     Pulmonary Services 175 -1% 2% pts. -10% 12% 
     Labor and Delivery 175 -1% 3% pts. -24% 14% 
 
South Florida cluster, where in 2003 only two of the four hospitals in that cluster 
discharged cardiac surgery patients. One (Baptist Hospital of Miami) enjoyed lead status 
with 75.3% of the cluster‘s share in that service line. By 2007, however, a third hospital 
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in the cluster had begun offering cardiac surgery services, contributing to the lead 
hospital‘s loss of cluster share by 7.7 percentage points. At the same time, the secondary 
player in that cluster gained 4.9 percentage points, again at the expense of the lead player. 
With the two smaller players gaining ground at the expense of the lead hospital, Baptist 
Hospital of Miami lost status in cardiac surgery in the cluster. While over the same period 
the cluster gained share of market from 6.7% to 9.4%, it is not known if its gains could 
have been greater had its lead hospital not lost ground in cardiac surgery at a time when 
total cardiac surgery patient demand in the South Florida market grew from 9,769 cases 
in 2003 to 12,247 cases in 2007 or 25.4%.  
On the other hand, such maneuvers may have actually been a defensive strategy 
by the South Florida cluster when inpatient cases in cardiology and invasive cardiology 
sharply declined by 18.5% and 18.1%, respectively. (This may have occurred if such 
services were increasingly being performed on an outpatient basis. Such data are not 
incorporated in this study.) Over the four-year period, the cluster retained its share of the 
two markets, without any erosion of Baptist Hospital‘s position in either cardiology or 
invasive cardiology, as cardiology as a diagnostic service in particular is considered 
critically important to securing follow-up cardiac surgery cases. Whether there was 
selfish maneuvering on the part of smaller hospitals in the cluster struggling for survival 
or a more planned, defensive strategy underway to protect the cluster as a whole and 
ultimately its lead hospital across service lines in cardiac care is not known. What is most 
apparent is the rapid pace of change during the period in high revenue, high volume 
service lines where investments in technology are large and competitive mistakes are 
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costly. Moreover, the scene in this vignette suggests the potential importance of 
analyzing movement across service lines in unison rather than separately in isolation 
before drawing definitive conclusions about strategic decisions or factors influencing 
them, whether a hospital, a cluster, or an entire system.  
Table 19 provides descriptive statistics for one additional continuous variable 
measuring hospital specialization based on change over the period 2003-2007 in a 
hospital‘s share of its cluster‘s total cases in each of the six service lines (Cluster 
Change). Compared to descriptive statistics for Market Change for all 303 hospitals 
appearing in Table 15, mean values for Cluster Change in Table 19 exhibit smaller 
standard deviations and tighter ranges for all service lines. These patterns suggest greater 
stability or predictability among positions of hospitals inside their clusters than in the 
markets overall. Table 19 illustrates, however, that there is greater variation among 
cluster hospitals in cardiac surgery than other service lines, indicated by a standard 
deviation of 20% pts., which is higher than in all other service lines in the sub-group. 
Table 19      
       
Specialization by Cluster Change 2003-2007   
              
Variable N Mean σ Min Max 
Cluster Change      
     Cardiac Surgery 175 4% 20% pts. -51% 100% 
     Cardiology 175 -159%
e-18
 7% pts. -23% 23% 
     Invasive Cardiology 175 -1% 6% pts. -29% 29% 
     Orthopedics 175 -1% 9% pts. -39% 28% 
     Pulmonary Services 175 -1% 6% pts. -29% 29% 
     Labor and Delivery 175 -2% 12% pts. -100% 26% 
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This is suggestive of a comparatively faster pace of change induced by technology as 
described in the preceding example involving Baptist Health System – South Florida – as 
well as the rapid influx of other general hospitals as competitors in this service line. 
Addressing Collinearity: Assessment of Correlation Between Variables 
Table 20 reports the correlation matrix for all of the independent variables. As can 
be seen, the highest correlation between independent variables is 0.19 between 
Competitiveness and Poverty. Since the estimated correlation between variables is still 
relatively low, multicollinearity is assumed not to be a concern for the study of the 303 
hospitals. Ownership does not appear in the table as a continuous variable because it is a 
dichotomous (binary) variable with values of zero or one. For this, a point-biserial 
coefficient must be applied. Similar to the Pearson statistic used for correlations between 
two continuous variables and shown in Table 20, the point-biserial coefficient is derived 
from the slope of a regression, also referred to as ―convergence by gradient.‖ The 
strongest value for the dichotomous variable is 0.04 and is between Ownership and Age. 
With no r-value exceeding 0.19 for continuous or dichotomous variables, no evidence of 
collinearity is revealed. 
The correlations are low as well for the cluster sub-group of 175 hospitals, as 
shown in Table 21. Had multicollinearity been a problem, it may have been necessary to 
eliminate redundant variables. However, the highest correlation involving independent 
variables in the cluster sub-group is between Density and Competitiveness with a value 
of only 0.49. Since independent variables for Physicians and Cluster Lead Hospital  
differ for each of the six targeted service lines and are entered separately into  
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Table 20      
       
Assessment of Collinearity: Highest Correlations in Study Sample (303 Hospitals) 
              
       
 Independent by Independent Variables  
       
  Poverty Age Size Competitiveness Growth Density 
       
Poverty 1.00 0.01 0.10 0.19 0.12 0.01 
       
Age 0.01 1.00 0.01 0.06 0.02 1.57
e-5
 
       
Size 0.10 0.01 1.00 0.22 0.01 0.01 
       
Competitiveness 0.19 0.01 0.22 1.00 0.04 0.08 
       
Growth 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.04 1.00 0.01 
       
Density 0.01 1.57
e-5
 0.01 0.08 0.01 1.00 
       
Physicians:       
       
MDCarSx 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.19 0.01 0.11 
       
MDCardio 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 
       
MDInvCar 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.06 
       
MDOB/GYN 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 
       
MDPulSve 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 
       
MDOrtho 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
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Table 21 
       
Correlations in the Cluster Sub-group (175 Hospitals)   
              
       
  Poverty Age Size Competitiveness Growth Density 
       
Poverty 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.01 
       
Age 0.01 1.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 
       
Size 0.01 0.01 1.00 0.03 0.01 0.06 
       
Competitiveness 0.01 0.02 0.03 1.00 2.76
e-5
 0.49 
       
Growth 0.10 0.02 0.01 2.75
e-5
 1.00 0.03 
       
Density 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.49 0.03 1.00 
       
Physicians:       
       
MDCarSx 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.11 0.01 0.26 
       
MDCardio 0.08 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.20 
       
MDInvCar 0.15 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.17 
       
MDOB/GYN 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.21 0.01 
       
MDPulSvc 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.04 
       
MDOrtho 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.21 0.01 
 
regressions, they do not need to be assessed for multicollinearity with each other. 
Neither Ownership nor Cluster Lead Hospital appears in the table because these 
are dichotomous (binary) variables. When the r-value (convergence by gradient) is 
derived, the correlation with continuous, independent variables for Ownership never 
exceeds 0.04. For Cluster Lead Hospital, however, the correlation is considerably 
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higher, ranging from 0.12 for labor and delivery to 0.25 for cardiology. Still, at this level 
of correlation, collinearity is not considered a statistical concern.   
However, most lead hospitals are expected to be the larger hospitals within 
clusters and thus the Cluster Lead Hospital effect might be masked by the role played 
by inpatient bed count. Considering the fact that the mean inpatient bed count of cluster 
hospitals is 257, while the mean for all 303 hospitals in the study sample is 229 or 10.9% 
fewer, it is possible that collinearity may not have been fully revealed in the foregoing 
analyses. Such concern is elevated when comparing inpatient bed count statistics of lead 
versus non-lead hospitals in clusters, depending on their cluster leadership by service 
line, as shown in Table 22.  
There is considerable variation between lead and non-lead hospitals throughout all 
six service lines, sufficient to raise continuing concern about multicollinearity between 
Hospital Size and Cluster Lead Hospital. Therefore, still another check for 
multicollinearity involves the variance inflation factor, which is calculated for each 
independent variable in the final regression models in order to quantify severity of 
multicollinearity in an ordinary least squares regression analysis (Hair, Anderson, 
Tatham, & Black, 2006). It measures how much the variance of an estimated regression 
coefficient is increased because of collinearity. The higher the variance inflation factor, 
the higher the likelihood of a collinearity problem. However, no evidence of collinearity 
emerges in any of the final models because the highest variance inflation factor never 
exceeds a value of two. A value of at least eight needs to be reached before strongly 
suspecting collinearity.  
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Table 22      
       
Comparison in Bed Count Between Lead and Non-lead Hospitals  
According to Service Line    
              
       
Service Line N Mean σ Min Max 
       
Pulmonary Services      
           Lead 50 407 266 89 1,500 
           Non-lead 125 197 127 25 757 
       
Labor and Delivery      
          Lead 47 391 280 54 1,500 
          Non-lead 128 207 134 25 757 
       
Orthopedics      
          Lead 49 419 261 89 1,500 
          Non-lead 126 194 126 25 883 
       
Cardiac Surgery      
          Lead 50 409 260 89 1,500 
          Non-lead 125 196 130 25 883 
       
Invasive Cardiology      
          Lead 48 418 261 89 1,500 
          Non-lead 127 196 130 25 883 
       
Cardiology      
           Lead 50 425 263 89 1,500 
          Non-lead 125 190 116 25 757 
 
Transformation of Dependent Variables 
Prior to analyzing the data using regression analysis, transformations of 
dependent variables are necessary due to their lack of normality and thus, violation of 
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linear regression assumptions. The Shapiro-Wilk‘s test is commonly used as a goodness 
of fit test, with the null hypothesis that a statistical sample comes from a normally 
distributed population (Shapiro & Wilk, 1965). If the null hypothesis that the data are 
normally distributed is rejected (the p-value is < .05), transforming a measure is justified 
(Vasu, 1979). All p-values for the Shapiro-Wilk test performed on the dependent 
variables in the study are < .01, indicating highly skewed data that warrant 
transformation. 
Taking natural log transformations (the most common approach) or calculating 
square-root transformations are appropriate for size or count data, such as bed count. 
However, it is not acceptable for data that range into negative values. Arcsine 
transformations are commonly used for variables ranging from -1 to 1 such as is the case 
for the Market Change and Cluster Change variables.  For values that range from 0 to 
1, the arcsine square root transformation is often employed, as it may be slightly more 
powerful (McDonald, 2009). Thus, this transformation is applied to the Internal Service 
Concentration and Internal Share variables. There is no recognized transformation 
available for Expected Market Share, for which the values range widely below -1 and 
above 1. Visually, the histogram approximates a normal distribution pattern, and so it will 
not be transformed. This remains nevertheless a limitation to quantitative analysis and 
interpretation. It is notable that the variables still failed the Shapiro-Wilk test for 
normality, even after they were transformed – which therefore remains a limitation in the 
study. Still, the transformed variables are retained in the primary analysis results because 
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the transformation ensures that the predicted values from the model will stay within the 
plausible range for the dependent variable. 
Outliers 
An outlier is an extreme value for one variable that distorts the distribution and 
thus overall descriptive statistics. It seems to be unattached to the rest of the distribution 
and thus is readily identifiable by observation using a graph, such as a histogram or box 
plot (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). In addition to such visual inspection, Mahalanobis 
distance, the distance of a case from the centroid of the remaining cases where the 
centroid is the point created at the intersection of the means of all variables, was also 
employed to assist with assessing for outliers (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). While 
selected outliers by visual inspection were removed temporarily to check model validity, 
final reported results included outliers. Their permanent removal was not statistically 
justified by diagnostics because in each situation the model‘s parameter estimates did not 
change dramatically without them. 
Results of Standard, Simultaneous Multiple Regression 
Following transformation of dependent variables and assessment of outliers for 
elimination, the results of standard, simultaneous regressions on each of the dependent 
variables depicting service line specialization in the full study sample of 303 hospitals are 
summarized in Tables 23 and 24. Both simple R
2
 and Adjusted R
2
 are displayed in the 
table. While R
2
 is a statistic whose value depicts the goodness of fit of a model, Adjusted 
R
2
 adjusts for the number of explanatory terms in a model. Unlike simple R
2
, the 
Adjusted R
2
 increases only if the new term improves the model more than would be  
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Table 23    
     
Standard, Simultaneous Multiple Regression for Internal Service Concentration 
          
  Parameter Standard  
Variable Estimate B Error (SE) p-value 
     
Competitiveness 0.45 0.03 < .01 
     
Growth 0.02 0.04 0.63 
     
Density <0.01 <0.01 <.01 
     
Hospital Size -0.03 <0.01 <.01 
     
Age - < 0.01 < 0.01 .97 
     
Poverty < 0.01 < 0.01 .85 
     
Ownership < 0.01 < 0.01 .61 
     
State - Florida -< 0.01 0.01 .72 
     
State - Nevada < 0.01 < 0.01 .91 
     
Physicians (Cardiology) 0.12 0.04 < .01 
     
Physicians (Invasive Cardiology) 35810 60842 .56 
     
Physicians (Pulmonary Services) -0.08 0.09 .38 
     
Physicians (OBGYN) -0.05 0.06 .39 
     
Physicians (Orthopedics) -0.03 0.03 .29 
     
Physicians (Cardiac Surgery) -0.73 0.30 .02 
     
R
2
 = 0.33 Adjusted R
2
 = 0.29 F value = 9.25   
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Table 24 
          
Standard Fixed Effects, Simultaneous Multiple Regression for Each of Six Service Lines  
          
                Expected     
 Internal Share Market Share Market Change 
Variable ß SE p ß SE p ß SE p 
          
Cardiac Surgery         
          
Competitiveness 0.01 0.01 .17 -0.51 0.05 <.01 -0.33 0.08 <.01 
Growth 0.01 .03 .69 0.03 0.19 .89 -0.38 0.29 .19 
Density -<0.01 <0.01 .01 -<0.01 <0.01 <.01 <0.01 <0.01 .02 
Hospital Size 0.05 <0.01 <.01 0.15 0.02 <.01 0.04 0.03 .10 
Poverty -<0.01 <0.01 .77 <0.01 <0.01 .15 <0.01 <0.01 .31 
Age <0.01 <0.01 .21 <0.01 <0.01 <.01 <0.01 <0.01 .50 
Ownership <0.01 <0.01 .23 -0.01 0.03 .67 0.05 0.05 .26 
State - Florida <0.01 0.01 .80 -0.02 0.07 .80 0.16 0.10 .13 
State - Nevada 0.01 <0.01 .11 -0.10 0.41 .02 -0.06 0.06 .37 
Physicians 0.68 0.27 .01 -1.24 1.49 .41 -5.96 2.29 .01 
 Adjusted R
2
 = 0.55 Adjusted R
2
 = 0.44 Adjusted R
2
 = 0.14 
 F value = 37.22 F value = 24.69 F value = 6.11 
          
Cardiology          
          
Competitiveness -0.02 0.02 .22 0.19 0.09 .03 -0.06 0.05 .20 
Growth 0.12 0.05 .03 -0.14 0.03 <.01 -0.05 0.16 .76 
Density <0.01 <0.01 .34 -0.01 <0.01 .18 <0.01 <0.01 .73 
Hospital Size -0.04 <0.01 <.01 -0.14 0.03 <.01 0.08 0.02 <.01 
Poverty <0.01 <0.01 <.01 -<0.01 <0.01 .41 <0.01 <0.01 .46 
Age <0.01 <0.01 .12 -<0.01 <0.01 .22 <0.01 <0.01 .79 
Ownership 0.03 <0.01 <.01 0.18 0.05 <.01 -0.02 0.03 .48 
State - Florida -0.05 0.02 <.01 -0.20 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.06 .62 
State - Nevada -0.01 0.01 .42 -0.04 0.07 .55 0.04 0.03 .91 
Physicians 0.10 0.05 .04 -0.04 0.27 .89 -0.03 0.15 .83 
 Adjusted R
2
 = 0.30 Adjusted R
2
 = 0.10 Adjusted R
2
 = 0.05 
 F value = 13.84 F value = 4.41 F value = 2.51 
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Table 24 - continued         
          
               Expected     
 Internal Share Market Share Market Change 
Variable B SE p B SE p B SE p 
Invasive          
Cardiology          
          
Competitiveness 0.19 0.02 0.25 -0.41 0.16 0.01 -0.07 0.06 .27 
Growth 0.05 0.06 0.38 <0.01 0.56 0.99 -0.06 0.21 .78 
Density -<0.01 <0.01 <.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.2 <0.01 <0.01 .75 
Hospital Size 0.06 <0.01 <.01 0.35 0.05 <.01 0.09 0.02 <.01 
Poverty -<0.01 <0.01 0.22 0.03 0.01 0.04 <0.01 <0.01 .48 
Age <0.01 <0.01 0.3 <0.01 <0.01 0.52 <0.01 <0.01 .73 
Ownership 0.02 <0.01 0.01 0.17 0.09 0.06 -0.09 0.03 <.01 
State - Florida -<0.01 0.02 0.76 0.16 0.2 0.41 0.05 0.07 .47 
State - Nevada 0.02 0.01 0.12 -0.03 0.12 0.8 0.25 0.05 .59 
Physicians 74909 72512 0.3 -203485 696334 0.77 -103927 257127 .68 
 Adjusted R
2
 = 0.45 Adjusted R
2
 = 0.12 Adjusted R
2
 = 0.05 
 F value = 25.93 F value = 5.00 F value = 2.74 
          
Orthopedics          
          
Competitiveness 0.02 0.02 .20 None significant -0.10 0.05 .06 
Growth 0.02 0.07 .75    -0.02 0.19 .19 
Density -<0.01 <0.01 <.01    <0.01 <0.01 .61 
Hospital Size 0.03 <0.01 <.01    0.12 0.02 <.01 
Poverty -<0.01 <0.01 <.01    <0.01 <0.01 .30 
Age <0.01 <0.01 <.01    <0.01 <0.01 .93 
Ownership 0.01 0.01 .33    -0.12 0.03 .58 
State - Florida -<0.01 0.02 .89    0.03 0.07 .55 
State - Nevada -0.01 0.01 .49    0.01 0.04 .77 
Physicians 0.02 0.03 .63    0.04 0.10 .67 
 Adjusted R
2
 = 0.23   Adjusted R
2
 = 0.10 
 F value = 10.10    F value = 4.36 
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Table 24 - continued        
          
                Expected     
 Internal Share Market Share Market Change 
Variable ß SE p ß SE p ß SE p 
          
Labor and          
Delivery          
          
Competitiveness -0.03 0.04 .40 -0.24 0.15 .11 None Significant 
Growth -0.04 0.13 .75 0.09 0.51 .87    
Density -<0.01 <0.01 .38 <0.01 <0.01 .61    
Hospital Size 0.06 0.01 <.01 0.11 0.05 .03    
Poverty -<0.01 <0.01 .04 <0.01 <0.01 .93    
Age -<0.01 <0.01 .04 -<0.01 <0.01 .71    
Ownership -0.04 0.02 .04 -0.16 0.08 .05    
State - Florida 0.04 0.05 .35 0.08 0.19 .67    
State - Nevada -0.03 0.03 .26 -0.03 0.12 .79    
Physicians <0.01 0.11 .98 -0.17 0.43 .70    
 Adjusted R
2
 =  0.16 Adjusted R
2
 = 0.01    
 F value = 6.96 F value = 1.25     
          
Pulmonary          
Services          
          
Competitiveness -0.04 0.02 .01 0.33 0.14 .02 -0.07 0.05 .13 
Growth -0.04 0.05 .41 -0.34 0.47 .47 -0.08 0.17 .65 
Density <0.01 <0.01 .01 -<0.01 <0.01 .38 <0.01 <0.01 .73 
Hospital Size -0.05 <0.01 <.01 -0.24 0.05 <.01 0.09 0.02 <.01 
Poverty <0.01 <0.01 <.01 -0.01 0.01 .36 <0.01 <0.01 .47 
Age <0.01 <0.01 .82 -0.01 <0.01 .07 <0.01 <0.01 .80 
Ownership -<0.01 <0.01 .36 -0.07 0.07 .32 <0.01 0.03 .08 
State - Florida -0.01 0.02 .55 -0.06 0.17 .73 0.04 0.06 .52 
State - Nevada <0.01 0.01 .82 0.15 0.10 .14 0.01 0.04 .70 
Physicians -0.09 0.12 .47 0.63 1.09 .56 -0.20 0.38 .59 
 Adjusted R
2
 = 0.44 Adjusted R
2
 = 0.08 Adjusted R
2
 = 0.07 
 F value = 24.27 F value = 3.60 F value = 3.39 
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expected by chance (Steel & Torrie, 1960). The use of this latter statistic, considered 
most useful in model development stages and particularly for sample data as opposed to 
population data, is considered a refinement that lends itself to regression analysis and 
interpretation.   
For Internal Service Concentration, a standard, multiple regression on all 303 
hospitals produces the following results shown in Table 23 with all of the independent 
variables entered simultaneously in the equation. For subsequent measures of 
specialization for each of the six service lines, results from initially applying standard 
fixed effects, simultaneous regression to all 303 hospitals and transformed measures of 
specialization appear in Table 24. 
Although none of the models displays Adjusted R
2
 values greater than 0.55 
(Internal Share – cardiac surgery), there are several results worth noting. The Internal 
Share measure generated the highest Adjusted R
2 
values of all models, producing a mean 
value of 0.36, ranging from 0.16 for labor and delivery to 0.55 for cardiac surgery. While 
models for labor and delivery are the weakest by any measure, models, on average, for 
cardiac surgery are the strongest.   
A second observation is the predominance of models (16 of 19) where Hospital 
Size is a statistically significant factor with a p-value < .05, although only in five of the 
16 models is the direction negative as hypothesized. This finding is not surprising, given 
the role of hospital size in determining clinical function. Note that it is consistently a 
statistically significant term for the first two measures – Internal Service Concentration 
and Internal Share – which may be the two that are most likely associated with internal  
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considerations of size. For similar reasons, Internal Share is likely to vary across 
hospitals based on size. Interestingly, Competitiveness and Density (each in seven of 19) 
also are frequently significant terms in the models. Competitiveness, in particular, 
appears in the models where external, market conditions are most likely to have an 
impact – Expected Market Share and Market Change. Competitiveness is most often 
negatively associated with specialization, as reflected in five of seven models in which it 
is significant. Models in which Density is significant find the variable for Density, as 
hypothesized, to be in mixed directions, equally positive and negative. 
All descriptive characteristics serve as a factor with statistical significance in at 
least one model, although Physicians serve as significant terms only in cardiology 
(Internal Share) and cardiac surgery (Internal Share and Market Change). 
Additionally, model fit is acceptable with at least one significant factor for all of the 
measures for each of the six service lines except for orthopedics (Expected Market 
Share) and labor and delivery (Market Change).  
Primary Analysis Results: Backward Deletion, Stepwise Regression 
Although stepwise regression can be performed in various ways, the backward 
deletion method is chosen as a refining methodology in an effort to determine the best 
fitting model. Although several approaches can be taken for the elimination of variables, 
the chosen method excludes independent variables one at a time if they do not contribute 
significantly to the results, until the required p-value threshold is met (in this case p < 
.05), or the Adjusted R
2
 value decreases dramatically upon deletion of a variable. The 
primary benefit in this approach is it identifies a subset of independent variables that 
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could be considered statistically helpful for predicting a given dependent variable. All 
other independent variables that provide little incremental predictive power are screened 
out (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  
While sometimes considered a controversial procedure because of its reliance on 
statistical criteria for determining the order of entry of variables in a model, the risk of 
overfitting data with stepwise regression is best avoided by drawing on a large and 
representative sample and not relying exclusively on chance on which variables to 
include (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  The stepwise regressions performed in this analysis 
were executed manually rather than menu-driven so that subjective judgment could be 
exercised appropriately. 
The ability of backward stepwise regression to eliminate redundant or superfluous 
variables renders the method helpful for identifying measures to include in future 
research. Sometimes the inclusion of too many independent variables can mask the 
effects of other variables that would otherwise be important. Backward stepwise 
regression determines which variables are having a meaningful effect and which are 
being masked or distorted by the inclusion of too many variables. Unlike standard, 
simultaneous regression, backward deletion, stepwise regression directly addresses the 
overarching mandate to seek parsimony in multivariate statistics by obtaining the best 
fitting model with the fewest variables possible. In sum, the method achieves better 
precision for parameter estimates, allows ease of interpretation with fewer variables, 
eliminates variables that are not influential, and gives a better model fit overall to achieve 
improved predictability.  
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Primary analysis results are thus presented first for Internal Service 
Concentration in Table 25 applying backward deletion, stepwise regression, followed by 
results for the remaining measures of specialization for each of the six service lines in 
Table 26. As in the results for standard, simultaneous regression, Internal Service 
Concentration and Internal Share are both transformed by arcsine square root, Market 
Change is transformed by arcsine, and Expected Market Share remains untransformed. 
A comparison of Table 25 to Table 23 for Internal Service Concentration demonstrates 
that the quality of the model is enhanced by more selectively entering variables into the 
equation, as highlighted by a strengthening in the F value from 9.25 to 27.58. Adjusted 
R
2
 improves only slightly from 0.29 to 0.31 because Adjusted R
2
, by definition, takes into 
account the number of independent variables of significance in the equation and penalizes 
for insignificant variables.  
Table 25     
      
Primary Analysis Results of Backward, Stepwise Regression – Internal 
Service Concentration    
            
    Standard p > |t| 
      ß Error p-value 
      
Internal Service Concentration    
      
Density  0.01 0.01 <.01 
Hospital Size -0.03 0.01 <.01 
Physicians (Cardiology) 0.12 0.04 <.01 
Physicians (Orthopedics) -0.06 0.02 <.01 
Physicians (Cardiac Surgery) -0.07 0.28 <.01 
    
Adjusted R
2
 = 0.31       F value = 27.58       
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Table 26 shows primary analysis results utilizing backward, stepwise regression 
for each of the three remaining measures of specialization for each of the six service 
lines, as the fourth measure among service lines used only in a sub-analysis of 175 
hospitals in clusters – Cluster Change – showed no cluster effect. Although 175 of the 
303 hospitals in the data sample belong to the same system and reside in proximity to 
each other, a sub-analysis showed no cluster effect and therefore is not presented. 
Models using backward deletion, stepwise regression (Table 26) for the remaining 
three measures of service line specialization strengthen without exception in all six 
service lines, as indicated by at least a doubling in the F-statistic. It often triples in size 
with backward, stepwise regression compared to the earlier standard, simultaneous 
regression (Table 24). The F value, an indicator of how much variation is attributable to 
the linear relationship versus random error, is higher when the p-value is smaller. In all 
but two cases (Expected Market Share and Market Change for labor and delivery), the 
F value exceeds 11.  
Since the only reason for proposing the sub-analysis on the 175 hospitals 
organized in clusters was to control for the cluster effect and since one fails to emerge in 
mixed effects analysis, it is not presented. It is therefore not meaningful to report on 
results with Cluster Change as a measure of specialization, as its usefulness only related 
to the sub-analysis. Other variables may exist that are not used in the study to better 
explain the any variance in service line specialization due to cluster effect. 
To put these results in a context for the testing of hypotheses in the next section to 
follow, Table 27 presents a summary organized in a matrix by dependent variables as 
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Table 26         
          
Primary Analysis Results of Backward, Stepwise Regression by Service Line  
          
        Expected       
 Internal Share Market Share Market Change 
Variable B SE p B SE p B SE p 
          
Cardiac Surgery          
          
Competitiveness 0.02 0.01 .02 -0.55 0.05 <.01 -0.36 0.07 <.01 
Growth          
Density 
-
0.01 0.01 .01 -0.01 0.01 <.01 0.01 0.01 .04 
Hospital Size 0.05 0.01 <.01 0.15 0.02 <.01    
Poverty          
Age 0.01 0.01 .01 0.01 0.01 <.01    
Ownership          
Physicians 0.79 0.27 <.01    -5.82 2.21 <.01 
State - Florida    -0.03 0.06 .60    
State - Nevada       -0.09 0.04 .02       
 Adjusted R
2
 = 0.54 Adjusted R
2
 = 0.44 Adjusted R
2
 = 0.13 
 F value = 73.32 F value = 40.61 F value = 16.65 
          
Cardiology          
          
Competitiveness   -0.18 0.07 <.01 -0.07 0.04 .05 
Growth 0.13 0.05 .01       
Density          
Hospital Size 
-
0.04 0.01 <.01 -0.13 0.03 <.01 0.07 0.01 <.01 
Poverty 0.01 0.01 <.01       
Age          
Ownership 0.03 0.01 .01 0.17 0.05 .01    
Physicians 0.11 0.05 .02       
State - Florida 
-
0.06 0.02 <.01       
State - Nevada 
-
0.01 0.01 .43             
 Adjusted R
2
 = 0.29 Adjusted R
2
 = 0.10 Adjusted R
2
 = 0.07 
  F value = 18.87 F value = 12.40 F value = 12.09 
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Table 26 - continued         
          
        Expected       
 Internal Share Market Share Market Change 
Variable B SE p B SE p B SE p 
          
Invasive          
Cardiology          
          
Competitiveness 0.04 0.01 -0.39 0.14 <.01     
Growth          
Density 
-
0.01 0.01 <.01       
Hospital Size 0.07 0.01 <.01 0.34 0.05 <.01 0.07 0.02 <.01 
Poverty    0.03 0.01 .03    
Age 0.01 0.01 .01       
Ownership 0.02 0.01 <.01 0.17 0.08 .05 -0.09 0.03 <.01 
Physicians          
State - Florida          
State - Nevada                   
 Adjusted R
2
 = 0.45 Adjusted R
2
 = 0.13 Adjusted R
2
 = 0.07 
 F value = 49.60 F value = 11.99 F value = 11.83 
          
Orthopedics          
          
Competitiveness   No significant terms -0.11 0.04 <.01 
Growth          
Density 
-
0.01 0.01 <.01       
Hospital Size 0.03 0.01 <.01    0.11 0.02 <.01 
Poverty 
-
0.01 0.01 <.01       
Age 0.01 0.01 <.01       
Ownership          
Physicians          
State - Florida          
State - Nevada                   
 Adjusted R
2
 = 0.24    Adjusted R
2
 = 0.12 
 F value = 24.70    F value = 21.04 
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Table 26 - continued         
          
        Expected       
 Internal Share Market Share Market Change 
Variable B SE p B SE p B SE p 
          
Pulmonary          
Services          
          
Competitiveness 
-
0.04 0.01 <.01 0.39 0.11 <.01 -0.08 0.04 .03 
Growth          
Density 0.01 0.01 <.01       
Hospital Size 
-
0.05 0.01 <.01 -0.23 0.04 <.01 0.08 0.02 <.01 
Poverty 0.01 0.01 <.01       
Age          
Ownership          
Physicians          
State - Florida          
State - Nevada                   
 Adjusted 
R
2 = 0.44 Adjusted R
2
 = 0.08 Adjusted R
2
 = 0.08 
 F value = 60.39 F value = 14.37 F value = 14.86 
          
Labor and          
Delivery          
          
Competitiveness   -0.23 0.12 .05    
Growth       0.39 0.18 .03 
Density          
Hospital Size 0.06 0.01 <.01 0.11 0.05 .03 0.04 0.02 .05 
Poverty 
-
0.01 0.01 .07       
Age 
-
0.01 0.01 .05       
Ownership 
-
0.04 0.02 .04 -0.16 0.08 .04    
Physicians          
State - Florida 0.04 0.04 .27       
State - Nevada 
-
0.05 0.02 .05             
 Adjusted R
2
 = 0.17 Adjusted R
2
 = 0.03 Adjusted R
2
 = 0.02 
 F value = 11.30 F value = 3.81 F value = 4.77 
                    
  
186 
 
Table 27      
       
Testing of Hypothesis: Matrix Organized by Dependent Variable   
     
              
  Internal  Expected   
  Service Internal Market Market  
    Concentration Share Share Change f 
       
Independent Variable-      
Ho Direction      
       
Growth - Positive ns Positive ns Positive 2/19 
       
Poverty - Positive ns Mixed Positive ns 5/19 
       
Density - Negative Negative Mixed Negative Positive 7/19 
       
Aging - Positive
a
 ns Positive Positive ns 5/19 
       
Competitiveness - ns Mixed Mixed Negative 12/19 
Negative      
       
Physicians - Positive Mixed Mixed ns Negative 4/19 
       
Hospital Size - Negative Mixed Mixed Mixed 17/19 
Negative      
       
Ownership - Positive ns Mixed Mixed Negative 6/19 
       
State as a Covariate ns Yes Yes ns 3/19 
a
Hypothesized to be positively associated with specialization, except in Labor and Delivery because of   
obvious age factor limitations on fertility and thus demand for services. 
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measures of specialization. Its companion summary, Table 28, follows with a matrix 
organized by service line. 
Regardless of how results are displayed for analysis and interpretation, it is 
apparent from Tables 27 and 28 that directions (positive or negative coefficients) are 
frequently mixed among measures of specialization and among service lines. Table 27 
demonstrates the directions of hypotheses by measure and highlights the strength of 
Internal Service in particular as a measure of specialization. Table 28 illustrates the 
strength of cardiac services in general, with cardiac surgery reflecting the highest number 
of significant market and organizational variables as well as the highest mean Adjusted 
R
2
.   
Summary of Hypotheses Testing 
The hypotheses are assessed, first by examining external, market characteristics 
and then by assessing internal, organizational factors. These assessments are based on 
results after all methodological refinements were performed, including transformations of 
dependent variables as measures for specialization and use of backward, stepwise 
regression. 
Characteristics of the Market Structure Representing the External Environment 
H1 states that higher local population growth rates in hospital markets are likely to 
be positively related to specialization. The analysis found a positive and statistically 
significant association between likelihood of specialization in cardiology and higher 
population growth rate with an Adjusted R
2
 of 0.29 in a model for Internal Share. In a 
weak model for Market Change, Growth is also positively associated with labor and  
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Table 28       
        
Testing of Hypotheses: Matrix Organized by Service Line 
        
    Cardiac   Invasive   Pulmonary Labor and 
    Surgery Cardiology Cardiology Orthopedics Services Delivery 
        
Independent Variable-       
Ho Direction       
        
Growth - Positive ns Positive ns ns ns Positive 
        
Poverty - Positive ns Positive Positive Negative Positive Negative 
        
Aging - Positive
a
 Positive ns Positive Positive ns Negative 
        
Competitiveness - Mixed Negative Mixed Negative Mixed Negative 
Negative       
        
Physicians - Positive Mixed Positive ns ns ns ns 
        
Hospital Size - Positive Mixed Positive Positive Mixed Positive 
Negative        
        
Ownership - Positive ns Positive Mixed ns ns Negative 
        
State as Covariate Yes Yes ns ns ns Yes 
        
f of significant 12 10 11 6 8 9 
variables             
a
Hypothesized to be positively associated with specialization, except in Labor and Delivery because of obvious age 
factor limitations on fertility and thus demand for services. 
 
 
delivery. Growth is otherwise not a significant factor. Consequently, the hypothesis is 
supported but limited to a few models. 
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H2 states that percentage of the local population living below the federally 
established poverty level is positively related to hospital specialization. Analysis finds a 
statistically significant, positive association between Poverty and specialization in 
pulmonary services and in cardiology with Adjusted R
2
 values of 0.44 and 0.29, 
respectively, in models for Internal Share. It is also positively associated with 
specialization in invasive cardiology in the model of Expected Market Share with an 
Adjusted R
2
 of 0.13. However, in the models for Internal Share examining orthopedics 
and labor and delivery, Poverty is negatively related to specialization with an Adjusted 
R
2
 of 0.24 and 0.17, respectively. Thus, the hypothesis is supported in some service lines 
but not others.  
H3 states that population density in a hospital‘s market is negatively associated 
with specialization. Analysis finds a marginal, positively related association of Density to 
the Internal Service Concentration measure, suggesting that general, community 
hospitals in more urban areas may be inclined to concentrate services in the form of 
specialization to establish uniqueness in a market comprised of more competitors. In the 
2003-2007 period examined, hospitals are entering rather than exiting the service line for 
cardiac surgery presumably because of demand and profitability. Consequently, Density 
is also positively associated with Market Change as new entrants acquire market share. 
With a greater number of hospitals competing in cardiac surgery in more urban areas, it is 
logical that a negative association is seen for Internal Share in cardiac surgery, as the 
number of cases discharged by a hospital in cardiac surgery represents a smaller portion 
of its total patient volume with demand for cardiac surgery being met by a greater 
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number of hospitals. Correspondingly, with more hospitals competing in cardiac surgery 
in more urban areas, hospitals underperform relative to their overall share of a market and 
thus values for Expected Market Share decrease when Density increases and vice 
versa. Hence, a negative association of Density to the measure is seen. No similar 
patterns emerge to help explain why Internal Share for invasive cardiology and 
orthopedics are also negatively associated with Density but not for pulmonary services. 
Nor is there an obvious explanation for why Cluster Change for orthopedics and labor 
and delivery is positively associated with Density. As with the findings for Poverty, it 
should be noted that these parameter estimates are very small, and although the 
relationship is statistically significant at p < .05, the magnitude may be of little 
consequence. Due to the mixed directions of correlation, the hypothesis of Density not 
necessarily being directionally associated is only partially supported.  
H4 states that as the percentage of the local population 65 years and older 
increases, it is positively associated with evidence of hospital specialization. In the 
stronger models for Internal Share, Age is positively associated with hospital 
specialization in cardiac surgery, invasive cardiology, and orthopedics with Adjusted R
2
 
values of 0.54, 0.45, and 0.24, respectively but negatively associated with specialization 
in Labor and Delivery with an R
2
 of 0.17, due as expected to the inherent demographics 
of demand mentioned earlier. Additional support for the hypothesis is found in Expected 
Market Share for cardiac surgery. Thus, the hypothesis for Age is considered well 
supported except for the obvious service line labor and delivery, as fertility rates 
biologically drop precipitously with age.  
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H5 states that hospitals located in highly competitive markets are negatively 
associated with specialization in high volume, high revenue-generating service lines. 
Competitiveness is a significant factor in 12 primary results models for specialization, 
and analysis finds a negative association between service line specialization and 
Competitiveness in nine of these models. It is consistently negative in cardiology but 
inconsistent from one measure of specialization to the next in cardiac surgery, pulmonary 
services, and invasive cardiology, with consistency lacking in the strongest models where 
Adjusted R
2
 values exceeds 0.30. In other words, direction shifts between positive and 
negative. As with other hypotheses, H5 is considered supported for some service lines and 
with some measures of specialization but not all. To summarize, Competitiveness is 
positively associated in cardiac surgery and invasive cardiology with Internal Share as 
the measure of specialization and in pulmonary services with Expected Market Share as 
the measure. For the remaining nine models, it is negatively associated in all service lines 
except labor and delivery. 
H6 states that hospitals located in markets with a high concentration of physician 
specialists in each of the six targeted service lines are positively associated with 
specialization. Three different categories of physician specialists influence specialization 
in the model for Internal Service Concentration but in different directions, as 
orthopedic surgeon and thoracic surgeon ratios are negatively associated with 
specialization whereas cardiologist ratios are positively associated with specialization. 
(Since the highest correlation between any two physician specialists is 0.50 and it is 
between orthopedic surgeons and obstetricians whose services do not typically overlap, 
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multiple variables for Physicians may statistically coexist in a backward stepwise 
regression model without redundancy.) In the models for Internal Share, the independent 
variable for Physicians is positively associated in cardiac surgery and cardiology. In a 
weaker model with lower Adjusted R
2
 values, the variable for Physicians is negatively 
associated with specialization in cardiac surgery, as measured by Market Change. In 
other words, higher concentrations of thoracic surgeons, used as a measure for specialists 
in cardiac surgery, are negatively associated with gains in market share. This possibly 
suggests that as the density of surgeons performing cardiac surgery relative to overall 
population increases, they may demonstrate less loyalty to any single hospital as they 
seek to accommodate patient wishes to secure cases, making it more difficult for 
hospitals to exert discipline over physicians, such as described earlier for the Baptist 
Health System - South Florida. Due to the mixed direction of coefficients in models, the 
hypothesis for Physicians is considered only partially supported in fewer than half of the 
service lines studied. 
Characteristics of Internal, Organizational Factors 
H7 states that hospitals with a greater number of inpatient acute care beds are 
negatively associated with specialization in high volume, high revenue-generating service 
lines. While Hospital Size is significant in its influence on hospital specialization in 17 
of the 19 models among final results, only in five is it negatively associated. Results are 
therefore mixed and disproportionately so. Analysis finds a negative association between 
a narrowness of service line offerings depicted by the overall measure Internal Service 
Concentration and Hospital Size. This is also true for cardiology and pulmonary 
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services in models for Internal Share and Expected Market Share. However, the 
opposite is true for the other four service lines in models for Internal Share: cardiac 
surgery, invasive cardiology, orthopedics, and labor and delivery, all which exhibit 
positive parameter estimates for Hospital Size. This suggests that larger hospitals are 
perhaps more likely to specialize in higher technology, higher risk, more highly acute 
care represented by these four service lines and by smaller ones in the more chronic care 
areas. Regardless, the hypothesis is not considered supported due to the mixed directions 
without consistent patterns. 
H8 states that for profit ownership (as opposed to not-for-profit ownership 
hospitals) is positively associated with specialization. Positive associations are indeed 
seen in models for Internal Share and Expected Market Share for both cardiology and 
invasive cardiology. However, models for these same measures of specialization in labor 
and delivery reveal a negative association with Ownership, suggesting specialization in 
this service line is more likely associated with not-for-profit owned hospitals. As with 
other hypotheses, the direction of the relationship of influence on specialization in the 
case of Ownership varies with service line and the measure for specialization. 
Ownership is positively correlated in regression analyses of two of three measures for 
specialization in invasive cardiology, specifically Internal Share and Expected Market 
Share. Although the hypothesis is considered not supported because of mixed results, 
such findings may be consistent with the extensive work by Horwitz (2007) in which 
significant and large differences by ownership type were found in services provided by 
acute care hospitals, with for profits more likely to specialize in service lines with higher 
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profitability such as invasive cardiology but not in lower profitability service lines such 
labor and delivery. 
H9 states that hospitals with a lead share of cases for their cluster in a high 
volume, high revenue-generating service lines are positively associated with 
specialization. As explained earlier, it is not meaningful to report on results with Cluster 
Change, as its usefulness only related to the sub-analysis for identifying cluster effect. 
Moreover, as a dichotomous variable, Cluster Lead Hospital, like Ownership, brings 
lower information content to any model than variables with continuous type of 
measurement and thus is less useful, all else being equal (Hulley et al., 2007). Its 
contribution may be strengthened if replaced with a continuous measure. Otherwise, 
Cluster Lead Hospital is a candidate to consider dropping from future studies. 
It is illogical to report negative or positive associations with the state variable because the 
negative or positive associations are using Virginia as a reference since state as a 
covariate is set up as a dummy variable. Thus, a ―negative‖ association for Florida means 
that the outcome is smaller or less for Florida than for Virginia. A ―positive‖ association 
means that the outcome for Florida is larger or greater than for Virginia. Similar 
interpretations can be made for Nevada. This relativity of terms explains why in results 
from backward, stepwise regression, one state with a p-value exceeding .05 will appear in 
the model alongside another state whose p-value is significant at < .05. 
Only in two models is the state covariate statistically significant and therefore 
included. In the model using Expected Market Share and with an Adjusted R
2
 of 0.44, 
specialization in cardiac surgery is less in Nevada than in Virginia (and hence, the 
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negative ß coefficient). Specialization in cardiology using Internal Share as its measure 
is less in Florida than in Virginia. Specialization in labor and delivery as measured by 
Internal Share is less in Nevada than in Virginia. This may reflect the very different 
demographics of the two states.  
Chapter Summary 
Slightly over half or 54.8% of all 303 hospitals in the study sample discharged 
patient cases in 2007 in all of the six service lines examined in this study. Such restriction 
in the highest volume, highest revenue-generating service lines identified nationally 
already signals specialization by general, community hospitals in the study. Hospitals 
were most selective about offering labor and delivery services, with only 179 of the 303 
or 59.1% treating such cases in 2007. On the other hand, all 303 hospitals reported 
inpatient cases in cardiology, reflecting the nationwide prevalence of chronic cardiac 
disease in an aging population requiring inpatient care.  
The hospitals also demonstrate considerable variation in the extent to which they 
concentrate in any service lines. During the brief period between 2003 and 2007, some 
hospitals exited three of the six service lines: invasive cardiology, orthopedics, and labor 
and delivery, with some entering while others were exiting two of these three service 
lines. None discontinued cardiac surgery services, pulmonary services, or cardiology.  In 
fact, 98 hospitals, from 147 to 245 or 66.7%, added cardiac surgery over the brief, four-
year period. In addition, dramatic, positive shifts in market share positions were 
experienced by some hospitals over the period, especially in pulmonary services and 
invasive cardiology. Regardless of what variables might be associated with such changes, 
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because these are high volume, high revenue-generating service lines and a number of the 
changes occurred in market share, such changes may reflect choices by many hospitals as 
part of their competitive strategy. 
Hospitals in the cluster sub-group were more likely to discharge cases in the 
targeted service lines than hospitals in the study sample as a whole. Still, among the 175 
cluster hospitals, only 64.0% discharged cases in all six service lines compared to 54.8% 
of all 303 hospitals in the study sample as a whole. As suggested earlier, this is likely 
because the clusters are all urban and are larger in size with 12.2% more beds on average 
than those in the 303 study sample covering both metropolitan and smaller, micropolitan 
areas. All of this suggests that the general hospital as a full-service provider of a wide 
range of costly and complex services may be undergoing some transformations.  
There is indeed evidence that specialization is occurring within hospitals, 
although the explanation for why this is happening is yet to be determined. This study 
points to some possible factors that are associated with variations in specialization among 
hospitals, but the mixed findings both within and across the six service lines suggest that 
much more investigation is needed.  
Market and organizational factors vary considerably among hospitals across the 
study sample. Physician specialists do not necessarily practice in all hospital markets, as 
no doctors in any of the six categories of specialists are recorded in some of the smallest 
markets with hospitals. The physician ratios as a percentage of the population range 
widely, as reflected in the relatively large standard deviations compared to means. On the 
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other hand, all hospitals in clusters have access to local physician specialists, except in 
cardiac surgery.  
Backward deletion, stepwise regression provides a refinement in methodology 
over standard, simultaneous regression for improving the predictability of models, the 
precision of parameter estimates, and ease of interpretation with fewer variables. It also 
helps to eliminate variables that are not influential, usually resulting in better fitting 
model and unmasking variables otherwise hidden. Strengthening of models using 
backward deletion, stepwise regression over standard, simultaneous regression is best 
illustrated by the substantial increases in F values, a statistic that indicates how much 
variation is attributable to the linear relationship versus random error.  
The backward stepwise regression also substantiated the influence of identified, 
specialty physicians in hospital specialization patterns. High concentrations of thoracic 
surgeons were found to be negatively associated with Market Change in cardiac surgery 
and even Internal Service Concentration as a general, compositive measure, suggesting 
possibly that as the market concentration of thoracic surgeons increases the less likely 
local hospitals witness market share gains in cardiac surgery service and, therefore, the 
less able hospitals are to gain distinctive positions in this clinical arena. They were 
positively associated with specialization as measured by Internal Share, reflecting more 
hospitals adding the service line over the period of study. The methodological 
refinements also helped to highlight the influence of states, as differences appeared in the 
analyses of cardiac surgery, cardiology, and labor and delivery. 
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Hospital Size was consistently statistically significant in the majority of the 
models. While Hospital Size is significant in its influence on hospital specialization in 17 
of 19 models, only in five models is it negatively associated. Results are therefore mixed 
in both directions. The importance of hospital size (inpatient bed count) has been 
observed in numerous studies, so this finding is not surprising. Interestingly, it appears 
from this study that smaller hospitals tend to concentrate in cardiology and pulmonary 
services as specialization strategies, whereas larger hospitals tend to focus on higher risk, 
more highly acute care, and higher technology services, including cardiac surgery, 
invasive cardiology, orthopedics, and labor and delivery.  
Competitiveness and Density also surfaced as significant factors in the models, 
and like Hospital Size, not consistently in the same direction. A lower degree of market 
competitiveness is significantly associated with specialization consistently in cardiology, 
orthopedics, and labor and delivery. Cardiac surgery, invasive cardiology and orthopedics 
are generally negatively associated with Density but not pulmonary services in the model 
measuring specialization by Internal Share. This is logical in that more densely 
populated, urban areas are more likely to have the diversity of population to demand 
more services in complex, more acute services requiring higher technology represented 
by the former than the latter.   
Since the only reason for proposing the sub-analysis on the 175 hospitals 
organized in clusters was to control for the cluster effect and since such effect fails to 
emerge in the mixed effects model, it is therefore not meaningful to report on results with 
Cluster Change, as its usefulness only related to the sub-analysis. The analysis showed 
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no significant cluster effect. Other variables may exist that are not used in the study to 
better explain any variance due to cluster effect.  
While the explanatory power exhibited in the models is generally strong, the 
Adjusted R
2
 values only once exceeded 0.50 (0.54 for Internal Share in cardiac 
surgery). This suggests that significant but unexplained variation among hospitals 
remains and that unidentified factors may be affecting the results. It is also probable that 
random variations attributable to patterns of disease in the population, local political 
climate and economy, organizational and market diversity and other factors could 
dampen the explanatory power of any of the models. Of course, some variation and low 
R-squares are also attributable to data and methodological limitations (e.g., non-
normality, lack of fully successful transformations, small sample sizes, and the presence 
of outliers). 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Overview 
The purpose of this study was to determine if general, community hospitals show 
evidence of specializing within the nation‘s six highest volume, highest revenue-
generating service lines and to identify market and organizational factors that correlate 
with such a strategy. To address these two research questions, hypotheses were developed 
from strategic management and organization theory as well as from work by Lawrence 
and Lorsch (1967). The study first transformed dependent variables to address problems 
with normality and then assessed outliers before applying standard, simultaneous 
regression. Backward deletion, stepwise regression was subsequently employed to 
improve the fit of models with the fewest, significant variables, and a mixed effects 
procedure was pursued to evaluate a possible lack of independence in strategies among 
same system cluster hospitals.  After no evidence of cluster effects was found, final 
results from regression models for each of the six service lines were interpreted to test 
support for hypotheses. This final chapter presents the major findings and their 
implications and offers recommendations for future research, concluding with a summary 
of limitations. 
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Summary and Interpretation of Major Findings 
The analyses of hospitals in the study sample produced a number of key findings, 
among which are: 
1. The study hospitals range widely in the extent to which they concentrate 
services and change their levels of service concentration. This is suggestive of functional 
diversity across hospitals as well as across markets. In the interval between 2003 and 
2007, a number of hospitals exited three of the top six service lines – invasive cardiology, 
orthopedics, and labor and delivery – with some exiting while others entered. All 303 
hospitals reported inpatient cases in the cardiology service line throughout the period, 
reflecting the nationwide prevalence of chronic cardiac disease in an aging population. 
This finding suggests that inpatient specialization in cardiology might not be easily 
achieved across hospitals within markets. This may be due to the place and method of 
hospital admission for patients discharged from the cardiology service line, the majority 
of which likely entered hospitals via the emergency department (ED), a factor not 
examined in this study. Importantly, this contrasts with the other cardiac service lines – 
cardiac surgery and invasive cardiology – to which most patients are believed to be 
admitted via physician referrals. If the cardiac diagnosis is known, a procedure for 
treatment is planned and scheduled, and admission is arranged by the referring physician 
or physician to perform the procedure. Physician referrals as a channel for admissions 
render such service lines considerably more adaptable to patient channeling, a key 
capability hospitals are likely to need for them strategically to engage in specialization 
within those service lines. (Specialization in other service lines, such as burn units, may 
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depend heavily on both emergency admissions and even transfers from nearby hospitals.) 
Clearly, source of admission and physician referral patterns warrant further analysis as a 
factor for studying specialization by general, community hospitals.  
2. The contribution of clusters to service line specialization remains inconclusive, 
based on the results of this study. Application of a mixed effects procedure to the sub-
analysis of clusters produced no evidence that the variance of the random effects in 
regression models is significantly different from zero. Hence, we were left to rely solely 
on the fixed effects in backward, stepwise regression for statistical findings and 
interpretation. It is possible that some clusters designated more than one cluster member 
to expand within given service lines in order to combat moves made by local competitor 
hospitals in their markets. If this were true, the cluster as a whole might gain share within 
the market, but the positive gains of one hospital‘s share could be cancelled out by losses 
of another cluster member‘s share. Additionally, as stated in Chapter Five, other variables 
may well exist that are not used in the study that could better explain the variation in 
change in cluster share for hospitals in each of the service lines. Alternatively, a different 
measure for service line choices by cluster members may permit variance associated with 
random cluster effects to be quantified for analysis.  
It is also possible that within-cluster specialization patterns are sufficiently 
complex and dependent on a number of distinctive structural and configurational 
characteristics for each cluster, such that within-cluster specialization might not be easily 
examined using statistical analyses. A case study approach might therefore be needed for 
the cluster strategies to be isolated and examined. The Baptist Health System example 
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gives some indication of how highly individualistic a cluster can be, varying in the 
numbers of hospitals, sizes, spatial distributions, service capacities, contractual 
arrangements with insurers, and other local considerations including patient demand. 
Accordingly, each hospital within a cluster has unique considerations such as different 
physician loyalties and expectations, admission mix and referral patterns, community 
expectations, and political histories. In sum, specialization might best be understood by 
studying individual clusters in a case study format in order to understand how and why 
changes in patient distributions within a cluster did or did not occur. 
3. The influence of the covariate for states suggests that variations may exist 
among markets because of epidemiological, environmental and demographic 
considerations that have a direct bearing on demand for inpatient care and therefore 
specific hospital service lines. A dummy variable for state alone, however, may not 
reflect complex differences among the states (such as in mortality rates, household 
incomes, ethnicities, and education) that reflect such diversity. It may be necessary to dig 
further into the regional or even local context of service line specialization. Hospitals 
from the three states comprising this study‘s sample data should not be considered 
representative of the nation‘s general, community hospitals as a whole because of  
differences between study and national distributions, as discussed earlier. 
4. Because of the diversity across even the high volume, high revenue-generating 
service lines, this study demonstrates the usefulness of examining service lines separately 
when assessing hospital specialization, rather than using a single, composite indicator of 
service concentration. With the best fitting models having been generated for cardiac 
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surgery (mean Adjusted R
2
 of 0.37), it is notable that all of the descriptive factors 
identified for study surfaced as statistically significant at least once in models for the 303 
hospitals. The fact that coefficients for the same characteristic (for example, Density) 
were in contrary directions across models for a given service line (for example, negative 
for Internal Share but positive for Market Change in cardiac surgery) suggests that the 
dependent variables may be measuring different facets of specialization if not something 
separate from specialization altogether. This raises the question of how best to measure 
service line specialization.  
Undoubtedly, measurement needs to take place at the service line level or lower 
rather than at a macro hospital level. The latter approach is more common in the literature 
– such as in previously referenced studies by Eastaugh (1992), Zwanziger et al. (1996), 
Gu (2005) and others who have looked at specialization using single, aggregate measures 
of service concentration. As this study has shown, however, once one transcends to more 
disaggregated levels of analysis, the results become more diverse and specific to 
particular service lines, which is suggestive of differences among disease categories and 
thus not easily summarized into general patterns. Failure to disaggregate tiers of analysis 
risks producing results that combine strategies potentially moving in opposite directions, 
thereby cancelling each other out and even possibly producing misleading results. On the 
other hand, reducing analysis of specialization to the level of a single procedure might 
fail to address hospital management considerations at the strategic level, at which 
resource requirements are orchestrated and investment decisions are made. 
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5. A particularly perplexing outcome from the study was the difficulty 
encountered in fitting a model for labor and delivery, for which the mean Adjusted R
2
 
was only 0.07 (and never greater than 0.17 in any single model). Factors other than those 
included in the study may offer greater predictive power, such as considerations relating 
to risks of litigation, lack of profitability, declines in the number of specialists practicing 
obstetrics due to threats of malpractice lawsuits, and so forth. Labor and delivery is 
clearly the most restricted service line among the six in this study, in terms of the 
numbers of hospitals providing that service. Although considerable specialization is 
occurring in labor and delivery, few of the variables examined in this study appear to be 
associated with a hospital‘s decision to provide that service. Still, it should be noted that 
most variables that were significant in the models tended to have parameter coefficients 
in consistent directions (especially Hospital Size and Ownership). Therefore, even 
though the fit of models for labor and delivery was not strong, compared to those for the 
other five service lines, results were relatively consistent across the characteristics 
examined in the models. Clearly, labor and delivery needs more specific and detailed 
analysis, with additional factors included, before conclusions regarding specialization in 
this service line can be drawn. 
6. Despite the fact that contrary associations in all but Age and Growth make it 
difficult to reach strong conclusions regarding the hypotheses, all hypotheses were 
supported in at least some models. The many differences across service lines and the 
factors influencing specialization reflect the ambivalence included in some of the 
hypothetical statements included in Chapter Three. Although the analyses produced many 
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mixed parameter estimates, Hospital Size surfaced as a statistically significant factor in 
all but two models (Market Change in cardiac surgery and Expected Market Share in 
orthopedics), confirming its role in explaining service line specialization by general, 
community hospitals. This is not an unexpected finding, of course, as larger facility sizes 
are often required for hospitals to have the resources and the patient volume needed to 
engage in many forms of specialization. Smallness of size can, however, restrict diversity 
of services, however, as noted by the negative association of Hospital Size with Internal 
Service Concentration as a measure of specialization, as well as Internal Share in 
pulmonary services and cardiology. 
Theoretical Implications 
Two broad bodies of literature – strategic management and organization theory – 
provide perspectives within which this study was framed. More specifically, a market 
structure framework (Porter 1980) and resource-based (Penrose, 1959) views from 
strategic management were combined to identify factors external and internal to 
organizations that might influence hospital specialization. In a sub-analysis, the study 
also used the work by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967, 1969) applying the concepts of 
integration and differentiation to characterize the likely consequences that consolidation 
of hospitals might produce locally for specialization. As an extension of Lawrence and 
Lorsch, the study incorporated the ―focused factory‖ concept to characterize the efforts 
clusters might make to rationalize service line capacities and functions across local 
cluster members.  
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Support for Porter‘s emphasis on market concentration is revealed in the fact that 
Competitiveness in particular was an influential factor in models generated in the study. 
It characterizes market concentration and thus market structure. Although there is 
inconsistency among service lines and in the direction of parameters depicting such 
association relative to hypothesized expectations, the first construct – that of Porter‘s 
theory regarding the relevance of market structure to specialization – is sustained.  
The other two constructs both draws on internal, organizational factors. 
Consistent with Penrose‘s resource-based view pertaining to core competences of the 
organization, the study examined two organizational characteristics that are assumed to 
represent differing degrees of resources and capabilities in hospitals: (a) hospital size 
defined by number of beds, and (b) the tax status of a hospital‘s ownership. With 
Hospital Size surfacing with significance in models across all six service lines studied 
and Ownership significantly associated with specialization in three service lines, the 
importance of incorporating internal, organizational considerations with external, market 
factors in searching for elements shaping a hospital‘s choices in service line 
specialization is considered demonstrated.  
There could be additional competitive advantages in specialization beyond the 
foregoing market and organizational arguments, such as the hospital‘s unique 
relationships with local physicians and multispecialty practice groups including new 
configurations known as accountable care organizations (ACO), its membership in group 
purchasing organizations, and its role within the strategies of broader multi-hospital 
systems. Hypotheses surrounding the significance of relationships could draw on further 
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conceptual development of core competences and market positioning as factors 
potentially impacting specialization. These remain yet to be quantified and explored.    
While the third construct – system configuration – generated inconclusive results, 
future research may need to explore other perspectives than that of Lawrence and Lorsch 
(1967, 1969) to explain patterns of specialization within hospitals. For instance, social 
exchange theory might be re-examined for its use in evaluating negotiated exchanges 
between parties involved in making major decisions that would restructure clinical 
capacities across members in complex, inter-organizational arrangements such as hospital 
clusters. As described earlier in Chapter Two, the theory of social exchange posits that all 
relationships are formed by the use of subjective cost-benefit analyses and comparisons 
of alternatives (Homans, 1958; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). By tapping into the theory‘s 
study of power, equity, and the creation of commitment during bargaining processes 
(Emerson & Cook, 1978), such perspectives could possibly be used to frame the 
processes by which ―understandings‖ among same-system, cluster hospitals are reached 
regarding service line strategies. This may be especially true in clusters where large, lead 
hospitals exert dominance. Despite its historical application to vertical relationships, there 
may be a novel place for social exchange theory to be applied within the wider realm of 
organization theory in explaining service line decisions by hospitals in same-system 
clusters.  
In conclusion, given the diversity across local markets and organization types, it is 
imperative that researchers draw on a combination of strategic management and 
organization theories to explain patterns of specialization among hospitals locally, as this 
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study attempted to do. While the models, even with refinements in methodology, did not 
reveal clear patterns, for example, of a focused factory approach to service line 
specialization among cluster hospitals, the Lawrence and Lorsch (1967, 1969) rationale 
for differentiation and integration as well as that for focused factories still seem a 
reasonable basis for conceptualizing why hospitals might wish to engage in this activity. 
This might not be an issue, therefore, of conceptual framing, but of research design (e.g., 
selection of the period of time to study, measurement issues, longitudinal versus cross-
sectional designs, use of a more qualitative, case study approach in lieu of, or 
supplementary to, a quantitative study to name a few), as discussed in the following 
section. Until this is demonstrated by research, whether quantitative or qualitative, such a 
rationale remains conjectural.  
Methodological Implications 
Refinement of methodology, including use of backward deletion, stepwise 
regression, improves the quality of analysis and strengthens the predictability of models 
for specialization. However, such refinement does not generate more conclusive results 
or aid substantially in more definitively supporting hypotheses. Only a few, new 
variables, such that they emerged as significant factors in selected models and 
specifically in labor and delivery, became known. Skewed distributions of data persisted 
despite transformations of specialization measures. Removal of outliers had little impact. 
No evidence of random variation due to cluster effect was found from mixed effects 
analysis. Chapter Five explored why the estimated directions for the parameter 
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coefficients could be mixed, as for example for Hospital Size, but the reasons were not 
always self-evident.  
All of the foregoing complicate the search for explanation and call for further 
investigation of alternative measures and design strategies. It is possible that dichotomous 
measures for Cluster Lead Hospital and Ownership, for example, should be replaced 
with either continuous variables or that a different study design, as discussed above, 
might be needed in future research (e.g., a combination design or case study approach 
altogether). Even variables for which somewhat consistent results were attained – such as 
for Competitiveness – warrant further exploration of just what the measure might be 
measuring. It is not known, for instance, whether one minus the HHI is a measure of non-
price or price competition, whether it is or is not more a correlate of market size rather 
than of market concentration, or, in general, just how variations in the measure translate 
into changes in specialization. It would also be important to understand what role payer 
contracts and or state regulations (e.g., certificate of need) might play in shaping 
specialization patterns among hospitals and influencing the freedom of choice they 
possess in making such decisions. All in all, the findings of this study suggest that 
specialization patterns might be not only highly complicated, perhaps even idiosyncratic 
to individual facilities and markets, but also possibly not strongly or directly associated 
with the kinds of marketplace incentives and organizational structures commonly 
examined in studies of hospital behavior. This is especially true in labor and delivery, for 
which the adjusted R
2
 remained low regardless of measure for specialization. 
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Policy Implications 
As discussed in Chapter One, specialization and coordination of clinical 
capacities among hospitals has been a focus of policy for nearly a century in this country. 
It represents an important approach to rationalizing the distributions of clinical capacities 
across hospitals, while improving quality, efficiencies, and overall provider performance. 
While the purpose of this study is not to argue for or against service line specialization by 
general, community hospitals, but rather to determine if there is evidence of its existence, 
certain policy considerations emerge from the study findings and deserve additional 
attention. At least six policy issues surface from this study.   
First, the study reinforces the need to better understand Hospital Size as a 
variable in determining patterns of hospital specialization. Interestingly, size has long 
been a focus of policy, stemming back to the Committee on the Cost for Medical Care in 
the late 1920s, the Hill-Burton legislation in the 1940s and 1950s, and the regional 
planning efforts in the 1960s and 1970s (Starr, 1982). Throughout this period, policy 
sought to improve the coordination between larger referral hospitals and smaller, often 
rural facilities that needed backup support. And, with respect to individual institutions, 
the country is today experimenting with the so-called ―critical access hospitals,‖ which 
are limited to 25 beds or fewer, in an effort to limit capacity to small hospitals and 
encourage the transfer of patients that need greater levels of care to larger facilities (Basu 
& Mobley, 2010; Casey & Moscovice, 2004; Scalise, 2004). As technology evolves and 
systems have become a central organizational unit in delivering services, however, it is 
less clear just what role size should play in service specialization. It is possible, for 
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instance, for smaller hospitals to specialize, especially if they have back-up relationships 
with other hospitals and providers in their local communities. Penrose‘s emphasis on 
internal resources and capabilities may serve to bridge gaps in our understanding of how 
hospital size affects hospital choices and patterns of specialization. 
Second, the study highlights possible difficulties in rationalizing service 
capacities across cluster members, although clusters may be the one organizational form 
that conceivably can facilitate coordinated choices by hospitals among service lines. 
Unfortunately, insufficient consideration has been given at the policy level to 
encouraging hospital cluster formation or to facilitating their coordinated engagement in 
specialization. Also, little attention has been given to how specialization within clusters 
might best be structured, what role the so-called ―lead‖ hospitals might play, and how to 
coordinate inter-facility transfers of patients and those that might need care exceeding 
local facility capabilities. This study did not find evidence of a cluster effect on 
specialization, a finding that either reflects an inadequate effort on the part of systems to 
engage internally in coordinated specialization, or a general lack of incentive provided by 
markets or policy design, or the need for a different approach to study design (as 
discussed above).  
This leads to a third policy issue. The study highlights the limited and unclear 
roles that market competition and other environmental factors play in stimulating or 
discouraging specialization. Such findings suggest that decisions to specialize might be 
much more complex and, perhaps, more idiosyncratic to the specifics of hospitals than 
initially believed. Thus, rather than examining traditional external, market and internal, 
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organizational factors, it is possible that the specifics of each hospital might be highly 
important in explaining patterns of specialization, including for example distinctive 
hospital capabilities, locations, historical roles in the communities, mixes of physicians 
and related referral configurations, third party relationships, and so forth. Clearly, there is 
a need for more research to inform policy on how best to influence patterns of system 
rationalization in local markets and systems. Additionally, in a much broader sense, the 
limited findings point to the critical need for policy to balance conflicting policy 
objectives, such as between competition and the need to rationalize system capabilities 
locally.  
Fourth, the findings feed specifically into the literature covering the relationship 
between volume and quality, which has generated a major policy debate over the 
argument for concentrating clinical functions through specialization in hospital markets. 
Results of this study illustrate that some service lines – particularly those requiring 
substantial investment in high technology, support equipment and highly trained 
specialists – are positively associated with larger hospitals. An example is cardiac 
surgery. Hospitals discharging cases in cardiac surgery (N = 245) have a mean inpatient 
bed count of 266. Hospitals in the dataset not managing inpatient cases in cardiac surgery 
are far smaller, with a mean inpatient bed count of 76 (N = 58). Similar contrasts surface 
for invasive cardiology, in which hospitals discharging cases have a mean bed count of 
265 (N = 243), contrasted to those without such cases showing a mean bed count of 85 
(N = 60). Such differences between groups of hospitals are considered significant. Still, 
the jury is out on the question of whether higher patient volume is directly correlated with 
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improved clinical outcomes, as evidenced by a retrospective study of 1.4 million 
interventions on patients involving multiple organs in 144 clinical categories and a 
variety of structural hospital characteristics in which there is not support for the 
volume/quality argument (Eggli, Halfon, Meylan, & Taffé, 2010). Although an increase 
in mortality rates was feared with more hospitals starting new cardiac surgery programs 
in the face of declining demand for coronary artery bypass grafting (CABG) procedures 
(Wilson, Fisher, Welch, Slewers, & Lucas, 2007), the counterintuitive finding of lower 
mortality rates in the setting of reduced CABG volume has been found in data spanning 
1988 to 2003 (Ricciardi et al., 2008). This suggests that procedure volume is an 
insufficient predictor of outcome on which to base regionalization strategies of 
rationalizing services. 
A more disturbing sub-issue emerged in the process of conducting this study – the 
exiting of community hospitals as providers of labor and delivery services, with choice 
and ease of access being compromised for community residents by the relatively low 
number of hospitals discharging patients (N = 179 of 303 or 59.1%) in this service. This 
has occurred despite the fact that labor and delivery represents a service where consumers 
traditionally seek care more locally, at least by comparison to the other five inpatient 
services examined in this study. Childbirth is not considered a disease and, therefore, 
mothers tend to prefer delivering their babies conveniently closer to home. Yet, the 
percentage of hospitals providing care in this service line is the lowest of any service line 
examined in the study. It is probable that this pattern is less one of planned specialization 
than a consequence of other factors not examined in this study. For instance, it is likely 
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that risk of litigation is a major consideration by hospitals in this particular service line. 
With or without tort reform with respect to litigation concerns, this finding raises the 
policy question of whether there should be limits on specialization by general, 
community hospitals, as specialization juxtaposes travel costs and inconvenience against 
possible gains (such as in quality and efficiencies) attributable to service centralization.  
An obvious related question is why hospitals are leaving this service line and 
what may be the implications for loss of access to labor and delivery for a community‘s 
residents. Low profit-generating service lines are not identified as a variable in this study 
nor are even low revenue-generating service lines examined for comparison purposes. 
Upon further analysis of the data, it appears that 119 or 66.5% of the 179 hospitals 
providing labor and delivery services in 2007 are not for profit, while 120 of the 187 
hospitals or 64.2% providing the service in 2003 were not for profit. These percentages 
approximate the proportion of not for profit hospitals among the 303 hospitals in 2007, 
constituting 188 or 62.0% of the total study sample. Thus, the tax status of ownership 
fails to offer immediate insight about hospitals exiting labor and delivery. 
However, the incentives from for profit ownership do offer possible insight into 
why hospitals are entering cardiac surgery over this same period. Cardiac surgery may be 
a far more lucrative service line than labor and delivery. Fifty-one of the 98 hospitals or 
52.0% entering cardiac surgery were for profit, disproportionately higher than the 38.0% 
representing for profit hospitals in the total study sample. It may therefore be service line 
profitability that is driving entry into this area. It may also be influenced by the financial 
incentives for specialty physicians and the pressures they exert on local hospitals to add 
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cardiac surgery services. In this latter example describing the rapid influx of general, 
community hospitals into the business of providing cardiac surgery services, the impact 
could very well be positive from a patient access point of view, yet carrying possible 
negative implications with respect to outcomes, efficiencies, and hospital overhead costs. 
It is not inconsequential that the number of CABG procedures nationwide actually 
peaked in 1996 and declined 20.0% by 2003, while the number of hospitals performing 
CABG increased steadily (Wilson et al., 2007). Percutaneous coronary intervention, 
known as angioplasty, with or without stents and performed by interventional 
cardiologists instead of surgeons, increased over the period by 128% (Ulrich, Brock, & 
Ziskind, 2003). From a policy point of view, the bigger issue reflected by the still wider 
availability of cardiac surgery services across a greater number of general, community 
hospitals in just four years in the face of declining demand is the continued oversupply of 
higher paid specialists and shortage of primary care physicians especially in rural areas. 
The influence on the healthcare system of professional specialization that has remained a 
hallmark of American medicine seemingly continues unabated despite the call for 
changes.  
Sixth, policy must confront the issue of market competition versus coordination. 
Specialization presumably reduces patient choice among hospitals, if coordinated among 
clusters. Thus, hospitals facing highly competitive markets may specialize in order to 
increase competitive advantage, as three of the six service lines in this study demonstrate. 
As mentioned previously, perhaps the inconsistency in direction by service line is 
actually a reflection of the fact that Competitiveness is more a reflection of a hospital‘s 
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market size than actual competitive pressures in the market. One of the underlying 
premises of this study – especially the sub-analysis of clusters - is that coordination is 
beneficial in supporting specialization. It was symbolized by the variable for Cluster 
Lead Hospital. In the end, the factors intended to characterize either competition 
(Competitiveness) or its antonym depicting coordination (Cluster Lead Hospital) may 
fail to go far enough to capture behavioral elements of individual hospitals such that the 
value of one or the other can be determined and correlated readily with service line 
specialization. Further investigation is needed to determine whether inpatient service line 
specialization has been the strategic response, as expected, in reply to the greatly 
increased market concentration that occurred over the prior two decades. Going forward, 
opportunities for coordination of services and shared accountability for a patient‘s 
healthcare in same-system hospitals organized in geographical clusters may be valuable 
to proving the merits of a more physician-centered organization emerging from health 
reform concepts such as accountable care organizations.  
Limitations 
This research focused on the correlates of hospital specialization at a given point 
in time – 2007. However, it is clear that specialization involves long-term strategic and 
investment decision-making that could take years to be fully realized. Determinants of 
such change themselves could occur over a period of years, followed by a period in 
which the decisions to specialize are implemented. This study attempted to examine 
changes over time using two of the dependent variables – Cluster Change and Market 
Change – although a full longitudinal design was not implemented. It would be 
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important in future research to examine specialization shifts more completely in the 
context of time. It would be insightful to determine whether or not the 2003-2007 period 
of study offered sufficient time for systems to have invested in service line changes or is 
the best interval within which to assess the digestion by systems of mergers and 
acquisitions that occurred in a prior decade. Thus, the lack of a full, longitudinal design 
represents a limitation of the study. 
This research made no judgment regarding any impacts of specialization on 
patient outcome, efficiencies or access or on the performance of the markets themselves. 
Yet, as discussed above, specialization choices could have important impact on any of 
these factors. Thus, future research needs to address more explicitly the relationships 
between specialization and organizational and market performance.  
While relationships with payers and local physician organizations are not 
explicitly measured, the analyses do assess the relationship between specialty physician 
concentrations in markets and patterns of specialization. Specialization by hospitals 
obviously is affected by many organizational entities other than hospitals, including 
especially payers, physician groups, rivals, and regulators as well as insurers for risks and 
malpractice. It would be important, therefore, to examine the broader organizational and 
competitive context of specialization.  
A unique contribution of this study was the attempt to isolate specialization within 
clusters of hospitals at the market level. An attempt was made to identify lead hospitals 
(with the highest share per cluster) in each cluster for each of the six service lines, but the 
results did not entirely confirm the expectation that the so-called lead hospitals further 
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concentrated services within their clusters. It is possible that lead hospitals might in some 
cases not truly represent the dominant hospital within a given cluster designated to lead in 
specialization. Future research needs to examine clusters more directly and completely. It 
might be especially important for this to be done first using qualitative case studies of key 
clusters across the country in order that the often-complex patterns and strategies clusters 
use to rationalize service capacity distributions across their members might be identified. 
As a corollary, future research should also assess whether clusters as a whole are gaining 
or losing overall shares within service lines compared to competitors.   
The restriction of data to the three states – Florida, Nevada, and Virginia – also 
constitutes a study limitation. As discussed earlier, this research should as a result be 
considered exploratory. It would be important to replicate the study using community 
hospital data from other states, as a study of the nation as a whole would not be feasible, 
given the lack at present of a nationwide database on all hospital discharges. 
This research is not intended to prove or disprove the merits or pitfalls of 
competitive differentiation by specialization. Nor is it intended to serve as an argument 
for or against specialty hospitals, as no comparison between general, community and 
specialty hospitals was conducted. The exclusions of specialty hospitals (and, depending 
on the service lines, of ambulatory care and same-day surgery centers) in local markets 
represents a limitation of the study.  
It is also possible that the study of specialization is best done at some other level 
of aggregation or disaggregation than service line. While it was assumed that hospitals 
plan specialization strategies generally at the level of broad service lines, the reliance on 
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selected specialists and other specific strategies could lead to specialization that might 
only be clearly observed at a much lower level of measurement, such as at the level of 
DRGs. This consideration might vary further in its importance by service line. With the 
definition of service differing among hospitals and among systems, there is also 
opportunity for variation in the classification of patient cases by service line, contributing 
to error. To the extent that this is true, it could account for the limited findings for some 
service lines and weakly predictive models. Clearly, more refined approaches to 
measurement and design are needed in order isolate the actual patterns of specialization 
that are occurring. Again, this may call for either the application of case studies or for the 
assessment of more hospitals in more states. 
Lastly, it is possible that some of the difficulty in explaining the variation and 
thus the low Adjusted R
2
 values in the final models may be attributable to measurement 
errors, such as violation of assumptions of normality, lack of proper transformations, and 
extreme outliers. Such obstacles linger as limitations to the study.
  
REFERENCES 
  222 
REFERENCES 
 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. (2007). Clinical classification systems 
(CCS) for ICD-10-CM fact sheet. Retrieved September 20, 2009, from 
http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/toolssoftware/ccs/ccsfactsheet.jsp. 
 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. (2007). HCUP facts and figures 2007: 
Statistics on hospital-based care in the United States. Retrieved December 23, 
2009. 
 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. (2007). HCUP quality control procedures. 
Retrieved June 7, 2009, from http://www.ahrq.gov/data/hcup:http:www.hcup-
us.ahrq.govtoolssoftware/ccs/ccs.jsp. 
 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. (2007). Healthcare cost and utilization 
project (HCUP) state inpatient databases (SID). Retrieved October 24, 2009, 
from http://www.hcup.us.ahrq.gov/toolssoftware/ccs/ccsfactsheet.jsp. 
 
Ain, S. (2002, August 4). After lean years, a hospital boomlet. The New York Times. 
Retrieved January 31, 2009, from http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage. 
html?res=9A05E6D6123BF937A3575BC0A964C8.html 
 
Albert, T. C., Johnson, E., Gasperino, D., & Tokatli, P. (2003). Planning for the baby 
boomers‘ healthcare needs: A case study. Journal of Hospital Marketing and 
Public Relations, 15(1), 77-88. 
 
Alison, G. T. (1971). Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban missile crisis (1st ed.), 
New York: Little, Brown. 
 
Alpha Center for Healthcare Planning. (1997, June 1). Hospital mergers reduce acute 
care beds but overcapacity remains an issue. Healthcare Financing and 
Organization Findings Brief. Washington, DC. 
 
American Community Survey and FactFinder, U.S. Census Bureau. Retrieved October 
18, 2009, from http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html?_lang=en. 
 
American Hospital Association. (2007). Trends. Retrieved December 12, 2008, from 
http://www.aha.org/aha/research-and-trends/chartbook/2007chartbook.html.
  
223 
American Hospital Association. (2008). Hospital statistics. Chicago American Hospital 
Association. (2009). Fast facts on U.S. hospitals fact sheet. Retrieved October 27, 
2009, from http://www.aha.org/aha/content2007/pdf/ fastfacts2007/pdf. 
 
American Hospital Association. (2009). Uncompensated hospital care cost fact sheet 
November 2009. Retrieved December 26, 2009, from http://www.aha.org/ 
aha/content/2009/pdf/. 
 
American Hospital Association and The Lewin Group. (2005). The costs of caring: 
Sources of growth in spending for hospital care. Retrieved January 17, 2009, 
from http://www.aha.org/aha/content/ 2005/pdf/costsharing.pdf. 
 
Anderson, G., & Horvath, J. (2004). The growing burden of chronic disease in America. 
Public Health Reports of the Bloomberg School of Public Health at Johns 
Hopkins University, 119, 263-269. 
 
Anderson, O. W. (1990). Health services as a growth enterprise in the United States 
since 1875. Ann Arbor, MI: Health Administration Press. 
 
Andrews, R. M. (September 2008). The national hospital bill: The most expensive 
conditions by payer, 2006. HCUP Statistical Brief #59. Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality, Rockville, MD. Retrieved November 17, 2009, from 
http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb59.pdf. 
 
Ansoff, H. I. (1965). Corporate strategy: An analytic approach to business policy for 
growth and expansion. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Astley, W. G., & Sachdeva, P. S. (1984). Structural sources of intraorganizational power: 
A theoretical synthesis. Academy of Management Review, 9, 104-113. 
 
Baker, L. C. (2001). Measuring competition in health care markets. Health Services 
Research, 36(1, Pt 2), 223-251. 
 
Bain, J. S., & Qualls, D. (1987). Industrial organization: A Treatise. Greenwich, CT: JAI 
Press. 
 
Barer, M. L. (1982). Casemix adjustment in hospital cost analysis: Information theory 
revisited. Journal of Health Economics, 1, 53-80. 
 
Barnard, C. I. (1938). The functions of the executive. Boston: Harvard University Press. 
 
Barney, J. B. (1986). Organizational culture: Can it be a source of sustained competitive 
advantage? Academy of Management Review, 11, 656-665. 
  
224 
Barney, J. B. (1986). Types of competition and the theory of strategy: Toward an 
integrative framework. Academy of Management Review, 11, 791-800. 
 
Barney, J. B. (1991). Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of 
Management, 17, 99-120. 
 
Barney, J. B. (1991). The resource based view of strategy: Origins, implications, and 
prospects. Editorial to Special Theory Forum. Journal of Management, 17, 197-
211. 
 
Barney, J. B., & Clark, D. N. (2007). Resource-based theory creating and sustaining 
competitive advantage. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. 
 
Basu, J., & Mobley, L. R. (2010). Impact of local resources on hospitalization patterns of 
Medicare beneficiaries and propensity to travel outside of local markets. Journal 
of Rural Health, 26, 20-29. 
 
Baumgardner, J. R., & Marder, W. D. (1991). Specialization among obstetricians/ 
gynecologists: Another dimension of physician supply. Journal of Medical Care, 
29, 272-285. 
 
Begg, C. B., Cramer, L. D., Hoskins, W. J., & Brennan, M. F. (1998). Impact of hospital 
volume on operative mortality for major cancer surgery. Journal of the American 
Medical Association, 280, 1747-1751. 
 
Berenson, R. A., Bodenheimer, T., & Pham, H. H. (2006). Specialty-service lines: Salvos 
in the new medical arms race. Health Affairs Web Exclusive. Retrieved 
November 22, 2008, from http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/25/5/w337. 
 
Berenson, R. A., Ginsburg, P. B., & May, J. H. (2006). Hospital-physician relations:  
Cooperation, competition, or separation? Health Affairs Web Exclusive. 
Retrieved November 17, 2009, from http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/ 
abstract/26/1/w31?siteid=healthaff&ijkey. 
 
Berenson, R. A., & Horvath, J. (2003). Confronting the barriers to chronic care 
management in Medicare. Health Affairs Web Exclusive. Retrieved November 
28, 2008, from http://content.healthaffiars.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w3.37 
vl/DC1. 
 
Birkmeyer, J. D. (2000). Should we regionalize major surgery? Potential benefits and 
policy considerations. Journal of the American College of Surgeons, 190, 341-
349.  
 
  
225 
Birkmeyer, J. D., & Dimick, J. B. (2004). Potential benefits of the 2003 Leapfrog 
standards: Effect of process and outcomes measures. Surgery, 135, 569-575. 
 
Birkmeyer, J. D., Siewers, A. E., Finlayson, E. V., Stukel, T. A., Lucas, F. L, Batista, I., 
et al. (2002). Hospital volume and surgical mortality in the United States. The 
New England Journal of Medicine, 346, 1128-1130. 
 
Birkmeyer, J. D., Stukel, T. A., Siewers, A. E., Goodney, P. P., Wennberg, D. E., Lucas, 
F. L., et al. (2003). Surgeon volume and operative mortality in the United States. 
New England Journal of Medicine, 349, 2117-2127. 
 
Birkmeyer, J. J. (2004). Understanding surgeon performance and improving patient 
outcomes. Journal of Clinical Oncology, 22, 2765-2766.  
 
Blumberg, M. S. (1979, June). Changing the behavior of the physician: A management 
perspective. Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual Symposium on Hospital 
Affairs. Graduate Program in Hospital Administration and Center for Health 
Administration Studies, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago. 
 
Bower, J. L. (1970). Managing the resource allocation process: A study of planning and 
investment. Unpublished manuscript, Harvard University Graduate School of 
Business, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Bower, J. L., & Christensen, C. M. (1995). Disruptive technologies: Catching the wave. 
Harvard Business Review, 73(3), 172. 
 
Brooks, R. G., Stern, J. S., Waldrip, D. R., & Hale, P. D. (1999). Definitive studies of 
magnet schools: Voices of public school choice. Washington, DC: Magnet 
Schools of America. 
 
Brahmajee, K. (2006). Relation between hospital specialization with primary 
percutaneous coronary intervention and clinical outcomes in ST-segment 
elevation myocardial infarction. Circulation, 113, 222-229. 
 
Burgelman, R. (1980). Managing innovating systems: A study in the process of internal 
corporate venturing. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Columbia University 
Graduate School of Business, New York. 
 
Burns, T., & Stalker, G. M. (1961). The management of innovation. London: Tavistock. 
 
Buzzell, R., & Gale, B. (2002). The PIMS principles: Linking strategy to performance. 
New York: Free Press. 
 
  
226 
Canavos, G. C., & Miller, D. M. (1999). An introduction to modern business statistics 
(2nd ed.). Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company. 
 
Carey, K., Burgess, J. F., & Young, G. J. (2008). Specialty and full-service hospitals: A 
comparative cost analysis. Health Services Research, 43, 1869-1887. 
 
Carr, W. J., & Feldstein, P. J. (1967). The relationship of cost to hospital size. Inquiry, 4, 
45. 
 
Carroll, G. R., & Hannan, M. T. (2000). The demography of corporations and industries. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Casalino, L. P., November, E. A., Berenson, R. A., & Pham, H. H. (2008). Hospital-
physician relations: Two traces and the decline of the voluntary medical staff 
model. Health  Affairs, 27, 1305-1314. 
 
Casey, M. M., & Moscovice, I. (2004). Quality improvement strategies and best practices 
in critical access hospitals. Journal of Rural Health, 20, 327-334. 
 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. (2008). Electronic billing and EDI 
transactions. Retrieved May 10, 2008, from http://www.cms.hhs.gov/ 
electronicbillingEDITrans/151450.asp. 
 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. (2008). Medicare severity diagnosis related 
groups. Retrieved February 28, 2010, from http://www.medical.philips.com/ 
pwc_hc/us_en/about/Reimbursement/assets/docs/news/CMSInpatientrule09factsh
eet.pdf. 
 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. (2009). ICD-10-CM. Retrieved October 31, 
2009, from http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/icd/icd10cm.htm. 
 
Chandler, A. D., Jr. (1962). Strategy and structure: Chapters in the history of industrial 
enterprise. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
 
Chattopadhyay, A., & Bindman, A. B. (2005). Accuracy of Medicaid payer coding in 
hospital patient discharge data: implications for Medicaid policy evaluation. 
Journal of Medical Care, 43(6), 586-591. 
 
Chen C.C., & Cheng, S. H. (in press). Hospital competition and patient-perceived quality 
of care: evidence from a single-payer system in Taiwan. Health Policy. 
 
Christian, C. K., Gustafson, M. L., Betensky, R. A., Daley, J., & Zinner, M. J. (2005).  
The volume-outcome relationship: Don‘t believe everything you see. World 
Journal of Surgery, 29, 1241-1244.   
  
227 
 
Clement, J. P., McCue, M. J., Luke, R. D., Bramble, J. D., Rossiter, L. F, Ozcan, Y. A., et 
al. (1997). Strategic hospital alliances: Impact on financial performance. Health 
Affairs, 16, 193-203. 
 
Committee on Quality of Healthcare in America, Institute of Medicine. (2001). Crossing 
the quality chasm: A new health system for the 21st century. Washington, DC:  
National Academy Press.  
 
Committee on the Costs of Medical Care. (1932). Final report: Medical care for the 
American people. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
The Comparative performance of U.S. hospitals: The sourcebook (1997). Baltimore, MD: 
Health Care Industries Association (HCIA) and Deloitte & Touche. 
 
Conrad, D. A., & Shortell, S. M. (1993, Fall). Integrated health systems: Promise and 
performance. Frontiers of Health Services Management, 13, 3-42. 
 
Cuellar, A. E., & Gertler, P. J. (2003). Trends in hospital consolidation: The formation of 
local systems. Health Affairs, 22, 77-87. 
 
Cuellar, A. E., & Gertler, P. J. (2005). How the expansion of hospital systems has 
affected consumers. Health Affairs, 24, 213-219.  
 
Cutler, D. M., & Horwitz, J. R. (August, 1998). Converting hospitals from not-for profit 
to for-profit status: Why and what effects? Working paper W6672. Washington, 
DC: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Dayhoff, D. A., & Cromwell, J. (1993). Measuring differences and similarities in hospital 
caseloads: A conceptual and empirical analysis. Health Services Research, 28, 
293-312. 
 
Dean, N. C., Silver, M. P., & Bateman, K. A. (2000). Frequency of subspecialty 
physician care for elderly patients with community-acquired pneumonia. Chest, 
117, 393-397. 
 
Deming, W. E. (1982). Out of the crisis: Quality, productivity, and competitive position. 
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Desai, H. B., & Margenthaler, C. R. (1987). A framework for developing hospital 
strategies. Hospital & Health Services Administration, 32, 235-248. 
 
  
228 
Devers, K. J., Brewster, L. R., & Casalino, L. P. (2003). Changes in hospital competitive 
strategy: A new medical arms race? Health Services Research, 38(1, Pt 2), 447-
469. 
 
Dimick, J. B., & Birkmeyer, J. D. (2008). Ranking hospitals on surgical quality: Does 
risk-adjustment always matter? Journal of the American College of Surgeons, 
207(3), 347-351. 
 
Dimick, J. B., Birkmeyer, J. D., & Upchurch, G. R. (2005). Measuring surgical quality: 
What‘s the role of provider volume. World Journal of Surgery, 29, 1217-1221. 
 
Douglas, T. J., & Ryman, J. A. (2003). Understanding competitive advantage in the 
general hospital industry: evaluating strategic competencies. Strategic 
Management Journal, 24, 333-347. 
 
Dranove, D., Shanley, M., & Simon, C. (1992). Is hospital competition wasteful? The 
RAND Corporation Journal, 23, 247-262. 
 
Dranove, D., & White, W. D. (1989, December). Changes in hospital market share under 
the Medicare prospective payment system. Working paper presented at the 
American Economic Association meeting, Atlanta, GA. 
 
Dranove, D., & White, W. D. (1996). Specialization, option demand, and the pricing of 
medical specialists. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 5, 277-306. 
 
Drucker, P. F. (1954). The practice of management. New York:  Harper and Row. 
 
Drucker, P. F. (1963). Managing for business effectiveness. Harvard Business Review, 3, 
59. 
 
Eastaugh, S. R. (1992). Hospital specialization and cost efficiency: Benefits of trimming 
product lines. Hospital & Health Services Administration, 37, 223-235. 
 
Edwards, M., Miller, J. D., & Schumacher, R. (1972). Classification of community 
hospitals by scope of service: Four indexes. Health Services Research, 23, 301-
313. 
 
Eggli, Y., Halfon, P., Meylan, D., & Taffé, P. (2010). Surgical safety and hospital volume 
across a wide range of interventions. Medical Care. Retrieved September 8, 2010, 
from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20829722. 
 
Emerson, R., & Cook, K. (1978). Power, equity, and commitment in exchange networks.  
American Sociological Review, 43, 721. 
 
  
229 
Epstein, A. M. (2002). Volume and outcomes – is it time to move ahead? New England 
Journal of Medicine, 346, 1161-1164. 
 
Evans, R. G., & Walker, H. D. (1972). Information theory and the analysis of hospital 
cost structure. Canadian Journal of Economics, 5, 398-418. 
 
Every, N. R., Frederick, P. D., Robinson, M., Sugarman, J., Bowlby, L., &, Barron, H.V.  
(1999). A comparison of the national registry of myocardial infarction (NRMI). 
Circulation, 111, 761-767. 
 
Families USA. (2008). Premiums versus paychecks: A growing burden for workers. 
Retrieved November 9, 2008, from 
http://www.familiesusa.org/resources/publications/report/premiums-vs-
paychecks-2008.html. 
 
Farley, D. E. (1989). Measuring case-mix specialization in the market for hospital 
services. Health Services Research, 8, 185-207. 
 
Farley, D. E., & Hogan, C. (1990). Case-mix specialization in the market for hospital 
services. Health Services Research, 25, 757-782. 
 
Fennell, M. L. (1980). The effects of environmental characteristics on the structure of 
hospital clusters. Administrative Science Quarterly, 25, 485-510. 
 
Fennel, M. L. (1982). Contest in organization groups: The case of hospital clusters. 
Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 23, 65-84. 
 
Fink, A., Sieu, A. L., Brook, R. H., Park, R. E., & Solomon, D. H. (1987). Assuring the 
quality of healthcare for older persons: An expert panel‘s priorities. Journal of the 
American Medical Association, 258, 1905-1908. 
 
Fleishman, J. A., Gebo, K. A., Reilly, E. D., Conviser, R., Christopher, M. W., Todd, K. 
P., et al. (2005). Hospital and outpatient health services utilization among HIV-
infected adults in care 2000-2002. HIV Research Network, 43(9 Supplement), III, 
40-52. 
 
Foster, D. (2009). Top cardiovascular care means greater clinical and financial value. 
Research Brief of Thomson Reuters™ Center for Healthcare Improvement. 
Retrieved on November 16, 2009, from http://img.en25.com/Web/Thomson 
Reuters/Cardio%20research%20brief%20v2.pdf. 
 
Foundation for Accountability (2001). Portrait of the chronically ill in America 2001. 
Portland, OR and Princeton, NJ: The Foundation for Accountability and The 
Robert Woods Johnson Foundation. 
  
230 
Fox, J. (1991). Regression diagnostics. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
Fox, J. (May, 2002). Linear mixed models: Appendix to an R and S-Plus companion to 
applied regression. Retrieved April 4, 2010, from http://cran.r-project.org/doc/ 
contrib/Fox-Companion/appendix-mixed-models.pdf. 
  
Friedenberg, R. M. (1996). Future physician requirements: Generalists and specialists–
Shortage or surplus? Radiology 200, 45A-47A. 
 
Frogel, M., Nerwen, C., Cohen, A., VanVeldhuisen, P., Harrington, M., Boron, M., & 
Palivizumab Outcomes Registry Group (2008). Prevention of hospitalization due 
to respiratory syncytial virus: Results from the Palivizumab Outcomes Registry. 
Journal of Perinatology, 28, 511-517. 
 
Furumoto, H. H. (1983). Group practice: Trend for the future. Veterinary Clinics of North 
America: Small Animal Practice, 13(4), 791-809. 
 
Fuss, S. (2009). Measuring poverty in the U.S. Retrieved on November 13, 2009, from 
http://www.nccp.org/publications/pub_876.html. 
 
Galvin, R., & Milstein, A. (2000). Large employers‘ new strategies in health care. New 
England Journal of Medicine, 347, 939-942. 
 
Girotra, S., X, L., Popescu, I., Vaughan-Sarrazin, M., Horwitz, P. A., & Cram, P. (2010). 
The impact of hospital cardiac specialization on outcomes after coronary artery 
bypass graft surgery: Analysis of medicare claims data. Circulation: 
Cardiovascular Quality and Outcomes. Retrieved ahead of print on October 18, 
2010, from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20923993. 
 
Glance, L. G., Dick, A. W., Mukamel, D. B., & Osler, T. M. (2007). Are high-quality 
cardiac surgeons less likely to operate on high-risk patients compared to low-
quality surgeons? Evidence from New York State. Health Services Research, 43 
(1, Pt 1), 300-312. 
 
Gold, R. B., & Kenney, A.M. (1985). Paying for maternity care. Family Planning 
Perspectives, 17(3), 103-111. 
 
Goshima, K. R., Mills, J. L., Awari, K., Pike, S. L., & Hughes, J. D. (2008). Measure 
what matters: Institutional outcome data are superior to the use of surrogate 
markets to define center of excellence for abdominal aortic aneurysm repair. 
Annals of Vascular Surgery, 22, 328-334. 
 
  
231 
Greenwald, L., Cromwell, J., Adamache, W., Bernard, S., Drozd, E., Root, E. et al. 
(2006). Specialty versus community hospitals: Referrals, quality, and community 
benefits. Health Affairs, 25, 106-118. 
 
Grilli, R. (2001). Specialization and cancer: Words with too many meanings should be 
handled with care. Journal of the Canadian Medical Association, 164, 210. 
 
Green, S. B. (1991). How many subjects does it take to do a regression analysis? 
Multivariate Behavioral Research, 26, 449-510. 
 
Gresenz, C. R., Rogowski, J., & Escarce, J. J. (2004). Updated variable-radius measures 
of hospital competition. Health Services Research, 39, 417-430. 
 
Grote, K. D., Levine, E. H., & Mango, P. D. (2006). U.S. hospitals for the 21st century. 
The McKinsey Quarterly. Web Exclusive. Retrieved on November 28, 2008, from 
http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/links/22705. 
 
Gu, T. (2005). Service specialization strategy in system affiliated hospitals. Doctoral 
dissertation, Virginia Commonwealth University, 1997. Retrieved from 
http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.library.vcu.edu/pqdlink?Ver=1&Exp=03-21-
2014&FMT=7&DID=888853341&RQT=309&attempt=1&cfc=1 
 
Guillory, V. J., Samuels, M. E., Probst, J. C., & Sharp, G. (2003, May). Prenatal care and 
infant birth outcomes among Medicaid recipients. Journal of Health Care for the 
Poor and Underserved, 14(2), 272-289. 
 
Haglund, C. L., & Dowling, W. L. (1993). The hospital. In S. J. Williams & P. R. Torrens 
(Eds.), Introduction to health services (pp. 135-176). New York: Delmar 
Publishers. 
 
Hair, J. F., Anderson, R., Tatham, R. L, & Black, W. C. (2006). Multivariate data 
analysis. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
 
Halm, E. A., Lee, C., & Chassin, M. R. (2002). Is volume related to outcome in health 
care? A systematic review and methodologic critique of the literature. Annals of 
Internal Medicine, 137, 511-520. 
 
Hamel, G. (2002). Leading the revolution. New York: Penguin Books. 
 
Hamel, G., & Prahalad, C. K. (1990). The core competence of the corporation. Harvard 
Business Review, 68(3), 79-91. 
 
  
232 
Hammon, J. L., & Davis, T. L. (1989). Service line concept gaining strength—hospital 
service lines. Physician Executive. Retrieved June 11, 2008, from 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0843/is_n3_v15/ai_8134739. 
 
Hannan, E. L., Wu, C., Walford, G., King, S. B., Holmes, D. R., Ambrose, J. A. et al. 
(2005). Volume outcome relationships for percutaneous coronary interventions in 
the stent era. Circulation, 112, 1171-1179. 
 
Hannan, M. T., & Freeman, J. (1989). Organization ecology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Harmon, J. W., Tang, D. G., Gordon, T. A., Bowman, H. M., Choti, M. A., Kaufman, H. 
S. et al. (1999). Hospital volume can serve as a surrogate for surgeon volume for 
achieving excellent outcomes in colorectal resection. Annals of Surgery, 230, 404-
413.  
 
Health, United States 2007. (2008). U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 
Retrieved September 20, 2008, from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/ 
bv.fcgi?=healthus 07.chapter45. 
 
Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP). (2008). State inpatient databases (SID). 
Retrieved September 20, 2008, from http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/ 
toolssoftware/ccs/ccsfact sheet.jsp.  
 
Hedberg, B., & Jönsson, S. A. (1977). Strategy formulation as a discontinuous process. 
International Studies of Management and Organization, 7, 88-109. 
 
Henry Ford Changes the World, 1908. (2005). Retrieved April 19, 2008, from 
http://www.eyewitnesstohistory.com/pfford.htm. 
 
Homans, G. C. (1958). Social behavior as exchange. American Journal of Sociology, 63 
(6), 597-606. 
 
Horwitz, J. R. (2007). Does nonprofit ownership matter? Yale Journal on Regulation, 24, 
139-205. 
 
Hoskisson, R. E., Hitt, M. A., Wan, W. P., & Yiu, D. (1999). Theory and research in 
strategic management: Swings of a pendulum. Journal of Management, 25, 417-
420. 
 
Hulley, S. B., Cummings, S. R., Browner, W. S., Grady, D. G., & Newman, T. B.  (2007). 
Designing clinical research (3rd ed.). Philadelphia: Lippincott, Williams & 
Wilkins. 
 
  
233 
Institute of Medicine. (1999). Crossing the quality chasm. Washington, DC: National 
Academy Press. 
 
Institute of Medicine. (1999). To err is human: Building a safer health care system. 
Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 
 
Isenberg, D. J. (1984). How senior managers think? Harvard Business Review, 6, 81-90. 
 
Isenberg, D. J. (1986). Thinking and managing: A verbal protocol analysis of managerial 
problem solving. The Academy of Management Journal, 29(4), 775-788. 
 
Itani, H., & Roehl, T. W. (1987). Mobilizing invisible assets. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
The Joint Commission. (2008). Health care at the crossroads: Guiding principles for the 
development of the hospital of the future. Retrieved November 20, 2008, from 
http://www.jointcommission.org/NR/rdonlyres/1C9A7079-7A29-4658-B80D-
A7DF8771309B/0/Hospital_Future.pdf. 
 
Kahn, J. M., Ten Have, T. R., & Iwashyna, T. J. (2009). The relationship between 
hospital volume and mortality in mechanical ventilation: An instrumental variable 
analysis. Health Services Research, 44, 862-879. 
 
Kaiser Family Foundation. (2007). Total number of hospitals, 1999 through 2005. State 
Health  Facts Online. Retrieved October 3, 2007, from http://www.state 
healthfacts.org. 
 
Konety, B. R., Allareddy, V., Modak, S., & Smith, B. (2006). Mortality after major 
surgery for urologic cancers in specialized urology hospitals: Are they any better?  
Journal of Clinical Oncology, 24, 2006-2012. 
 
Kotler, P. (1967). Marketing management. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
 
Kovacic, W. E., & Smallwood, D. E. (1994). Competition policy, rivalries, and defense 
industry consolidation. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8, 91-100. 
 
Kumbhani, D. J., Cannon, C. P., Fonarow, G. C., Liang, L., Askari, A. T., Peacock, W. F. 
et al. (2009). Association of hospital primary angioplasty volume in ST-segment 
elevation myocardial infarction with quality and outcomes. Journal of the 
American Medical Association, 302(20), 2007-2213. 
 
Lake, T., Devers, K., Brewster, L., & Casalino, L. (2003). Something old, something 
new: Recent developments in hospital-physician relationships. Health Services 
Research, 38(1, Pt 2), 471-488. 
  
234 
Lave, J. R., Fine, M. J., Sankey, S. S., Hanusa, B. H., Weissfeld, L. A., & Kapoor, W. N. 
(1996). Hospitalized pneumonia: Outcomes, treatment patterns, and costs in urban 
and rural areas. Journal of General Internal Medicine, 11(7), 415-421. 
 
Lawrence, P. R., & Lorsch, J. W. (1967). Differentiation and integration in complex 
organizations. Administration Science Quarterly, 12, 1-30. 
 
Lawrence, P. R., & Lorsch, J. W. (1969). Organization and environment. Homewood, IL:  
Richard D. Irwin, Inc.  
 
Leander, W. J. (1993). Product line management: Formalizing clinical product lines as 
part of  patient focused restructuring. Review of the Patient Focus Care 
Association, Winter, 2-5.  
 
The Leapfrog Group. (2000). The Leapfrog Group for patient safety rewarding higher 
standards. Retrieved November 17, 2007, from http://www.leapfroggroup.org/ 
toolkit.htm. 
 
The Leapfrog Group News Archive (2006, October 16). Fifty-nine hospitals named to 
first-ever leapfrog top hospitals list. Retrieved April 11, 2008, from 
http://www.leapfroggroup.org/news/leapfrognews/3274959. 
 
The Leapfrog Group News Archive (2009, December 3). Announcing top 2009 hospitals. 
Retrieved December 4, 2009, from http://www.leapfroggroup.org/ 
news/leapfrog_news/4768932?o4750968=. 
 
Lindblom, C. (1959). The science of muddling through. Public Administration Review, 
19(2), 79 - 81. 
Littell, R. C., Milliken, G. A., Stroup, W. W., Wolfinger, R. D., & Schabenberger, O. 
SAS for mixed models (3rd ed.). Cary, NC:  SAS Institute Inc. 
 
Liu, H., & Sharma, R. (2002). Access to health care: Medicare beneficiaries under age 
65. Academy of Health Services Research Healthy Policy Meeting Abstract, 19, 
13. 
 
Luft, H. S., Bunker, J. P., & Enthoven, A. C. (1979). Should operations be regionalized? 
The empirical relation between surgical volume and mortality. New England 
Journal of Medicine, 301, 1364-1369. 
 
Luke, R. D. (2010). System transformation: USA and international strategies in 
healthcare organization and policy. International Journal of Public Policy, 5, 190- 
203. 
 
  
235 
Luke, R. D., Luke, T. M., & Muller, N. (in press). Distributing high-risk cases within 
urban hospital clusters. Health Affairs.  
 
Luke, R. D., Ozcan, Y. A., & Olden, P. C. (1995). Local markets and systems: Hospital 
consolidations in metropolitan areas. Health Services Research, 30, 553-575. 
 
Luke, R. D., Walston, S. L., & Plummer, P. M. (2004). Healthcare strategy in pursuit of 
competitive advantage. Chicago:  Foundation of the American College of 
Healthcare Executives. 
 
March, J. G., & Simon, H. A. (1958). Organizations. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Martensen, R. L. (1996). Hospital hotels and the care of the ‗worthy rich.‘ Journal of the 
American Medical Association, 275, 325. 
 
McCarthy, M., Datta, P., Sherlaw-Johnson, C., Coleman, M., & Rachet, B. (2008). Is the 
performance of cancer services influenced more by hospital factors or by 
specialization? Journal of Public Health (Oxford), 30, 69-74. 
 
McClelland, D. C. (1953). The achievement motive. New York: Appleton, Century, Croft 
Publishers. 
 
McCue, M. J., Clement, J. P., & Luke, R. D. (1999). Strategic hospital alliance: Do the 
type and market structure of strategic hospital alliance matter? Medicare Care, 
37, 1013-1022. 
 
McDonald, J. H. (2009). Handbook of biological statistics (2nd ed.). Baltimore, MD:  
Sparky House Publishing. 
 
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission. (2005, March). Physician-owned specialty 
hospitals. Retrieved October 18, 2009, from http://www.medpac.gov/documents/ 
Mar05SpecHospitals.pdf. 
 
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission. (2006, August). Physician-owned specialty 
hospitals revisited. Retrieved October 18, 2009, from http://www.medpac.gov/ 
documents/Aug06specialtyhospital_mandated_report.pdf. 
 
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission. (2007, March). Acute inpatient services. 
Retrieved October 18, 2009, from http://www.medpac.gov/documents/ Mar07_ 
EntireReport.pdf. 
 
Milstein, A. (2005). Hospital referrals. Health Affairs, 24, 887.  
 
  
236 
Milstein, A., Galvin, R. S., Delbanco, S. F., Salber, P., & Buck, C. R. (2000). Improving 
the safety of healthcare: The Leapfrog initiative. Effective Clinical Practice. 
Retrieved December 2, 2007, from http://www.acponline.org/journals/ecp/ 
novdec00/milstein.htm. 
 
Mintzberg, H., Ahlstrand, B., & Lampel, J. (1998). A guided tour through the wilds of 
strategic management. New York: The Free Press. 
 
Mintzberg, H., & Lampel, J. (1999). Reflecting on the strategy process. [Electronic 
version]. Sloan Management Review, 40. Retrieved April 11, 2008, from 
http://www.imese.gr/  courses/STRPROCESS.doc. 
 
Moscucci, M., Share, D., O‘Donnell, M. J., McNamara, R., Lalonde, T., Defranco, A. C. 
et al., (2005). Relationship between operator volume and adverse outcome in 
contemporary percutaneous coronary intervention practice: an analysis of a 
quality-controlled multicenter percutaneous coronary intervention clinical 
database. Journal of the American College of Cardiology, 46, 625-632. 
 
Moses, H., Thier, S. O., & Matheson, D. H. M. (2005). Why have academic medical 
centers survived? Journal of the American Medical Association, 293, 1495-1500. 
 
Murin, S. (2005). Leapfrog: Is this initiative a prince? University of California at Davis 
School of Medicine. Retrieved October 28, 2007, from http://www.thoracic.org/ 
sections/chapters/thoracic-society-chapters/ca/current-news/resources/ CTS_ 
Leapfrog2.pdf. 
 
Nackel, J. G., & Kues, I. W. (1986). Product line management: Systems and strategies, 
Hospital & Health Services Administration, 31, 109-123. 
 
Nakamura, S., Capps, C., & Dranove, D. (2007). Patient admission patterns and 
acquisition of feeder hospitals. Economic Analysis Group, Baker Institute for 
Public Policy, Rice University. Retrieved December 26, 2008, from 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/eag/221240.htm.  
 
Nathan H., Cameron, J. L., Choti, M. A., Schulick, R. D., Pawlik, T. M. (2009). The 
volume-outcomes effect in hepato-pancreato-biliary surgery: Hospital versus 
surgeon contributions and specificity of the relationship. Journal of the American 
College of Surgeons, 208(4), 528-538. 
 
National Center for Health Statistics (2008). Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 
Retrieved on August 1, 2008, from http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/. 
 
Newhouse, J., & McClellan, M. (1998). Econometrics in outcomes research: the use of 
instrumental variables. Annals of Research in Public Health, 19, 17-34. 
  
237 
Normann, R., (1977). Management for growth. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Ohmae, K. (1982). The mind of the strategist. New York: McGraw Hill. 
 
Onega, T., Duell, E. J., Shi, X., Wang, D., Demidenko, E., & Goodman, D. C. (2008). 
Geographic access to cancer care in the United States. Cancer, 112, 909-918. 
 
Ormond, B. A., & Bovbjerg, R. R. (1998). The changing hospital sector in Washington, 
DC: Implications for the poor. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. 
 
Ouchi, W. G. (1980). Markets, bureaucracies, and clans. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 24, 129-141. 
 
Pascale, R. T., & Athos, A. G. (1981). The art of Japanese management: Applications for 
American executives. New York: Warner Books. 
 
Pear, R. (2008, April 7). Researchers find huge variations in end-of-life treatment. The 
New York Times. Retrieved November 10, 2008, from http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2008/04/07/health/policy/07care.html.r=2&sq=april%207,%202008&oref=slogin. 
 
Penrose, E. T. (1959). The theory of growth of the firm. New York: Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
 
Perrow, C. (1967). A framework for the comparative analysis of organizations. American 
Sociological Review, 32, 194-208. 
 
Peterson, E. D., Coombs, L. P., DeLong, E. R., Haan, C. K., & Ferguson, T. B. (2004).  
Procedural volume as a marker of quality for CABG surgery. Journal of the 
American Medical Association, 291, 195-201. 
 
Peterson, E. D., Shah, B. R., Parson, L., Pollack, J., French, W. J., Canto, J. G. et al.  
(2008). Trends in quality of care for patients with acute myocardial infarction in 
the National Registry of Myocardial Infarction from 1990 to 2006. American 
Heart Journal, 156(6), 1045-1055. 
 
Pfeffer, J. (1982). Organizations and organization theory. Marshfield, MA: Pitman Press. 
 
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (1978). The external control of organizations: A resource 
dependence perspective. New York: Harper and Row. 
 
Phibbs, C. S., & Robinson, J. C. (1993). A variable-radius measure of local hospital 
market structure. Health Services Research, 28, 313-324. 
 
Polit, D. F., & Beck, C. T. (2004). Nursing research: Principles and methods (7th ed.). 
Philadelphia: Lippincott, Williams & Wilkins.  
  
238 
Porter, M. E. (1980). Competitive strategy: Techniques for analyzing industries and 
companies. New York: The Free Press.  
 
Porter, M. E. (1985). Competitive advantage: Creating and sustaining superior 
performance. New York: The Free Press.  
 
Porter, M. E. (1998). Michael E. Porter on competition. Boston: Harvard Business 
School Press. 
 
Porter, M. E., & Teisberg, E. O. (2006). Redefining healthcare: Creating value-based 
competition on results. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Prahalad, C. K., & Hamel, G. (1990). The core competence of the corporation. Harvard 
Business Review, 68, 79-91. 
 
Quality Care Nevada. (2009). Hospitals and health systems. Retrieved October 14, 2009, 
from http://www.qualitycarenevada.org/ index.asp? Type=B_BASIC&SEC= 
{7707D6CB-3079-4EF0-A9D6-B81FB8D31E7F}. 
 
Raffel, M. W. (1980). The U.S. health system: Origins and functions. New York: John 
Wiley and Sons. 
 
Rakich, J. S., Beaufort, B., & Longest, K. D. (1992). Managing health services 
organizations (3rd ed.). Baltimore, MD: Health Professionals Press. 
 
Rhenman, E. (1973). Organization theory for long range planning. London: John Wiley 
& Sons. 
 
Ricciardi, R. R., Virnig, B. A., Ogilvie, J. W., Dahlberg, P. S., Selker, H. P., & Baxter, N. 
N. (2008). Volume-outcome relationship for coronary artery bypass grafting in an 
era of decreasing volume. Archives of Surgery, 143, 338-344. 
 
Rice, T. H., & Labelle, R. J. (1989, Fall). Do physicians induce demand for medical 
services?  Journal of Health Politics, Policy & Law, 587-601. 
 
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. (1996). Chronic care in America: A 21st century 
challenge. Princeton, NJ: Author. 
 
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (2008). Comorbidity and outcomes of coronary artery 
bypass graft surgery at cardiac specialty hospitals versus general hospitals. 
Princeton, NJ: Author. Retrieved December 22, 2008, from 
http://www.rwjf.org/pr/product.jsp?id+23411 &print=true&referer=http%3A 
//www.rwjf.org. 
  
239 
Robeznieks, A. (2008, March 24). Built to last: Healthcare construction spending holding 
up well. Modern Healthcare. Retrieved February 3, 2009, from 
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/apps/ pbcs.dll/article? Date=20080324& 
Category=REG/. 
 
Robeznieks, A. (2008, March 24). Focus on the hospital. Modern Healthcare. Retrieved 
February 3, 2009, from http://www.modernhealthcare.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article? 
Date=20080324& Category= REG/. 
 
Robeznieks, A. (2008, March 24). A speed bump for the building boom: Modern 
Healthcare‘s 29th annual construction & design survey. Modern Healthcare. 
Retrieved February 3, 2009, from http://www.modernhealthcare.com/apps/ 
pbcs.dll/article? Date=20080324& Category=REG/. 
 
Robeznieks, A. (2008, May 26). Site under construction: As a trio of states lower the 
certificate of need barriers to building hospitals, others are studying a variety of 
reforms to promote competition. Modern Healthcare. Retrieved February 3, 2009, 
from http://www.modernhealthcare.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?Date= 
2008526&Category=REG/. 
 
Robinson, J. (1997). Physician-hospital integration and the economic theory of the firm.  
Medical Care Research & Review, 54, 3-24. 
 
Robinson, J., & Luft, H. (1985). The impact of hospital market structure on patient 
volume, average length of stay and the cost of care. Journal of Health Economics, 
4, 333-356. 
 
Roemer, M. I. (1961). Bed supply and hospital utilization: A natural experiment. 
Hospitals, 35, 36-42. 
 
Rundall, T., Starkweather, D., & Norrish, B. (1998). After restructuring: Empowerment 
strategies at work in America’s hospitals. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc. 
 
Sarel, D., Brendaly, R., Marmorstein, H., & Barach, P. (2005). Childbirth choices. 
Marketing Health Services, 25, 14-19. 
 
Scalise, D. (2004). Critical access hospitals. Hospital Health Networks, 78, 51-56. 
 
Schlesinger, M., & Gray, B. H. (2006). How not-for profits matter in American medicine 
and what to do about it. Health Affairs Web Exclusive. Retrieved April 30, 2009, 
from http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/23/6/181. 
 
  
240 
Schneider, J. E., Miller, T. R., Ohsfeldt, R. L, Morrisey, M. A., Zelner, B. A., Li, P. 
(2008). The economics of specialty hospitals. Medical Care Research Review, 65, 
531-563.  
 
Schumpeter, J. A. (1942). Capitalism, socialism, and democracy. New York: Harper & 
Brothers.  
 
Selznick, P. (1957). Leadership in administration: A sociological interpretation. 
Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson Press. 
 
Shapiro, S. S., & Wilk, M. B. (1965). An analysis of variance test for normality 
(complete samples). Biometrika, 52(3-4), 591-611. 
 
Shaver, J. M. (1998). Accounting for endogeneity when assessing strategy performance: 
Does entry mode affect FDI survival? Management Science, 44, 571-585. 
 
Shi, L. (1997). Analyzing hospital market share along product lines. Health Services 
Management Research, 10, 137-145. 
 
Shi, L., & Singh, D. A. (2004). Delivering health care in America: A systems approach 
(3rd ed.). Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett Publishers. 
 
Shortell, S. M., & Kaluzny, A. D. (2000). Organization theory and health services 
management. In S. M Shortell & A. D. Kaluzny (Eds.), Health care management: 
Organization, design, and behavior (4th ed.) (pp. 4-33). Albany, NY: Delmar 
Thomson Learning. 
 
Shortell, S. M., Morrison, E., & Hughes, S. (1989). The keys to successful 
diversification: Lessons from leading hospital systems. Hospital & Health 
Services Administration, 34, 471-492. 
 
Shortell, S. M., & Zajac, E. J. (1990). Health care organizations and the development of 
the strategic management perspective. In S. S. Mick and Associates (Eds.), 
Innovations in health care delivery: Insights for organization theory (pp. 144-
180). Ann Arbor, MI: Health Administration Press. 
 
Skinner, B. F. (1969). Contingencies of reinforcement: A theoretical analysis. New York:  
Appleton Century Crofts. 
 
Skinner, W. (1974). The focused factory. Harvard Business Review, 52, 113-120. 
 
Sloan, F. A. (2000). Not-for profit ownership and hospital behavior. In A. J. Culyer & J. 
P. Newhouse (Eds.), Handbook of health economics (pp. 1141-1174). North-
Holland: Elsevier Science Publishers B. V.   
  
241 
Smithson, K. (2003). VHA study: Physician affiliation biggest factor in consumers‘ 
choice of hospital. Health Care Strategic Management, 21, 4-5. 
 
Sowden, A. J., Deeks, J. J., & Sheldon, T. A. (1995). Volume and outcome in coronary 
artery bypass graft surgery: True association or artifact? British Medical Journal, 
311, 151-155. 
 
Snook, I. D. (1995). Hospital organization and management. In L. F. Wolper (Ed.), 
Health care administration: Principles, practices, structure, and delivery (2nd 
ed.) (pp. 16-31). Gaithersburg, MD: Aspen Publishers, Inc.  
 
Starr, P. (1982). The social transformation of American medicine. New York: Basic 
Books, Inc. 
 
Steel, R. G. D., & Torrie, J. H. (1960). Principles and procedures of statistics. New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Stevens, R. (1971). American medicine and the public interest. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press. 
 
Strach, J. S., & Young, J. (2007, August 6). Inpatient and outpatient growth by service 
line: 2006 Thomson 100 top hospitals performance improvement leaders versus 
peer hospitals. Retrieved upon request of Thomson Health November 22, 2008, 
from http://www.100tophospitals.com/leadership/. 
 
Strunk, B. C., Ginsburg, P. B., & Banker, M. I. (2006). The effect of population aging on 
future hospital demand. Health Affairs, 25, w141-w149. 
 
Succi, M. J., Lee, S. Y. D., & Alexander, J. A. (1997). Effects of market position and 
competition on rural hospital closures. Health Services Research, 31, 679-699. 
 
Surgical Review Corporation. (2007, June 13). Freestanding outstanding bariatric 
surgery centers of excellence full approval application released. Retrieved 
December 28,  2008 from http://www.surgicalreview.org/news_page.aspx?item= 
FreestandingFullRelease 
 
Sutherland, J. M., & Steinum, O. (2009). Hospital factors associated with clinical quality. 
Journal of Health Policy, 91(3), 321-326. 
 
Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2007). Using multivariate statistics (5th ed.). Boston:  
Pearson, Allyn & Bacon. 
 
Taylor, F. W. (1917). The principles of scientific management. New York: Harper & 
Row. 
  
242 
Technical analysis II: Rate of change indicator. (2009). Retrieved February 1, 2009, from 
http://www.incademy.com/courses/Technical-analysis-II/Rate-of-change-
indicator/19/1032/html 
 
Tesch, T., & Levy, A. (2008). Measuring service line success: The new model for 
benchmarking. Healthcare Financial Management, 7, 68-74. 
 
Theil, H. (1967). Economics and information theory. North-Holland: Elsevier Science 
Publishers B.V. 
 
Thompson, J. D. (1967). Organization in action. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Tibaut, J. W., and Kelley, H. H. (1959). The social psychology of groups. New York: 
Wiley & Sons.  
 
Trinh, H. Q., Begun, J. W., & Luke, R. D. (2008). Hospital service duplication: Evidence 
on the medical arms race. Health Care Management Review, 33, 192-202. 
 
Trinh, H. Q., & O‘Connor, S. J. (2002). Helpful or harmful? The impact of strategic 
change on the performance of U. S. urban hospitals. Health Services Research, 
37, 145-171. 
 
Tu, H. T., & Lauer, J. (2008). Word of mouth and physician referrals still drive health 
care provider choice. Washington, DC: Center for Studying Health Change. 
Research Brief No. 9. Retrieved March 23, 2009, from http://www.hscharge. 
com/CONTENT/1028.  
 
Tynan, A., November, R. E., Lauer, J., Pham, H. H., & Cram, P. (2009, April). General 
hospitals, specialty hospitals and financially vulnerable patients. Research Briefs, 
(11), 1-8. 
 
Ulrich, M. R., Brock, D. M., & Ziskind, A. A. (2003). Analysis of trends in coronary 
artery bypass grafting and percutaneous coronary intervention rates in 
Washington state from 1987 to 2001. American Journal of Cardiology, 92, 836-
839. 
 
 Urbach, D. R., & Baxter, N. N. (2004). Does it matter what a hospital is ‗high volume‘ 
for? Specificity of hospital volume-outcome associations for surgical procedures: 
Analysis of administrative data. British Journal of Medicine, 328, 737-740. 
 
U. S. Census Bureau. (2006). Facts for features: Special edition – Oldest baby boomers 
turn 60! Retrieved January 31, 2009, from http://www.census.gov/Press 
Release/www/ releases/archives/factforfeaturesspecialeditions/006105.html. 
  
243 
U. S. Census Bureau. (2008). About metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas. 
Retrieved April 5, 2008, from http://www.census.gov/population/www/estimates/ 
aboutmetro.html. 
 
U. S. Census Bureau. (2008). FactFinder. Retrieved June 12, 2008, from http:// 
factfinder.census.gov/servlet/SAFFFacts?_event=Search&geo_id=01000US&    
geoContext=&street=&_county=&_cityTown=&_state=04000US12&_zip=&    
lang=en&sse=on&ActiveGeoDiv=geoSelect&_useEV=&pctxt=fph&pgsl=010&s
ubmenuId=factsheet1&ds_name=DEC_2000_SAFF&_ci_nbr=null&qr_name= 
null&reg=null%3Anull&keyword=&_industry. 
 
U. S. Census Bureau. (2008). FactFinder – Florida fact sheet. Retrieved February 21, 
2009, from http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSAFFFacts?event=Search 
&geoid=04000US32&geoContext=01000US%7C04000US32&_street=&_county
=&cityTown=&_state=04000US12&_zip=&_lang=en&_sse=on&ActiveGeoDiv=
geoSelect&useEV=&pctxt=fph&pgsl=040&_submenuId=factsheet_1&ds_name=
ACS_2007_3YRSAFF&_ci_nbr=null&qr_name=null&reg=null%3Anull&_keyw
ord=&industry= 
 
U. S. Census Bureau. (2008). FactFinder – Nevada fact sheet. Retrieved February 21, 
2009, from http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSAFFFacts?_even =Search 
&geoid=01000US&_geoContext=01000US%7C04000US51&_street=&_county=
&_cityTown=&_state=04000US32&_zip=&_lang=en&_sse=on&ActiveGeoDiv=
geoSelect&useEV=&pctxt=fph&pgsl=010&_submenuId=factsheet_1&ds_name=
ACS_20073YRSAFF&_ci_nbr=null&qr_name=null&reg=null%3Anull&_  
keyword=&_industry=. 
 
U. S. Census Bureau. (2008). FactFinder – Virginia fact sheet. Retrieved February 21, 
2009, from http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSAFFFacts?_event= 
Search&state=04000US51&_lang=en&_sse=on. 
 
U.S. Census Bureau. (2008). Metropolitan and micropolitan statistical area. Retrieved 
February 19, 2009, from http://www.census.gov/population/www.metroareas 
/aboutmetro.html. 
 
U. S. Census Bureau. (2008). U S. fact sheet. Retrieved October 18, 2009, from http://fact 
finder.census.gov/servlet/GCTTable?_bm=y&-context=gct&-ds_name 
=DEC_2000SF1UCONTEXT=gct&mt_name=DEC_2000_SF1_U_GCTP1_US& 
tree_id=4001&-redoLog=false&-caller=geoselect&-geo_id=&-format=US-
1&lang=en. 
 
Vasu, E. S. (1979). Non-normality in regression analysis: Monte Carlo investigation 
under the condition of multicollinearity. Working papers in Methodology.  
  
244 
Number 9. Chapel Hill: Institute for Research in Social Science, University of 
North Carolina.  
 
Virginia Commonwealth University Office of Research (2007, February 5). VIII-1 Initial 
review – exempt. Retrieved December 8, 2007, from http://www.research 
.vcu.edu.irb/wpp/flash/VIII-1.htm. 
 
Virginia Commonwealth University Office of Research (2007, June 29). Types of IRB 
review. Retrieved December 8, 2007, from http://www.research.vcu.edu/irb/ 
reviewtypes.htm. 
 
Wade, M., & Hulland, J. (2004). The resource-based view and information systems 
research: Review, extension, and suggestions for future research. MIS Quarterly, 
28, 107-142.   
 
Walonick, D. S. (2008). Organizational theory and behavior. Retrieved November 8, 
2008, from http://www.survey-softwaresolutions.com/walonick/organizational-
theory.htm 
 
Westphal, J. D. (2005). Resilient organizations: Matrix model and service line 
management. Journal of Nursing Administration, 35, 414-419. 
 
Wilson, C. T., Fisher, E. S., Welch, H. G., Siewers, A. E., & Lucas, F. Lee (2007). U.S. 
trends in CAGB hospital volume: the effect of adding cardiac surgery programs. 
Health Affairs, 26, 162-168. 
 
Zwanziger, J., & Melnick, G. A. (1988). The effects of hospital competition and the 
Medicare PPS program on hospital cost behavior in California. Journal of Health 
Economics, 7, 301. 
 
Zwanziger, J., Melnick, G. A., & Rahman, A. (1990, March). Differentiation and 
specialization in the California hospital history, 1983-1986. Presented at the 
RAND Conference on Health Economics, Santa Monica, CA. 
 
Zwanziger, J., Melnick, G. A., & Simonson, L. (1996). Differentiation and specialization 
in the California hospital industry 1983 to 1988. Journal of Medical Care, 343, 
361-372.
  
APPENDIX A 
DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS 
  
245 
APPENDIX A 
 
Definition of Key Terms 
 
Defining Community Hospitals 
 
The American Hospital Association defines community hospitals as all non-
Federal, short-term, general, and other specialty hospitals, excluding hospital units of 
other institutions, such as prisons. Government-owned hospitals, such as those under the 
Veteran‘s Administration, are explicitly excluded. Reference to general, community 
hospitals therefore excludes non-Federal, long-term, and specialty hospitals (American 
Hospital Association, 2008). 
Defining Hospital Specialization 
Hospital specialization represents a community hospital‘s focus on one or more 
clinical service lines. This is not a new phenomenon but more a function of strategy, 
branding, and resource allocation. When pursuing specialization in a clinical discipline, a 
hospital may include claims of distinction, using widely publicized terms such as ―center 
of excellence‖ as a symbol of superiority over rivals. Implicit in the concept is some 
element of comparative advantage. The selected measure for measuring and thus 
demonstrating quantitative evidence of specialization for use in this research is an index 
that corresponds to the difference between actual versus Expected Market Share in a 
selected service line.
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Defining Local Market 
Local market will be defined as a Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA), the current 
standard definition issued by the Office of Management and Budget in 2000. It designates 
metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas and is applied to U.S. Census data (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2008). On average nationwide, 93% of a state‘s entire population is 
covered by the data housed for all of its CBSAs, according to the Bureau‘s web-based 
―About Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas.‖ 
Defining Market Share 
Share of market is represented as the quotient derived arithmetically by dividing 
the sum total of a market‘s size into that portion owned or controlled by a single player in 
the market. The sum of percentage shares of all players in a market equals 100%. If there 
is only one player in a market, it is understood to be a monopoly and that player controls 
100% share of the market.  
The boundaries of a market define the size of the market and can be geographical, 
technological, or by other defined borders. In the case of this study, borders of a local 
market are defined in geographical terms as a Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA). The 
market is defined in terms of inpatient case volumes for each diagnostic classification 
being studied. A hospital‘s market share is determined by the percentage of total like 
cases it has treated over the entire year 2006. A federal government classification term 
for a region surrounding an urban center with a population of 10,000 or more, use of 
CBSA has replaced the Metropolitan Service Area (MSA) as the standard for defining a 
local market. 
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Defining Multi-hospital System (MHS) 
Sometimes referred to as a multi-hospital chain, a MHS represents two or more 
hospitals owned, leased, sponsored, or contractually managed by a central organization 
(AHA, 2007). Such affiliations may be among government-owned facilities, such as the 
Veterans‘ Health System of VA hospitals, investor-owned and thus for profit hospitals, or 
not-for profit organizations. They may be short-stay or long-term hospitals, general or 
specialty in nature. Unlike networks or alliances, they are centrally controlled and imply 
financial ownership and binding obligations among entities. 
Defining Service Line 
Researchers have struggled in their analysis of service lines because service lines 
are somewhat loosely defined and vary among institutions. The definition can vary from 
hospital to hospital. A general, community hospital can have as many as 35 service lines. 
They typically reflect the teaching disciplines for medical training and supportive 
hospital services. An example is Labor and Delivery, inclusive of all obstetrical services. 
Ideally, they are managed as profit centers, meaning that they represent domains within a 
hospital receiving patient revenue for services provided and through which expenses for 
payroll, supplies, and other needs are tracked and recorded. Service line management is 
an organizational structure designed to meet customer needs, largely growing out of 
product line management thinking and experience (Westphal, 2005). The Clinical 
Classification Systems (CCS) of HCUP aids in the framing of service lines around 
diagnostic categories and thus selection of highest volume and highest revenue-
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generating service lines targeted for analysis in this study (Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality, 2007).  
Defining Specialty Hospital 
 
Specialty hospitals are typically those treating patients with specific medical 
conditions or those in need of specific medical or surgical procedures. The former 
category, and one more diagnostic in nature, is exemplified by psychiatric care, spinal 
cord rehabilitation, and children‘s care. The latter is procedurally focused. Examples are 
hospitals where only certain procedures are performed such cardiac or orthopedic 
surgery. They represent the essence of niche marketing because of a specialized set of 
services that are provided only to certain types of patients (Rakich, Beaufort, & Longest, 
1992).
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External Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
 
Considered the best measure of competition because it captures relative size of all firms 
competing in a market. 
 
Widely used in a variety of diverse industries as an established, validated instrument. 
 
Represents a value between 0 and 1. The closer the index is to 1, the stronger the 
dominance of a competitor over pricing, negotiating, and thus power in the market. The 
closer the index is to 0, the more the marketplace reflects pure competition among all 
competitors and thus no dominance by any one player. 
 
Derived from the sum of the squared market shares of each individual hospital competing 
in a selected service line in a single market. Examples of calculations are shown below: 
 
Example of high competition: There are 5 hospitals in a market and each has an equal 
share of the total case volume, or 20% share. The HHI = (.20)² + (.20) ² + (.20) ² + (.20) ² 
+ (.20) ² = .200. 
 
Example of a single dominant hospital in a market: There are 5 hospitals in a market. One 
has 80% of the market while the remaining four each have only 5% share. The HHI = 
(.80) ² + (.05) ² + (.05) ² + (.05) ² = (.05) ² = .650. 
 
Example of a market with two players who dominate others but who lack sufficient 
volume to dominate the other: There are 5 hospitals in a market. Two each have 44% 
share. The remaining three hospitals each has only 4% share of market. The HHI = (.44) ² 
+ (.44) ² + (.04) ² + (.04) ² + (.04) ² = .392.
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